Miranda v. Arizona and the debate over criminal suspect rights

Miranda Rights

Miranda

THE PROS AND CONS OF THE MIRANDA RIGHTS

Protection against self-incrimination is undoubtedly one of the most basic rights as described in the laws and codes of the American legal system. In the past, this right was often completely abridged, for those that were accused of a crime would be forced to confess their guilt through various forms of torture. But under American law, the protection against self-incrimination infers that a person is innocent until proven guilty in a court of law by his/her peers or judges and that the government or some other legal body must prove their guilt via a fair and balanced trial.

In Miranda v. Arizona (1966), one of the best examples of the decisions laid down by the Warren court, it was determined that "in order to secure criminal suspect's Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination, the police must advise suspects in custody, before any questioning takes place, of their right to remain silent" (Day, 1964, 145). Ernesto Miranda, convicted of kidnapping and rape due to his confession, had his case overturned on the grounds that he had been denied his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights as outlined in the U.S. Bill of Rights. This decision established the now-famous "Miranda warning" that requires the police to advise suspects before questioning that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say can be used against them, that they have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if they are unable to afford an attorney, one will be provided by the court.

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The so-called "Miranda Decision" was very controversial, due to "the probe conducted by the Supreme Court into police practices that had previously been concealed from the public and free from the scrutiny of the courts" (Gay, 1967, 67). Thus, conservative critics argued that this decision went too far in creating new rules for the police, due in part to the fact that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments do not specifically refer to advising suspects of their rights. In contrast, civil libertarians responded by saying that the Supreme Court acted properly in regard to what is required in order to give practical meaning to specific provisions of the Bill of Rights. Therefore, the "Miranda Decision" contains numerous pros and cons in relation to its legality and interpretation, due to some viewing it as protecting the criminal at the expense of the victims while others see it as not going far enough to protect the victims instead of the criminal.

OVERVIEW OF THE MIRANDA DECISION:

Chief Justice Earl Warren, in giving his opinion for a majority of five on the Supreme Court, acknowledged that an earlier decision known as Escobedo v. Illinois had been subjected to much speculation, uncertainty, disagreement and criticism by numerous lower courts, legal scholars, prosecutors and law enforcement personnel. According to Chief Warren, the Miranda case "had been accepted in order to explore some facets of the problems. . . Of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation. . . And to give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow" (Dix, 1973, 78).

Furthermore, Chief Warren, in regard to the threats to suspects and the challenge for courts, stressed that "the interrogation of suspects in a police-dominated atmosphere may result

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was even more blunt when he stated "that a good many criminal defendants who otherwise would have been convicted on what this Court previously thought will now, under this new version of the Fifth Amendment, either not be tried at all or will be acquitted if the State's evidence is put to the test of litigation" (Riley, 1994, 189-90).

The implementation of Miranda v. Arizona was based primarily in terms of contrasting constitutional philosophies and their impact on public policy. Chief Justice Warren's statement of the Court's new position was extremely specific in regard to the rules police must follow in conducting interrogations, but it did not address all of the issues of implementation. Thus, the pros and cons associated with the rights determined by Miranda v. Arizona were discussed and argued for many years and in essence are still being debated by lawyers, judges and police officials.

SECTION 2: THE PROS AND CONS OF THE MIRANDA RIGHTS:

CUSTODY:

As outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, the rights related to the concept of custody have evolved of the years and is composed of three parts -- first, the process of resolving the degree of control over the suspect, second, the location of the interrogation, and third, the perceptions and intentions of the participants, such as the police, the lawyer and the suspect himself. The "Miranda Decision" stated that the new rules must apply "after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" (Gold, 1995, 213).

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These rules regarding custody also applies to a person who is questioned by the police while in prison, thus placing him in the custody of the state which mandates that he/she must be given the Miranda rights. Furthermore, if a suspect is not being held in the police station nor in prison but is under arrest in his bedroom in a boardinghouse, he too is under custody and is thus entitled to the Miranda rights. This situation of custody is very favorable for the suspect, but in the case of the police, it forces them to protect the rights of the criminal even though he/she has already confessed to a crime.

Conversely, the Court decided that if a suspect who was in a police station but had come voluntarily, was not under arrest and was allowed to leave freely at the end of any interrogations despite the fact that he/she had confessed to a crime, this suspect was not in custody and therefore Miranda warnings were not required. Overall, the aspect of custody seems to focus upon the removal of one's freedom, whether while in jail or under interrogation. For the suspect, the rights determined by the "Miranda Decision" appear to protect the criminal under all circumstances.

MANDATED WARNINGS:

The "Miranda Decision" also prescribed certain warnings, being that a suspect must be told that he/she has the right to appointed counsel during and before all interrogations and that if the suspect could not afford an attorney, one would be appointed for him/her by the court. Like the rights associated with custody, this aspect of mandated warnings is clearly in favor of the suspect, due to the fact that if a suspect says the wrong thing which might incriminate himself without the presence of a lawyer, such incriminations could be viewed as damaging to the Miranda 7

suspect's case. For the police, this only adds to their inability to seek out information from the suspect which may in part help to solve a criminal act.

