Bakke, Gratz & Grutter: Affirmative Action Case Analysis

Introduction to Race-Conscious Admissions Cases

The following is a comparative case analysis of three landmark Supreme Court decisions addressing race-conscious admissions policies in higher education: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), Gratz v. Bollinger (2003), and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003). Each case is examined using a standard legal brief format, followed by a comparative analysis of the Court's evolving doctrine on affirmative action and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978)

Citation: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).

Background: The Medical School opened in 1968 with a class of 100 students. When it opened, it had no admissions program for minority or disadvantaged students. At that time, it enrolled three Asian students but no Black, Mexican-American, or Native American students. Over the next two years, the faculty developed a special admissions program aimed at increasing the representation of disadvantaged and minority students.

Under the special admissions program, a dedicated committee reviewed candidates who indicated they wished to be considered as disadvantaged and/or minority applicants. The University did not formally define "disadvantaged," but applicants who self-selected were screened by the admissions chairman for evidence of economic or educational deprivation. Disadvantaged applicants were evaluated similarly to general admissions applicants, except that they were not required to meet the 2.5 minimum GPA cutoff applied to regular applicants. The special admissions committee then presented its top choices to the general admissions committee, which could reject candidates but did not compare them directly against general applicants.

Respondent Bakke was a white male who applied to the Medical School in both 1973 and 1974 under the general admissions program. In 1973, he was considered a desirable applicant with a strong benchmark score, but no one in the general admissions program was accepted with a comparable score once his application was complete. Bakke wrote to the Chairman of the Admissions Committee, contending that the special admissions program operated as a quota. When he reapplied in 1974, he was interviewed by the Chairman, who scored him low. Despite this, his benchmark score remained strong. His application was again rejected. In both years, applicants were admitted under the special program with GPAs, MCAT scores, and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's.

Bakke filed suit in the Superior Court of California, seeking mandatory, injunctive, and declaratory relief compelling his admission to the Medical School. The Superior Court enjoined the University from considering race in admissions decisions but declined to order Bakke's admission.

Issues: Did the Medical School's admissions program violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.), and the California Constitution? Was the lower court correct in enjoining the University from considering race in admissions decisions? Should the trial court have ordered Bakke's admission? Does a private right of action exist under Title VI? Should the trial court have applied strict scrutiny to the University's admissions program?

Reasoning: Title VI's legislative history reflects a congressional intent to halt federal funding of entities engaged in racial discrimination, with a focus specifically on discrimination against African Americans. The Court held that "in view of the clear legislative intent, Title VI must be held to proscribe only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth Amendment." 438 U.S. 265, 287. The Court further held that "the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment extend to all persons," 438 U.S. 265, 289, noting that the Fourteenth Amendment provides: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV.

The Court emphasized that "the guarantee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of another color. If both are not accorded the same protection, then it is not equal." 438 U.S. 265, 289–90. It also held that "racial and ethnic classifications . . . are subject to stringent examination without regard to these additional characteristics." 438 U.S. 265, 290. The Court drew on prior precedent: "Distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943). And: "Legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).

Analysis: The Court declined to rule on whether private parties had a right of action under Title VI, as that issue had not been raised in the lower courts — nor was the question of whether Title VI plaintiffs must exhaust administrative remedies. Instead, the Court assumed Bakke had a right of action under Title VI. 438 U.S. 265, 284.

The Court held that "the special admissions program is undeniably a classification based on race and ethnic background. To the extent that there existed a pool of at least minimally qualified minority applicants to fill the 16 special admissions seats, white applicants could compete only for 84 seats in the entering class, rather than the 100 open to minority applicants. Whether this limitation is described as a quota or a goal, it is a line drawn on the basis of race and ethnic status." 438 U.S. 265, 289. While the University's program did not survive strict scrutiny, the Court recognized that the state had a legitimate interest in maintaining a diverse student population — an interest that could justify giving some consideration to race in the admissions process.

