This paper examines the crash of American Airlines Flight 587 on November 12, 2001, which killed all 260 people aboard and five on the ground shortly after takeoff from John F. Kennedy International Airport. The analysis traces the chain of events leading to the crash, including wake turbulence encounters and the first officer's rudder inputs, and follows the NTSB's three-year investigation through its successive hypotheses β terrorist attack, composite material failure, and ultimately pilot-induced aerodynamic overload. The paper also discusses the rudder sensitivity characteristics of the Airbus A300-605R, subsequent related incidents, and the regulatory and training changes that followed.
American Airlines is one of the largest airlines in the world. On November 12, 2001, barely two months after the horrifying terror attacks on the Twin Towers, New York was the scene of another tragic event in aviation history. On that morning, American Airlines Flight 587, which had taken off from John F. Kennedy International Airport in New York bound for Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, met with a fatal accident. The flight, which departed JFK at 9:14 a.m., slammed into the residential area of Rockaway, a suburb in Queens. All 260 people aboard β including 251 passengers, Captain Ed States, First Officer Sten Molin, and seven flight attendants β perished. Five people on the ground were also killed in the crash.
In the wake of the prevailing atmosphere of fear following September 11, there was widespread public panic that the crash was another terror attack against America. The initial NTSB investigation team was also open to different possibilities, and the probability of a terrorist attack was pursued. Subsequently, based on a lack of evidence, the role of terrorists was ruled out and the investigation focus shifted to the technical aspects of the crash. It took the NTSB three years to publish its final report on the disaster. A brief overview of the critical in-flight events and the subsequent investigation reveals some shocking discrepancies and glaring omissions that led to the fatal chain of events.
American Airlines Flight 587 took off from John F. Kennedy International Airport at 9:14 a.m. on November 12, 2001. What was supposed to be a routine three-and-a-half-hour flight unfortunately turned out to be a fatal catastrophe for everyone aboard, as the plane crashed barely two minutes after takeoff in the neighboring Queens suburb. The experienced Captain Ed States, age 42, and First Officer Sten Molin, age 34 with ten years of experience, began their pre-flight checks at 7:00 a.m. The Airbus A300-605R, built in Europe with a carrying capacity of 266 people, was one of the oldest models in the American Airlines fleet. This particular aircraft had already recorded over 37,000 hours of flying time and was regarded as one of the most reliable planes in the fleet.
The scheduled departure at 8:40 a.m. was delayed due to increased security checks in the wake of the September 11 attacks. At 9:11 a.m., a Japan Airlines Boeing 747 that was ahead of Flight 587 on runway 31L was cleared for takeoff. The ground controller issued a warning to the crew of Flight 587 regarding the potential wake turbulence they could face from the Japan Airlines jumbo jet flying ahead of them. At 9:14 a.m., First Officer Sten Molin, who was in charge of the first leg of the flight, began the takeoff roll.
At 9:15 a.m., Flight 587 attained an altitude of 1,700 feet and the control room issued a navigation fix. The very next moment, Flight 587 began to experience severe turbulence β the swirling vortex of air trailing the Japan Airlines 747 ahead. First Officer Molin managed to fly through the first episode by adopting the standard procedure of increasing speed to achieve turbulent air penetration speed. Since the flight was below 10,000 feet, he increased speed to the permissible maximum of 250 knots. The relief was short-lived, however, as the plane was struck by a second, more severe bout of turbulence. The plane began to roll, and the first officer used his foot pedals to push the rudder first to the right and then to the left in an attempt to regain roll control. He called for more power and repeated the rudder movements, but was unable to bring the plane back under control. Spinning violently, the aircraft crashed into the ground in Rockaway, Queens, at 9:16 a.m. With no survivors, the crash of Flight 587 is recorded as the second deadliest aviation accident in United States history.
The NTSB immediately deployed a Go Team to the crash site to collect evidence and analyze the cause of the crash. The investigation took roughly three years β 1,079 days β and involved 16 teams contributing over 100,000 man-hours of work. The former NTSB chairman, Marion Blakey, also immediately traveled to the accident site in New York and supervised the investigation process.
The airplane was totally destroyed by the impact forces. Investigators analyzed the pattern of scattered debris, which provided important clues about the sequence and nature of the accident. They found that both engines had landed 245 meters ahead of the main crash site, while the tail section was recovered 1.2 kilometers behind the crash site, from the waters of Jamaica Bay. This was highly significant, as it clearly indicated that the tail fin had separated from the aircraft well before the crash β and may therefore have been responsible for it. The FBI thoroughly examined the tail fin for traces of explosives to determine whether terrorism had played a role. The search team also recovered the cockpit voice recorder, which was sent to the NTSB's headquarters in Washington for thorough analysis.
"Terror and material failure hypotheses examined"
"Flight data recorder reveals excessive rudder inputs"
"A300-605R rudder design flaws and related incidents"
"Regulatory responses and unresolved safety recommendations"
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