Theism and the Moral Argument

Introduction
The moral argument consists of four components—moral facts, moral knowledge, moral transformation and moral rationality. As Baggett and Walls point out, the most pertinent moral facts are concerned with moral duties and values, particularly what is known as intrinsic human value.[footnoteRef:2] The question raised, of course, is where does intrinsic human value come from if not from God? Nature itself seems incapable of instilling in the human shell this universal sense of value. This is a particular fact that has to be dealt with in order to understand why the moral argument is necessarily a theistic argument, which is what this paper will argue. Moral knowledge, transformation and rationality all support the argument as well. Moral knowledge itself is a sense of the universality of morality—the the absolute validity of the platitudes of Practical Reason, as Baggett and Walls define it.[footnoteRef:3] Moral transformation refers to what Evans identifies as the relation between moral duty and personal transformation: the need for one to conform oneself and transform one’s life so that it aligns with the moral precepts that one can come to know through ascertainment of the facts of morality by using reason.[footnoteRef:4] Rationality thus plays a part in the moral argument because “rationality expunged of the relevance of morality is a thin, myopic, and emaciated notion indeed.”[footnoteRef:5] All four components work together, overlap and are integrated to form the whole of the moral argument—so much so that one cannot speak of just one component wholly without touching on the others. This paper will touch on the components while explaining and replying primarily to objections of moral knowledge, which is how one can come to theism, for knowledge of morality is a stepping stone to knowledge of God since morality itself (the objective moral order) comes from God. [2: David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 116.] [3: David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 245.] [4: Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation (Oxford University Press, 2013), 87.] [5: David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford University Press, 2011), 169.]
Moral Knowledge
Moral knowledge is typically viewed as an end in and of itself by atheistic philosophers. They see moral knowledge as simply a facet of the human experience—and organizing principle for human societies, which have evolved over time and place. The basis of their argument is that one can be moral without believing in God, but of course the argument is a bit of a non-sequitur. Where faith is concerned is a different matter altogether. The issue that theist philosophers have is that morality itself cannot have come from anywhere else but God. If it is used as an organizing principle, it is used in the same way that one uses stone for building or wood for fire: these things are external to one’s self and provide one with uses. The same is true of morality. It exists in an objective sense, external to human beings, which is why they can come to universally or collectively know it, recognize it, understand it and use it—for whatever end they choose—whether as an organizing principle or as a means of personal transformation.
Justification
In order to organize or grow, one must have a sense of the moral order that exists in the world. The question behind the moral argument, however, is what one is to make of that moral order in terms of origin—i.e., where does it come from? Is it invented by man, or rather simply perceived by man, who himself created it and passes it down from generation to generation, tweaking it a bit here and there to suit himself or his society? Or does it remain objective and unchanging, calling for all to adapt themselves to it and conform to the order that it itself represents?
Naturalism will allow one to come to have moral beliefs, but it does not lead one to moral knowledge.[footnoteRef:6] In other words, the naturalist or atheist may have moral beliefs—but they are not justified by anything other than the individual’s own subjective opinion. If faith (belief) rests upon reason, where is the reason for the naturalist’s belief in morality? The naturalist may say that the reason is in the simple fact that one can discern the goodness of morality, which is reason enough to believe in it. Yet, to explore the argument it is helpful to dissect it. On what grounds is the goodness of morality based? Is it the individual himself? Does the subjective opinion of each individual determine the goodness of morality? If so, there can be no uniformity or universal morality. Morality for one may differ from one’s neighbor, and without a shared sense of morality there can be no organizing principle. It is in fact very much like what one perceives today in the fragmented and fractured and tribal societies of today: individuals and groups with their own senses of morality and the moral order, each defining morality according to his own beliefs. What justifies those beliefs? Simply the individual’s or group’s collective will. The will of the person or the people judges this or that action, behavior, perspective or belief to be good because it satisfies the person’s or group’s desire for goodness that aligns with his or their own viewpoint. It is justification by way of Egoism. Essentially, the morality of the naturalist and the atheist is the morality of Egoism.[footnoteRef:7] [6: David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 209.] [7: Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation (Oxford University Press, 2013), 72.]
The Problem of Egoism
But is Egoism sufficient philosophical justification for moral belief? It is ultimately subjective and leads to conflict and division, as every Ego stands in the way of someone else’s Ego. The philosophies of naturalism have gone out of their way in their attempt to square the circle: utilitarianism was Mill’s attempt to explain the morality of the Good by way of defining it as that which benefits the most number of people, i.e., the common good. He applies a democratic principle to his depiction of morality, reducing morality to a tool of pragmatism (whatever makes the most number of people in society happiest—that is good), but it says nothing of the others. So if 51% of the population is happiest with one elected official and 49% hates that official, there is not going to be much order in society: the situation will be rife with conflict and moral disagreement. Morality by definition must enjoy a consensus—and that consensus must be universal. Morality must be external and objective, or else it has no influence, no utility, and no shared meaning.[footnoteRef:8] [8: David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 245.]
