Aristotle's Three Types of Friendship Explained

Introduction

In his Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle outlines his view of friendship and explains that there are three distinct types of human friendship: friendship of utility, friendship of pleasure, and friendship of virtue. He distinguishes them from one another on the basis of how they are formed, their defining characteristics, and their relative value to human beings. In general, Aristotle argued that friendship is one of the most significant human relationships, even suggesting that one type — friendship of virtue — surpasses even highly important concepts such as law and justice. In particular, Aristotle held that while friendships of utility and pleasure fulfill specific and important human needs, it is friendship of virtue that deserves the greatest esteem and that represents the highest form of human friendship.

Aristotle's characterization and analysis of the three different types of friendship is largely consistent with contemporary ideas about human relationships. Friendship of utility corresponds to functional symbiosis between individuals who contribute something valued by the other and for which each friend reciprocates in kind. Friendship of pleasure corresponds to bonds based on or inspired by mutual affinity for similar, though relatively superficial, interests. Finally, friendship of virtue corresponds to friendships grounded in shared values and fundamental beliefs. Naturally, friendships of that type are consistent with Aristotle's characterization of them as the most substantial and important of the three kinds of friendship enjoyed by human beings.

Friendship of Utility

According to Aristotle, a friendship of utility represents a relationship in which both parties contribute something to the relationship that is valued by the other (Egner & Denonn, 1961). The form of that value may be bartered services, paid services, or simply reciprocal favors of any sort that are roughly equivalent in the degree to which they are appreciated by both individuals. The modern-day analog of Aristotle's characterization might include the friendly relations shared by a shopkeeper and a regular customer, business partners, or neighbors who take turns watering or mowing one another's lawn.

Aristotle explained that friendships of utility tend to be superficial precisely because they are inspired by the nature of transaction or the mutual external needs of the individuals for each other's tangible contributions (Egner & Denonn, 1961). While the human community thrives on these kinds of relationships, they are superficial because they do not require that the individuals involved share anything substantial. Therefore, friendships of utility typically form quickly — even spontaneously — and may end abruptly whenever the need that created the friendship ceases to exist. Likewise, in friendships of utility, one friend can be easily substituted by a different person who fulfills the same need (Magill & McGreal, 1981).

Aristotle also argued that friendships of utility are particularly well-suited to the elderly because older individuals generally have a greater need for the assistance of others than do younger people (Magill & McGreal, 1981). While this may be true in many respects, it may be the least accurate of Aristotle's observations, simply because advanced age often brings additional psychological maturity that enables individuals to better appreciate and more readily form the kinds of friendships Aristotle describes as the most substantial and valuable: namely, friendships of virtue.

Despite having been formulated millennia ago, Aristotle's general conception of friendships of utility perfectly describes the modern-day relationship between superficial friendly acquaintances who may or may not ever come to know one another on any meaningful level. This would include the friendships between patrons who frequent restaurants or other service-oriented businesses and their proprietors, or friendships formed between customers and their hired professionals. Such friends need one another for specific reasons and may share genuine pleasantries, but their relationship is built around the superficiality of their need for each other's specific contribution. These friendships can end abruptly or be replaced without significant loss on either part, and even a long-lasting friendship of this type may never develop any greater substance than existed on the day the friends first met, regardless of how long it endures.

Friendship of Pleasure

According to Aristotle, a friendship of pleasure represents a relationship in which the individuals share a specific common interest that forms the basis of the friendship (Magill & McGreal, 1981). Aristotle differentiated friendships of pleasure from friendships of utility by pointing out that the former are based on preferences and shared interests, whereas the latter are based on specific needs that exist irrespective of personal preferences. For example, the friendship between shopkeepers and their customers is based on a reciprocal need: the shopkeeper needs the customer's patronage to support himself, and the customer needs the goods the shopkeeper sells. In most cases, neither individual has any choice or control over the need that generates the friendship. Conversely, in friendships of pleasure, individuals typically choose the interests they share with their counterparts, and those chosen interests form the basis of the relationship (Magill & McGreal, 1981).

Whereas Aristotle characterizes friendships of utility as most natural among the elderly, he suggested that friendships of pleasure are most natural to young people. While the first suggestion may or may not be entirely accurate, one could easily conclude that the second is extremely accurate, even today — or perhaps especially today. Children typically form friendships based on nothing more than the physical proximity of their homes or attendance at the same classes. Childhood friendships are often formed and terminated with relative ease, such as by relocation or transfer to a new school. Likewise, teenagers often select friends from their many acquaintances based on superficialities such as a shared appreciation for similar music or sports.

Aristotle argues that, as a result, friendships of pleasure are equally superficial and, much like friendships of utility, are formed and ended quickly and are relatively easily exchanged (Magill & McGreal, 1981). Aristotle's views on friendships of pleasure are also highly applicable to contemporary friendships among individuals whose principal motivation is a shared interest in an external pursuit or recreational activity. In that regard, friendship of pleasure differs from friendship of utility only in that the former reflects a mutual satisfaction of a need not necessarily chosen by the individuals, while the latter often reflects an autonomous choice in the specific interest the friends share. It may be the source of significant joy and much-needed companionship; nevertheless, it remains a superficial form of friendship precisely because it reflects an arbitrary external commonality.

Conclusion

Aristotle's three-part typology of friendship — utility, pleasure, and virtue — remains a compelling framework for understanding human relationships. While friendships of utility and pleasure fulfill genuine and important needs, it is friendship of virtue that Aristotle, and this analysis, identifies as the most enduring and meaningful. Grounded in shared values and fundamental beliefs rather than in transactional needs or arbitrary interests, friendship of virtue represents, for Aristotle, the fullest realization of what human friendship can be. The enduring relevance of this framework across millennia speaks to the depth and accuracy of Aristotle's moral philosophy.

References

Egner, R. E., & Denonn, L. E. (1961). The Basic Writings of Bertrand Russell. New York: Simon & Schuster.

Hursthouse, R. (1999). On Virtue Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Magill, F. N., & McGreal, I. P. (1981). Masterpieces of World Philosophy in Summary Form. New York: Harper & Row.

Rosenstand, N. (2008). The Moral of the Story: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: McGraw-Hill.