Improvement of order A2014957

Trimester 3, 2010-11

In the Future, How Independent of the International Hierarchy of Influence Can Australia's Foreign Policy Be?

Having gone through it thoroughly there are major omissions from your analysis. You don't interrogate any of the concepts, your evidence is sparse and lacks detail apart from the trade figures for 1 year, and you have an undergraduate dependence on Quoted material to make your point. Also there are no references to the materials supplied to you for your study of the topic.

I suggest you use the next month to get fully engaged in your discussion about the independence of Australia's foreign policy, drawing on the materials available to you and reaching your own conclusions based on your analysis of past and present actions and pronouncements about the future.

You are rewarded for doing the allotted task with a depth of detail and analysis.

I look forward to reading your 7th level presentation.

In Australia we use s instead of z in words like globalise

Introduction

As the forces of globalisation continue to redefine geopolitical boundaries around the world, Australia remains in a unique position with regards to its foreign policy. Not only does it not share any borders with other countries, Australia's relative geographic isolation from the rest of the English-speaking Western world has required it to pursue foreign policy initiatives with the nations of Asia in the past, that have been in its best economic interests, while balancing the need to closely cooperate with other countries such as the United Kingdom and the United States, for security purposes. This foreign policy balancing act has helped Australia remain competitive in an increasingly globalised marketplace, and it is clear that Australia's interests will be best served by pursuing a foreign policy that recognizes the importance of its membership in the international community. Nevertheless, Australia future success and security demand a foreign policy that keeps its best interest in the forefront and avoids foreign entanglements that detract from these interests. Such entanglements might include scenarios wherein Australia was compelled to act militarily by virtue of bilateral agreements with other countries, such as its joint security agreement commitments with Japan, the U.S. Or the U.K. To determine how independent of the current international hierarchy of influence. Australia's foreign policy can -- and should -- be in the future, this paper provides a review of the relevant literature, followed by a summary of the research and important findings in the conclusion. For the purposes of this study, the term "future" will roughly refer to the next 25 to 50 years, the term "hierarchy of influence" will mean the international community in general and those countries with which Australia maintains close relations in particular, and "independence" will refer to the ability of Australia to act unilaterally in foreign policy matters.

NOW

AND THEN

Review and Discussion

Current Level of Independence of Australia's Foreign Policy

Just as "no man is an island," no country can afford to remain completely isolated from the international community in the 21st century. Indeed, even the isolationist "Hermit Kingdom" of North Korea remains inextricably bound to its major ally, China, as well as numerous nonaligned nations throughout Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East (Haglund 2003). Likewise, Australia's unique geographic position has created a need to develop foreign policy initiatives that reinforce the country's independence, while actively engaging other countries for its own economic and security interests. In this regard, Gyngell and Wesley emphasize that, "Given where we are located, we have to rely more directly on our own efforts to protect and advance the considerable security and economic interests we have engaged in the international system" (2003, p. 11). Some good examples of this process were Australia's mutual security pact with Japan in 2007 (Jiang 2007), Prime Minister Rudd's recent efforts to reverse the diplomatic standoff with Papau New Guinea through dialogue and personal engagement, the approval of the national government to initiate ratification procedures for the Kyoto Protocol that holds special significance for Oceania, and the Pacific Partnerships for Development (Elliott, Fry, Tow & Ravenhill 2008).

Nevertheless, Australian foreign policy has also historically acknowledged the need for bilateral relationships with the United States and the United Kingdom for mutually beneficial economic and security purposes. As Snyder points out, "Australia's Asia-Pacific regional security policy has traditionally seen a balancing between two competing policy approaches, one of seeking protection from threats in the region by 'great and powerful friends' and the other of greater engagement with the region" (2006, p. 322). In fact, Australian foreign policy has consistently embraced alliance-making as a means to ensuring its domestic security and economic interests. In this regard, Dr. Ashton Calvert, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra since 1998, emphasizes that, "Throughout its history as an independent country, Australia has been actively involved in international affairs both within and beyond the Asia-Pacific region to which we belong" (2003, 25). In other words, even though Australia has always had a multilateral focus, it has also relied on mutual alliances for support. For example, Henderson (2004) reports that following Federation in 1901, Australia consistently relied on the United Kingdom until World War II; thereafter, Australia has forged closer relations with the United States to the point where the Howard government was perceived to be acting as a "deputy sheriff" for U.S. interests in the Pacific region (Elliott et al. 2008).

By sharp contrast, unlike many of the nations of Asia and Europe, Australia's foreign policy has historically sought to reinforce its independence from the international hierarchy of influence because of its geographic isolation from other countries. In this regard, Gyngell and Wesley observe that, "Because Australia does not belong to a natural grouping we are not in a position to rely on the efforts of others in protecting and advancing our interests in international affairs" (2003, p. 12).