The main problem with the morality and moral beliefs of the moderns of philosophy is that there is no universality: universalisms and objectivity are rejected for the promotion of the subjective morality—the morality that applies to one’s own existence. It is an existential philosophy—a post-modern philosophy—that eschews the use of reason to seek justification for the existence of morality. Dostoevsky famously quipped that if there is no God, everything is permitted. What he meant was that there can be no morality, no immorality, no law, and no violations if there is no Law Giver—and man himself does not suffice as an adequate law giver for man can be overthrown and at that point a new morality or law is installed—the logical underpinning of which is “might makes right.” That logic, however, does not square with objective morality, for as Baggett and Walls point out, true morality will eventually lead one to make self-sacrifice,[footnoteRef:9] which is what flies ultimately in the face of Egoism and gives the lie to that patently self-contradictory moral philosophy. [9: David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 255. ]
Does Might Make Right?
In a “might makes right” type of situation, which is what man-made morality comes down to, the concept of self-sacrifice is more difficult to justify. In the moral argument that has theism as its basis, self-sacrifice aligns perfectly with the concept of a Christian redemption, a need for mankind to be re-united with God, and the pathway to that re-unification coming by way of the denial of the self and the conformity of the self with the Christian ethic. Moreover, there is nothing irrational about the moral argument rooted in theism: the classical philosophers—Socrates, Plato and Aristotle—all understood morality in the same objective sense and judged that the moral law was written by God. They had no conception of the Christian God since they preceded Christ by hundreds of years, but the point is that they rationally and logically deduced that morality must be external to man and that true knowledge of morality depends on having a knowledge of God—for without that knowledge of God, one has only belief in morality—not knowledge of morality.[footnoteRef:10] Baggett and Walls explain this sufficiently well: “Our rational trust in God’s goodness enables trust in his provision of moral knowledge and the wisdom we need to conduct our lives and societies….”[footnoteRef:11] [10: David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 183.] [11: David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford University Press, 2011), 166.]
The belief in morality is imperfect for the purposes of this discussion. Moral knowledge is one of the four components of the moral argument—not moral belief. One may believe in morality’s existence the same way one believes in the existence of trees or clouds. One can see they exist. But that is no explanation for why they exist. They do not exist because one believes in them—yet that is the logical of the philosophers of the modern age: they imbue their belief with creative powers—i.e., the moral order exists because they have willed it into existence through their own belief. They assign to themselves, in other words, godlike powers. They are unwilling, of course, to consent that it is God who wills the moral order into existence just as He willed all of creation into existence. They are of the conviction that the world itself bubbled into being through some cosmic accident, which they will inevitably admit remains a mystery both physically and philosophically (since logically speaking nothing can come from nothing). Morality, like the trees and oceans and sky, evolved into being from that cosmic accident and yet unlike the clouds and trees and sky morality occupies a space only in the hearts and minds of individuals insofar as they agree on what it is. When they disagree and oppose one another, the situation has entered into the “might makes right” phase of evolution (can one call it philosophy?) and the winner imposes upon the losers the belief system of his choosing. For them, this is the explanation of morality’s existence and all the justification they need.
Does it suffice, however? One is still left with the lingering question of where it all come from and how any of it came into existence at all. At this point the philosopher of modernity will reply that it is impossible to know and thus everyone must become agnostic in the face of the unknowable. But agnosticism is little more than a screen—an attempt to avoid the issue and deflect the question. The question stands and must be answered from a logical standpoint: something cannot come from nothing. The trees, sky and ocean must have an origin. The so-called cosmic accident—the cosmic blip—must have had a trigger. What?
The Prime Mover
It is the principle of the prime mover, the unmoved mover, the first uncaused cause. Aristotle posited this concept—not a Christian—and so it is possible to assess its logic outside the Christian spectrum and oblige the philosopher of modernity to consent to its soundness. The prime mover argument is simple to understand and Aristotle put it succinctly when he stated that in order for anything to exist in this world there must be a prime mover—a primary agent, an unchanging, immortal being that has no beginning and no end and that is ultimately responsible for the whole of the order in the world that man knows through his senses. There can be no other logical explanation, and any other explanation given must necessarily be illogical. The philosopher of modernity who refuses to consent must forfeit his claim to logic.
