The Civil War: Carnage, Gettysburg, and the Myth of Innovation

Introduction: A War of Waste, Not Innovation

When historians and other interested researchers analyze the American Civil War, there is little to be found in terms of great advancements or innovations, either technological or theoretical. What one discovers, even in a brief review of the "War Between the States," is human carnage, bloody battlefields, broken hearts, families torn apart, burned cities, wasted lives, and political hatred. All that waste, rage, and killing resulted from the inability of two regions of a new country to reach a compromise over two critical issues: (a) Should the evil institution of slavery — human bondage — be allowed to continue? And (b) do individual states within the union have the right to adopt their own moral and political policies, even when those policies radically depart from the U.S. Constitution?

This paper reviews the Civil War, including one of its most famous and bloodiest battles. It also provides pertinent facts and statistics that reveal the true nature of this ugly confrontation between the North and the South.

Troop Strength and the Scale of Suffering

How many men fought in the Civil War? According to historian James M. McPherson, although "estimates of the number of men who fought for the Confederacy are based on fragmentary" information, it is believed that somewhere between 600,000 and 800,000 men fought for the South, while it is "generally accepted" that some 2,100,000 troops fought for the North (McPherson 306). That means over two million families in the North and possibly 800,000 families in the South were affected — at the very least through emotional distress, and at the worst through the painful death of a loved one.

Southern Miscalculations and Strategic Failures

On the subject of possible innovations and military contrasts between the North and South, McPherson explains that though the Confederate army attempted to institute "ingenuity and innovations" in its naval strategies, the South's navy "could never overcome Union supremacy on the high seas or along the coasts and rivers of the South" (316). Attitude problems also contributed to the South's defeat.

"In southern eyes the North was a nation of shopkeepers," McPherson writes. "It mattered not that the Union's industrial capacity was many times greater than the Confederacy's" (316). In fact, "southern boys" were "expecting a short and glorious war" and "rushed to join the colors before the fun was over" (McPherson 317). As history shows, there was nothing "fun" about the bloodbath that was to come.

Another miscalculation that contributed to the South's defeat, according to historian David Potter, was that the Confederacy opted for a defensive strategy "rather than take any initiative against the North" (Potter 120). The South believed that citizens up North were "so badly divided" that they would "not support a war of invasion against the South" (Potter 120). There were sound reasons for a defensive posture — it is "less costly," and "an army loses fewer troops defending a position" rather than attacking one (Potter 120).

Nevertheless, Potter explains that the South was, in effect, confining itself to "preventing the Union from winning," rather than actively pursuing the Union's defeat (122). And when the South did take the war to the North — at places like Gettysburg — it often backfired.