Resolve of the Americans in the War for Independence

Why Great Britain Failed

In spite of Great Britain's naval strength at the time of the American War for Independence, there were some lapses in strategy and a misunderstanding of colonial resolve that led to Britain’s loss of its American colonies. Specifically, Great Britain did not reckon on the colonies securing international alliances, and did not do enough to win hearts and minds.

Mahan’s Perspective

Mahan (2007) emphasized the importance of naval power in achieving strategic dominance and argued that control of the sea could determine the outcome of wars through the projection of power, the disruption of trade, and (ultimately) with the support of ground operations. However, several factors limited Great Britain's ability to use its naval superiority to achieve a favorable outcome in the American War of Independence. Great Britain’s projection of power was challenged by American allies; it did not succeed in disrupting trade to the extent that American revolutionaries were forced to capitulate; and its navy was not supported by effective ground operations.

First, the vast gulf between Great Britain and the American colonies just in terms of distance (but as well as culture) posed serious logistical challenges, which made it difficult to maintain a consistent and effective presence. The American colonists were able to use revolutionary ideals and rhetoric to impose their views on the populace, which in turn rallied with an organic swelling of ground support against Great Britain and its soldiers. Great Britain, for her part, had to deal with logistical issues like supplies for supporting ground operations across the Atlantic. Meanwhile, the American forces, which were aware of their own naval disadvantage, could rely on guerrilla tactics against the British to stymie any advances Britain could make.

The British Navy could certainly project power along the coast, in accordance with Mahan’s principle, but much of the conflict took place inland, where naval power had limited direct influence, outside of blockades. Still, the ability of the American forces and their allies to operate effectively inland reduced the strategic effectiveness of British naval strength, and the length of the coast also added to this.

Additionally, the entry of France (and later Spain and the Netherlands) into the war on the side of the American colonies complicated the situation and further reduced the impact of Britain’s naval power. The need to defend against French naval forces, protect its own trade routes, and conduct operations in other theaters diluted the British Navy's efforts in America, where naval force could no longer stand to be concentrated. Plus, the British blockades were not completely effective in stifling American trade or completely cutting off supplies, because of the vastness of the American coastline and the new support from European allies.

Sun Tzu's Perspective

Sun Tzu (2021) argues that principles such as the importance of knowing one's enemy, being flexible in strategy, and moral factors that allow you to win hearts and minds make the difference in any war. From Sun Tzu's perspective, several strategic misjudgments can be identified in the British conduct of the war:

First off, the British likely underestimated the resolve and capability of the American forces and their leadership. Sun Tzu emphasized the importance of understanding and respecting one's adversary—but Britain does not seem to have done this. For example, under the leadership of Washington, American forces were able to elude and undermine British forces on several points.

Second, the British military strategy was often rigid and failed to adapt to the nature of the conflict, particularly with the guerrilla tactics and the rag tag armies that did not operate in accordance with customary ground warfare. Sun Tzu advocated for adaptability and seizing opportunities. A more flexible approach might have allowed the British to focus on ground preparations.

Sun Tzu also argued for the importance of moral factors in warfare. The British struggled to win the "hearts and minds" of the American populace, and this was another big problem: the revolutionary rhetoric coming from Thomas Paine and Ben Franklin were much more effective at swaying hearts and minds. This in itself played a big part in why Britain’s naval power did not solve the problem. Control over the colonies began in the hearts and minds—not on the sea. The naval blockade and other measures only inevitably served to further alienate neutral parties and harden resistance.

Plus, the global nature of British interests and commitments stretched its naval resources. Sun Tzu warned against overextension and the importance of concentrating forces. The need to protect other colonies and trade routes limited the concentration of naval power in American waters. As Howard and Paret (1976) point out, “if you want to overcome your enemy you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will” (p. 77). In other words, maximum strength is needed to coerce the enemy—and Britain’s strength was divided across far too many miles to be effective.

Counter-Argument: British Naval Strength's Strategic Impact

It is acknowledged that Great Britain faced challenges in using the might of its naval power during the American War of Independence, but it is also arguable that British naval strength did have significant strategic effects, even if not decisively altering the course of the war in Britain's favor.

Despite the logistical challenges, the British Navy's control over key sea lanes did allow for the movement of troops and supplies, demonstrating Mahan's principle that sea power is crucial for supporting land operations. The ability to transport large numbers of troops across the Atlantic was a direct result of naval supremacy.

The British blockade, although not entirely effective in sealing off the American coast, did exert economic pressure on the colonies by restricting trade. This aligns with Mahan’s views on the importance of naval blockades in weakening an enemy’s economic base.

Likewise, the British Navy's engagements with French naval forces prevented France from exerting its full strength in support of the American cause. This prevented a potential decisive defeat of British forces, which shows the strategic value of the navy in containing the impact of foreign intervention.

Finally, the presence of the British Navy along the American coast had a psychological impact, reminding the colonies of the might of the British Empire. This aspect of naval power, aligning with Sun Tzu’s emphasis on the psychological dimensions of warfare, played a role in the British strategy to intimidate and control.

Rebuttal: Limitations of the Counter-Argument

Yes, the counter-argument highlights valid points regarding the impact of British naval power, but it overlooks several important aspects that hindered the strategic effectiveness of its power.

First, control of sea lanes and the ability to transport troops do not translate into success without effective ground operations. The British naval strength could not compensate for the shortcomings in strategy and execution on land, which generals like Washington were able to exploit. This was gap in strategy that Mahan's principles implicitly recognize by stressing the importance of integrating naval and land operations.

Yes, it is also true that economic warfare imposed hardships, but it also served to galvanize American resolve and encouraged the development of alternative trade networks. Instead of hurting the hearts and minds of Americans, it actually made them more resolute and determined. Plus, European allies, in particular France, provided important supplies that reduced the blockade’s effects. This turn showed the limitations of economic pressure in achieving strategic objectives for Britain.