This paper examines the February 9, 1998 crash landing of American Airlines Flight 1340, a Boeing 727 operating from Kansas City to Chicago O'Hare International Airport. It traces the sequence of events from departure through the final instrument approach, describes the crash landing and the substantial damage sustained by the aircraft, and documents the aftermath, including emergency evacuation, passenger injuries, and subsequent litigation. Drawing on the National Transportation Safety Board's accident brief, the paper analyzes both the probable cause—flight crew failure to maintain proper pitch attitude—and a contributing cause rooted in an uncorrected autopilot desensitization setting dating to a procedural change made in the early 1980s.
An American Airlines Boeing 727 operating as Flight 1340 from Kansas City to Chicago met with an accident on February 9, 1998 (0954 central standard time), while landing at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD). Although there were no fatalities, 22 passengers and 1 flight attendant—out of the 116 passengers, 3 flight crewmembers, and 3 flight attendants on board—received minor injuries, and the airplane was substantially damaged. This paper traces the sequence of events leading to the accident, describes the crash and its aftermath, and analyzes its probable causes.
0843 hrs: Flight 1340 departs from Kansas City International Airport on February 9, 1998, after a one-hour delay in the scheduled flight time because of poor weather conditions at O'Hare International Airport, Chicago ("Aircraft Accident Brief," 1998, p. 1).
0936:51 hrs: After an uneventful flight, the flight crew makes initial contact with the west arrival controller at the Chicago Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) facility.
0948:32 hrs: The west arrival controller at TRACON clears the airplane for an Instrument Landing System (ILS) CAT II approach to runway 14R at ORD and instructs the crew to maintain an airspeed of 170 knots until reaching the outer marker, located 5.2 miles from the runway threshold. At this point, Flight 1340 is approximately 18 miles from the airport. A CAT II approach is a straight-in ILS approach conducted to decision heights as low as 100 feet above the highest elevation in the touchdown zone, with runway visual range less than 1,800 feet but not less than 1,200 feet ("Aircraft Accident Brief," 1998, p. 2).
0948:39 hrs: The flight crew acknowledges the approach clearance.
0949:08 hrs: The west arrival controller advises Flight 1340 to contact the ORD tower and to report its position at the outer marker.
0952:15 hrs: The flight crew contacts the ORD south local tower controller and reports its position at the outer marker. The controller clears Flight 1340 to land two seconds later and advises the flight crew that the winds at runway 14R are calm.
0952:29 hrs: The flight crew acknowledges the landing clearance. This was the last radio transmission received from the flight crew; the remaining events are therefore based on recorded data and post-accident statements by the flight crew and controllers.
The Approach — 0948:32 to 0953:54 hrs: Following the approach clearance from the TRACON west controller at 0948:32, the first officer selected AUTO/G/S (glideslope) on the autopilot and on the flight director. The glideslope function informs the pilot of the airplane's vertical position relative to the ideal approach path. Airplane speed was set at 170 knots with flaps at 15°. At the outer marker, the flaps were extended to 30° and the airplane was slowed to 143 knots.
The first officer continued to fly the approach until 0953:49, when the captain took control of the plane, stating "I got it," as the airplane descended through 140 feet above ground level. The first officer later recalled that he first felt a "pitch down" sometime between the 200-foot call and before reaching the decision height (DH). He also stated that the captain was in control of the plane at the time, the autopilot was engaged, and when he looked out the window he saw the approach lights and the "nose pointed short of the runway."
The cockpit voice recorder (CVR) recorded the flight engineer stating, "ooh nose uh" at 0953:51. At 0953:52, the autopilot was disconnected when the airplane was at an altitude of approximately 80 feet. Simultaneously, the first officer called out "one hundred [feet]" and the flight engineer stated, "nose up, nose up." The captain did not call for a missed approach but did pull back on the control column, which prevented a more disastrous nose-first impact. At 0953:54, the CVR recorded the sounds of impact.
The airplane touched down 160 feet short of the runway pavement, became airborne again, touched down a second time on the runway, and then slid approximately 2,350 feet before coming to rest in an upright position in the mud about 250 feet to the right of the runway ("Aircraft Accident Brief," 1998, p. 15).
The two main landing gears and parts of both wings were found along a 2,670-foot debris path stretching from the point of initial impact short of the runway threshold to where the airplane came to rest. The pneumatic start connection door and the lower tailskid assembly were found 180 feet from the runway threshold. Additional debris included airstairs, the airstairs door, right spoiler panels, flap surfaces, and control assemblies. The bottom of the fuselage sustained substantial damage and was torn, dented, and scratched.
"Evacuation, injuries, and passenger lawsuit"
"NTSB findings on crew error and autopilot flaw"
The crash of American Airlines Flight 1340 resulted from a combination of flight crew error and an uncorrected technical deficiency in the autopilot system that had gone unaddressed for nearly two decades. The crew's failure to respond appropriately to abnormal pitch deviations at the decision height, compounded by an autopilot desensitization rate that had not been adjusted to reflect a change in standard flap procedures, produced the conditions for the accident. While all on board survived, the event resulted in significant aircraft damage, passenger injuries, and subsequent litigation, and it underscores the importance of coordinating procedural changes with corresponding adjustments to automated flight systems.
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