Conclusion: The Court affirmed the lower court's determination that the University's special admissions program was unlawful and affirmed the direction that Bakke be admitted to the Medical School. However, the Court reversed the lower court's injunction barring the University from giving any consideration to race in its admissions process.

Gratz v. Bollinger and Grutter v. Bollinger (2003)

Citations: Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).

Background: These cases involved distinct challenges that shared the same basic factual background. In Gratz, petitioners Gratz and Hamacher were Caucasian residents of Michigan who sought admission to the University's undergraduate program. Though their credentials placed them at or above the qualified range, they were denied early admission and ultimately denied admission altogether. The University's Office of Undergraduate Admissions (OUA) maintained written guidelines governing admissions for each academic year. While these guidelines changed over time, during all relevant periods the University considered African Americans, Hispanics, and Native Americans to be underrepresented minorities and admitted virtually every qualified applicant from those groups. Under the OUA's guidelines, every applicant from an underrepresented racial or ethnic minority group was automatically awarded 20 points of the 100 needed to guarantee admission.

Petitioners filed a class action alleging that the University's use of racial preferences in undergraduate admissions violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. They sought damages for past violations, declaratory relief, an injunction against future racial discrimination, and an order requiring the University to admit Hamacher as a transfer student. Hamacher's claim was found to challenge racial discrimination on a class-wide basis, and he was designated as class representative.

In Grutter, the plaintiff was a white Michigan resident with a 3.8 GPA and a 162 LSAT score who was rejected by the University's Law School. She alleged that she was discriminated against on the basis of race, because the Law School used race as a significant factor, giving applicants from underrepresented minority groups a substantially greater chance of admission than Caucasian and Asian American applicants with similar credentials. The Grutter and Gratz cases were heard together because both challenged the University's admissions policies.

Issues: Did the petitioners have standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief? Did the Bakke decision continue to justify the consideration of race in admissions decisions? Did the University have a compelling governmental interest in obtaining a racially and ethnically diverse student body? Were petitioners or the respondent University entitled to summary judgment?

Reasoning: The Court reaffirmed that the "injury in fact" necessary to establish standing in an Equal Protection Clause lawsuit is the denial of equal treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier itself, not the ultimate inability to obtain the benefit. Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666. The Court confirmed that diversity can constitute a compelling state interest. It also held that the administrative difficulty of implementing a program capable of considering each applicant as an individual does not justify the use of an unconstitutional admissions program. A violation of the Equal Protection Clause constitutes a violation of both Title VI and § 1981. The Court upheld the Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions decisions as constitutionally permissible, while also expressing the belief that, 25 years after Grutter, affirmative action would no longer be necessary to ensure diversity.

Analysis: Hamacher had been denied admission as a freshman but would have been admitted had he been a member of an underrepresented minority group. Because he was able and ready to apply as a transfer student, he had standing to seek prospective relief — both as a student denied freshman admission and as one seeking transfer admission.

While Bakke made clear that diversity can constitute a compelling state interest, the automatic award of one-fifth of the points needed to guarantee admission to every underrepresented minority applicant solely because of race was not narrowly tailored to achieve educational diversity. That system amounted to a quota, which the Court deemed impermissible. Instead, universities must adopt admissions guidelines under which every applicant is considered as an individual — though race may be one factor in that individual consideration.

The Court did not find similar constitutional defects in the Law School's policies. The Court held that the Law School had a legitimate interest in obtaining a critical mass of minority students, reasoning that future lawyers needed exposure to diverse perspectives to understand and serve a diverse society — a benefit that extended to the entire student body, not only to minority students admitted through race-sensitive policies.

Conclusion: In Gratz, the Court granted the University's motion for summary judgment with respect to its current admissions guidelines but found that the guidelines in effect from 1995 through 1997 operated as a quota in violation of Bakke, granting petitioners' motion for summary judgment as to those years. In Grutter, the Court determined that the Law School's admissions program was constitutionally appropriate and that a school could legitimately seek a critical mass of minority students. Taken together, the two decisions established that while quota systems remain impermissible, universities may use race as a plus factor in holistic admissions review in order to achieve student body diversity.