Aristotle’s argument is not a matter of faith. Though the concept of immortality is beyond the scope of man’s reason, for it cannot be comprehended fully, it is not irrational to consent to its existence. Reason dictates that it must be so, for only a being that is eternal could have the ability to create out of itself a world such as we experience here. If such a being does not exist, then this world cannot exist. Those who will not consent base their refusal on the lack of empirical evidence for this eternal being: they say there is no proof. But they must surely be kidding only themselves for the proof is all around them. They themselves are the proof. The air they breathe is the proof. The proof is undeniably staring them right in the face. Their problem is not proof. Their problem is that by admitting the existence of an eternal being, they will inevitably be drawn into the matter of faith in the Christian God, for Christ is the center point of all human history and the Man by whom mankind still dates his own life.
Faith is the real stumbling block, and moral knowledge will lead one to it, which, again, is why many a modern will pause at moral belief only and stop, seeing no need to proceed onto justification. It is not that they see no need; it is rather that they see all too well where that road leads and, having already rejected faith, they must also reject the road that leads to faith. That road of course is logic, and this is where moral rationality must come into play in the discussion. Moral knowledge must inevitably yield to moral rationality because knowledge implies conformity and conformity implies transformation and transformation needs a reason. The rational explanation for morality is transformation—conformity to the moral order that exists externally to all.
Of course if moral order is merely internal and dictated by the ruler whose might has made right his own description of morality then no transformation is required of him—only of his subjects. Here it is important to be reminded of what Baggett and Walls assert: “our very real cognitive limitations should remind us all to retain a tremendous amount of epistemic humility, a virtue sometime sadly lacking in all us.”[footnoteRef:12] Humility is necessarily needed to consent to the reality of the moral order and its only possible justification, for in that justification is the realization of one’s own separation from the creator and one’s need to be re-united. All desires inevitably stem from that one desire of re-unification. All desire finds its satisfaction in re-unification and nowhere else. That is a humbling thought and one must not be afraid to consent to it when seeking the justification for moral knowledge. [12: David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford University Press, 2011), 166.]
The theistic argument, Baggett and Walls show, “assigns ultimate emphasis neither to human nature nor even to the whole created order, but rather to God himself.”[footnoteRef:13] God is what gives the rationality justification for morality. Those who object to the need to justify morality beyond a “might makes right” doctrine still must consent that their doctrine will inevitably lead to God as well. [13: David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford University Press, 2011), 166.]
For it cannot be denied that the prime mover is the mightiest of all—and if one is going to adhere to the argument that “might makes right,” then one must still admit that the mightiest of all is that which must be called God. This is the ontological argument of Anselm: God is that than which nothing greater can be imagined. God is the prime mover and the one Who literally “makes right” by His own might as the omnipotent being that He is.
Knowledge of Morality is Knowledge of the Will of God
Moral knowledge is knowledge of the will of God, for the moral order is the manner by which God has written his will on the world. One’s heart and mind may resist that will or accept it—one is free to choose and God is not in the business of forcing one to choose to accept. The free will that man possesses is a reflection of the freedom with which God created existence. Moral knowledge should make this clear. Those who prefer not to consent to knowledge thus stop at belief and save themselves the trouble of having to logically explain their convictions.
The reason of course is that they would prefer not to have to deal with the will of God and what that means for them in their own lives. Consenting to the will of God means consenting to transformation: it means changing oneself and becoming that which even the existentialists are always talking about when they discuss the idea of becoming. In their own language and terms, they admit to the need to become something else. They hide their justification within their own wills, thinking themselves them mightiest things they can imagine—but they are in a state of denial for it is not difficult to imagine something mightier than man. The will of God is what moral knowledge will take one to, but it is not something one will be forced to go to. God gave man the use of reason so that man could find Him. If man chooses to be led to water but does not drink, it is no one’s fault but man’s.
Conclusion
The concept of moral knowledge is such that it supports the moral argument along with the elements of facts, transformation and reason. Knowledge is that which is obtained by consenting to the facts, and it is the step that leads to transformation and faith, itself based upon reason. The moral argument thus must inevitably come down to theism. Without God, there can be no morality, for the justification required for all existence to exist is the existence of a prime mover—an eternal being that has no beginning and no end. If one is going to acknowledge an objective moral order, one must acknowledge an orderer. If one is not going to acknowledge an objective moral order but rather only consent to the idea that might makes right, one must still admit that there is nothing mightier than God.
Bibliography
Baggett, David and Jerry Walls. God and Cosmos. Oxford University Press, 2016.
Baggett, David and Jerry Walls. Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality. Oxford University Press, 2011.
Evans, Stephen. God and Moral Obligation. Oxford University Press, 2013.