When a suspect whom the police wishes to subject to custodial interrogation asserts the right to silence or to an attorney, the police must honor this request. Once a request for counsel has been made, the suspect "cannot be subjected to more interrogation by the police unless a lawyer has been made available to him unless the suspect willingly initiates more communication or conversations with the police" (Day, 1964, 198). Unlike the request for counsel, the request not to be interrogated is very shadowy, for the "Miranda Decision" did not address the permissibility of a resumption of questioning after the right to silence has been asserted without the presence of a lawyer.

When a suspect under interrogation without a lawyer does make incriminating statements to the police, their admissibility depends on the state's ability to meet its burden of establishing a valid waiver of the Miranda rights. Thus, an oral or written statement of waiver by the suspect is usually sufficient. However, "the question is not one of form but rather whether the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. . . The courts must presume that a suspect did not waive his rights. . . But in some cases, waiver can be clearly inferred from the actions and words of the suspect during interrogation" (Dix, 1973, 216).

Thus, the rights of the suspect to appointed counsel, the right to silence and the right to non-incrimination are obviously in favor of the suspect. Generally speaking, a suspect does not understand nor is he/she familiar with the methodology involved in an attorney's actions in court, but with the presence of an attorney, a suspect will be warned what not to say to the police.

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When a suspect remains silent during interrogations, it can be an indication of guilt which further protects the criminal. If a suspect incriminates himself, this will assist the police and the prosecutors, but if the suspect has not been warned beforehand, then any incrimination cannot be used in court which only adds to the protection of the suspect.

INTERROGATION RIGHTS:

Interrogation occurs when the police or some other official asks a suspect about his/her activities in regard to a criminal act, but not when the questions are routine in nature, such as those concerning name, age and occupation. Because the Miranda rules apply only to custodial interrogation brought about by the police or other law enforcement personnel, many questions have come about over exactly what constitutes interrogation.

Justice Potter Stewart emphasized for the majority that "the Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its equivalent. . . interrogation under Miranda also refers to any words or actions on the part of the police that are likely to create an incriminating response from the suspect" (Gay, 1967, 245). Therefore, once again, the suspect clearly has the advantage when being interrogated by the police, for if they coerce or accidentally ask the wrong question, it will generally be not admissible in court, even if the question results in an obvious confession to a crime.

EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS:

According to the "Miranda Decision," all statements obtained in violation of the Miranda rights are not admissible as evidence against the accused whose rights were violated. However, certain exceptions do exist and can best be explained by examining the case of Vivien

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Harris who sold heroin to an undercover agent and was warned of his right to counsel. The prosecution made no attempt to use his answers against him at trial, but when Harris related a contradictory story while testifying in his own defense, the judge allowed the prosecutor to question Harris about his inconsistent prior statements. When Harris was convicted, he appealed on the grounds that unwarned statements should have been excluded, and a closely divided court decided that the statements were admissible for purposes of impeaching his credibility.

As a dissenting voice, Justice Brennan stated that "the privilege against self-incrimination protects the individual from being compelled to incriminate himself in any manner. . . statements merely intended to be exculpatory by the defendant are often used to impeach his testimony at trial. . . these statements are incriminating. . . And may not be used without full warning and effective waiver. . ." (Riley, 1994, 256).

Thus, the dissenters concluded that a violation of the Miranda rules and rights is a violation of the Fifth Amendment and should have the same consequences as a violation in the form of actual coercion, meaning that "the prosecution must demonstrate that the second confession was an act independent of the earlier confession. . . thus, the accused must be informed that his latter confession may not be admissible" (Day, 1964, 267).

Once again, the Miranda rights fully protect the suspect, even if he/she "accidentally" relates more information or another story that contradicts the first one. For the prosecution, this situation can be deadly and only increases the difficulty in convicting someone of a criminal act. In the case of Ernesto Miranda, after a woman identified him as her rapist, police questioned

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him and he soon confessed. At his trial, he made no claim that the confession had been involuntary and offered no evidence in his defense; the confession was entered into evidence and he was convicted of kidnapping and rape. But three years later, the Supreme Court used Miranda's case to determine the significance of the fact that at the interrogation, the police did not clearly warn him of his rights to counsel and to remain silent. Its conclusion was that this "mistake" by the police rendered his confession inadmissible which then led to his conviction being overturned. With this in mind, the pro-rights of the accused according to the "Miranda Decision" greatly outweigh the contrasting aspects, for it appears that the criminal wins out regardless of the truth.

CONCLUSION:

The "Miranda Decision" clearly accomplished its goal by creating a Fifth Amendment right to counsel that is distinct from but closely related to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Both of these "rights" have continued to evolve through the normal process of judicial interpretation, although dissent is always present. Apart from the "Miranda Decision," the more traditional law of the Fifth Amendment's protection against compulsory self-incrimination continues to evolve also. As pointed out by Susan D. Gold, "the Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we must never fail to make the defendant aware of his rights, for if we do, the entire system may collapse under its own weight" (1995, 276).

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