According to these arguments, God does not have a beginning in time, nor is he contingent. Therefore he is in a position to have created the universe. The moral argument (Hick 28), in contrast to those above, focuses on the existence of human beings within contemporary society, and how morals are manifest in this society. According to this argument, the moral facts could only be as they are and in fact exist on the basis of God's presence. There are several moral arguments, two of which include the formal moral argument and Kant's moral argument.

The formal moral argument holds that morality is implicit in divinity. According to this argument, morality exists only because God exists. In other words, God created morality in the human heart. The basis for this lies in the fact that morality is prescriptive, giving guidance on how to live. Proponents of this argument then uses this as a basis for the argument that a being prescribes morality, which entails God at the basis of all moral principles. Secondly, the argument is that the authoritative nature of morality suggests that it originates from the highest authority known to human beings, which is God.

The Kantian moral argument is based upon the view that moral behavior is basically rational. At the basis of this rationality is the fact that it is in the human interest to behave morally as opposed to the consequences suffered from immoral behavior. The argument makes a connection with divine motivation by pointing out that moral behavior in the world does not always prove fruitful, while immoral behavior is not always punished. The intrinsic tendency to behave morally is then used as a basis for proof that there is something beyond physical life that inspires moral behavior; a reward that is greater than what may be expected in the normal course of physical life. In other words, God inspires moral behavior by offering the reward of a pleasant afterlife.

Arguments Against the Existence of God

According to Platinga (in Quinn & Meeker 189), one of the most prominent arguments against the existence of God is religious diversity,...

Indeed, Hick (30) also presents the argument that religion is the fulfillment of a sociological need rather than proof of divine existence. The fact that religion manifests itself in such diverse ways, and also the fact that religious experience is so arbitrary and individualistic, are used to argue against the existence of God.
Both Quinn and Platinga (in Quinn & Meeker) acknowledge the problematic nature of such diversity and also of the acceptance of such diversity for the fundamentalist believer. However, Quinn suggests that one appropriate response could be to simply remain faithful to one's own belief system, as there is no definitive proof that the other viewpoint is correct.

Furthermore, one could argue that religious diversity does in fact do nothing to disprove the existence of God himself, but rather the existence of a homogeneous human society. It could be argued that God has revealed himself in different ways to different societies in order to appeal to the specific nature of the society concerned. Hence religious tolerance is legitimized, while each society is free to worship God as they please. In this way, religious diversity exactly suggests that God does exist rather than the opposite.

The world today has opened not only scientific and technological possibilities, but also an opportunity to more scientifically argue for the existence of God. This provides the modern believer with an exciting array of tools for the fortification of his or her faith.

Sources

Hick, John H. Philosophy of Religion. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1990.

Platinga, a. "Pluralism: A Defense of Religious Exclusivism," in the Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, K. Meeker and P.Quinn (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2000: 172-192.

Quinn, P. "Toward Thinner Theologies: Hick and Alston on Religious Diversity," in the Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity, K. Meeker and P.Quinn (eds.), New York: Oxford University Press, 2000: 226-243.