Because of this geographic isolation, Australia's close historic relations with the U.S. And the U.K. have been based primarily on the countries' shared heritage and closely aligned security and economic interests rather than their proximity (Calvert, 2003). Moreover, Australia's foreign policy will be one of the more important methods by which the country's independence within the sphere of the international hierarchy of influence will be sustained. For instance, Australia's former foreign minister, Smith, emphasises that, "Foreign policy is an indispensable arm of strengthening national security and strategic interests" (2008, p. 4). Consequently, Australia's level of foreign policy independence will be affected by longstanding mutual security and trade agreements, as well as shifts in the economic sphere wherein the United States and the United Kingdom may become less relevant and important to Australia's best interests while countries such as China, Indonesia and Japan assume new relevance and importance. Collectively, all of these countries as well as the international community can be said to form a hierarchy of influence, varying only in degrees, with the 19 other countries that form the Group of Twenty and the 53 countries comprising the Commonwealth Heads of Government being at the forefront of this hierarchy of influence for Australia. A further analysis of the current international hierarchy of influence on Australia's foreign policy is provided below.

The Relevant International Hierarchy of Influence on Australia's Foreign Policy

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, the international hierarchy of influence that has affected Australia's foreign policy was broad-based and included the nations of Asia (primarily Japan and China) and the countries of the European Union (Calvert 2003), this hierarchy of influence has largely been dominated by the United Kingdom and the United States. According to Calvert, Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade in Canberra since 1998, "Given U.S. pre-eminence in world strategic and economic affairs, the importance to Australia of these already very strong ties with the United States is likely to grow. Australia's contemporary relationship with the United Kingdom is also strong and vibrant" (Calvert 2003, p. 25).

Given the shared heritage, language, customs, values as well as the enormous mutual economic and security interests of Australia, the UK and the U.S., these close relations are understandable and it is reasonable to suggest that this longstanding trilateral relationship will remain relevant for the foreseeable future and that Australia's foreign policy will reflect this relationship (Flitton 2004). In support of this assertion, in 2008, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Stephen Smith confirmed that, "Australia's alliance with the United States remains indispensable to Australia's defence, security and strategic arrangements. That will continue to be the case for a very considerable period of time" (2008, p. 5). Nevertheless, in a speech at the University of Western Australia entitled "Australia's foreign policy looking west," the current Minister for Foreign Affairs, Kevin Rudd, recently observed that "Global interests require us to be active in all the regions and capitals of the world through what I have long called creative middle power diplomacy" (2010, 3). In addition, Rudd also cited the growing influence of India, Latin America and the Gulf states that will require stronger relations in the coming years. Furthermore, Peterson, a correspondent for the Post Gazette, recently reported that, "Mr. Rudd has been seen as intent on balancing Australia's relations with China and those with the United States, a longtime ally and major trading partner. But he has argued recently that China should, to reflect the changing world economic order, have greater voting rights within the IMF and a greater say in how its funds are spent" (2009, 2). Based on China's role as Australia's largest trading partner and its proximity, Australia's current Minister for Foreign Affairs is using the Group of Twenty (G20) forum to advance these goals. In this regard, Peterson adds that, "Canberra's key ambitions heading into the G-20 summit go beyond the trilateral Australia-China-U.S. relationship. Mr. Rudd -- currently co-chair of the G-20's working group on IMF reform -- is arguing for a clear role for China in the management of the global economy" (2009, 3). Likewise, Prime Minister Julia Gillard recently cited the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) organization as being highly influential in Australia's foreign policy. For instance, speaking at the APEC CEO Summit in November 2010, Gillard emphasised that, "From the beginning, one of APEC's historic goals has been to deepen regional economic integration by opening borders and creating opportunities for business and government" (2010, 2).

The point has been made by Darwell (2005), a consultant director of Reform, a London-based think tank, that the close relationships between the UK and the U.S. will not necessarily mean that it will not be possible for Australia to pursue increasingly close ties with China in the future. For example, Darwell emphasises that, "(i)nternational relations is not a zero-sum game, and Australia's close relationship with the U.S. does not come at the cost of its relations with China. Both China and the U.S. have an interest in developing constructive relations with one another, not least because of China's hunger for economic growth, which is precisely where Australia's interests lie" (2005, p. 58).

The foregoing observation suggests that notwithstanding the historic relationships between Australia and the United States, Australian foreign policymakers can pursue an independent course that is focused on the country's best interests without necessarily jeopardizing these longstanding relations. This observation is supported in large part by current trade levels between Australia and China as shown in Figures 1 and 2 below.

Figure 1. Australia's Major Import Partners

Figure 2. Australia's Major Export Partners

Source: Australia 2010

Although Australia has managed to weather the lingering global financial crisis better than most, it is certainly not immune to the effects of a global economic downturn and its increasing reliance on China as a major trading partner will also involve increasing trade interdependence in ways that might adversely affect Australia's ability to formulate and administer independent foreign policies that do not take these trends into account. As can be readily discerned from Figures 1 and 2 above, in both imports and exports, China dominates Australia's trade with other countries.

Despite the longstanding relationships between the U.S., UK and Australia, it is becoming increasingly apparent that American and British influence in the international hierarchy is waning while that of China is waxing. In particular, the so-called Global War on Terrorism that is being aggressively prosecuted by the United States and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom, has diminished the legitimacy of these countries' leadership roles in the eyes of many members of the international community (Snyder 2006). These trends have created significant shifts in the international hierarchy of influence with countries such as China, Japan and India assuming greater importance for Australia's interests. According to Snyder (2003), a Senior Lecturer at the School of International and Political Studies, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University in Geelong, Victoria, Australia, the outcomes of these trends remain unclear at present, but it is apparent that they will hold important implications for Australian foreign policymakers in the future. In order to build stronger relations with the countries of Southeast Asia, Australia needs to forge closer economic and cultural ties with countries that are in Australia's region. According to Snyder, "Australia needs to build on the positive relations it has with the states in the region at both the political and military level to mitigate these concerns" (2006, 322). Based on the foregoing trends, the sphere of influence represented by the U.S. And the UK, while remaining important, will likely diminish somewhat as the economic, political and military clout of China and its neighbors, particularly Japan, continue to increase in the coming years (Jiang 2007). This point was also made by the Honorable Stephen Smith in a speech to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute National Security Dinner in 2008:

"Japan has been our closest and most consistent friend in our region for many years. Australia and Japan have many things in common, including our shared values, our democratic outlook and our shared regional engagement. Japan is a key economic, security and strategic partner of central importance. Our cooperation on regional security issues continues to expand. All this provides the basis for a critical partnership that will see both countries working together in the region for many years to come. (4)

In sum, the world is clearly shifting from the unipolar framework that characterized the last decade to a multipolar framework that will require reevaluations of what is truly in Australia's best military and economic interests in the future, and these issues are discussed further below.

Projections of Australia's Foreign Policy for the Future

It is clear that the 21st century is in fact shaping up to be the "Century of Asia," with China among the frontrunners in terms of economic development. For example, according to Darwall, "(w)hile the twentieth century was the century of the Americas, the chances are the twenty-first century will be the century of Asia and we may see, for the first time, a real eclipse of American economic power" (2005, p. 58). Although currently the only superpower in the world, the military might of the United States is being gradually countered by the military build-up in China and Russia and it appears to be just a matter of time before the hegemony enjoyed by the U.S. during the second half of the 20th century is eclipsed. In this regard, Hiro (2008) emphasises that, "No superpower in modern times has maintained its supremacy for more than several generations. and, however exceptional its leaders may have thought themselves, the United States, already clearly past its zenith, has no chance of becoming an exception to this age-old pattern of history" (140).

In fact, there is already evidence of this transition taking place, with China's military spending increasing by 18% in 2007 alone (Hiro 2008). According to Hiro, although China's military budget of $45 billion represented a fraction of the spending levels in the United Sttaes ($459 billion), a report from the U.S. Department of Defense clearly emphasized that, "China's rapid rise as a regional and economic power with global aspirations," and maintained that China was "planning to project military force farther afield from the Taiwan Straits into the Asia-Pacific region in preparation for possible conflicts over territory or resources" (2008, 141).

These shifts in the current hierarchy of influence will be particularly important for Australia given its proximity to these countries in the future. In this regard, in a speech delivered to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute National Security Dinner on 9 April 2008, the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade Stephen Smith observed, "The Australian Government is determined to look afresh at our strategic and national security challenges and how to respond to them. We need to adapt and respond to new challenges. This century, a globalised world demands more than ever a committed and active bilateral, regional and multilateral diplomacy from Australia" (2008, p. 3). These objectives will involve maintaining current mutual agreements with the United States, but will also require a recognition that other countries may become more important to Australia's military and economic interests in the future. Projected into the near future, say for the next decade or so, these demands will require an Australian foreign policy that balances the country's historic relationships with the U.S. And UK in favour of expanded relationships with the rest of the international community, particularly China, Japan, India and Brazil as burgeoning economic powerhouses. This point was made by Flitton who reported in 2004 that, "Instead of over-relying on a special relationship with any one country, Australia should be more 'promiscuous' in its international affairs" (2004, p. 229). Given the recent trends discussed above, this recommendation remains relevant today and for the future of Australia's foreign policymaking efforts.