Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency Strategy Post-9/11

Introduction and Definitions

Efforts to counter terrorists bring us up against a number of perplexing questions before operations begin. Does so much stress on control and prevention of political violence cloud a necessary attempt to analyze and understand the causes of terrorism? There are many factors that play into the causes of terrorism such as people living in places where everyday life is constantly disrupted from terrorist attacks, lack of economic opportunity, religious radicalization, and tribal or religious conflict, to name a few. Yet there is only one real question: how do we put an end to it and eliminate the problem? While there may be one seemingly simplistic question, there is no simple answer to the issue of terrorism.

The prime goal of counter-terrorism is to deter, detect, disrupt, and defeat terrorist operations. It is important to distinguish between counter-terrorism and anti-terrorism, terms that many people use interchangeably. Anti-terrorism is more defensive in nature and works toward developing policies and programs such as a more visible police presence around sensitive sites or a beefed-up guard force at a military base entrance. Counter-terrorism, by contrast, is offensive in nature—examples include the killing of Osama bin Laden or the capture of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

This analysis focuses primarily on counter-terrorism efforts currently being developed internationally and institutionally by the United States, European Union, Britain, and the United Nations, including financial aspects such as the movement, tracking, fundraising, and organizations that enable terrorist groups financially.

Counter-terrorism operations prior to 9/11 had been an uncoordinated effort for many years by individual countries seeking to deal with sporadic incidents or long-term activity. In piecemeal fashion, this was a tidying-up-after-the-damage operation, damping down the flames but scarcely extinguishing the fire. Post-9/11, the U.S. and most of the world, through aggressive counter-terrorism operations, discovered terrorist networks to be far more organized, sophisticated, and funded than previously thought. Now that terrorism has grown to touch most of the world, opinion generally has called for a more aggressive global response and a coalition effort to combat the spread of terrorist ideology and attacks.

Post-9/11 Institutional Response and Core Principles

Some of the major principles and successful strategies of counter-terrorism include neutralizing terrorist organizations by weakening them and rendering potential targets more difficult to attack; building a consensus among agencies to negotiate ways forward and to share intelligence; identifying terrorist perpetrators, sympathizers, and financiers while seizing terrorist funding and redirecting it toward financing counter-terrorism efforts; implementing effective counter-insurgency operations utilizing government, NGOs, and UN humanitarian organizations to rebuild, educate, and develop basic services to civilian populations; and gathering intelligence that is specific regarding terrorist strength, leadership profiles, sources of supply and equipment, logistics, goals, and affiliations.

A fundamental question frequently asked is this: how can governments most effectively control terrorism while maintaining democratic freedoms? In many countries among those responsible for security, there is not always wholesale agreement over principles of counter-terrorism. The security and stability of their nation, perhaps even its basic existence, is menaced by anti-institutional violence. Many of the so-called partner nations have harsh, even draconian, security measures within their borders. The U.S. can be viewed as not adhering to basic human rights by mere association in some cases. While the U.S. must insist on democratic reforms within these nations, the need to utilize bases and geographical locations makes it difficult diplomatically in the global war on terrorism.

To deal with the global threat of terrorism, the United States, European Union, and the UN have been implementing programs to develop schools, governmental institutions, hospitals, and market-based economies. While Iraq is a developing nation, Afghanistan is much further behind. The UN has estimated Afghanistan's lack of basic government, civil, medical, and educational systems to be comparable to feudal Europe. Implementing counter-insurgency efforts while conducting counter-terrorism operations is relatively new to the U.S. FM 3-24, the Army Counter-Insurgency manual (COIN), published in 2006, was the first major revision to U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine in over 20 years. The previous manual was written in 1984 and called the Marine Corps Manual of Small Wars; it had never been exercised. Prior to this, Vietnam was the last effort the U.S. had undertaken in counter-insurgency, with very poor results. The need for a new approach in COIN was highly needed, and this need was noticed. Five years after the invasion of Afghanistan, the COIN strategy was implemented to coincide with counter-terror efforts.

An interesting adjunct to the UN response was that three weeks after 9/11, the organization convened its General Assembly as usual but gave over an entire week to discussing terrorism and counter-terrorism. In a rare event of precedence, New York's mayor, Rudolf Giuliani, was invited to open proceedings attended by 160 states. Unanimously, members backed stiff legal measures to outlaw terrorism, and the Security Council's Resolution 1373 banned all forms of support for terrorists. Member states were compelled to cooperate to eliminate terror wherever possible. Ambassadors from developing countries constantly pointed out that there was a difference between those legitimately fighting for freedom against oppression or an occupying power and those who resort to indiscriminate violence. Second, there was the reminder that the world must fight not only terrorism but also the poverty and underdevelopment that so often fuel despair and violence. Third, concern was voiced that counter-terrorism must never violate basic human rights.

UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001 binds member states to modify their domestic laws to permit more effective surveillance and powers of arrest to hunt suspected terrorists and to use sophisticated means of accumulating and sharing information. The U.S. and its allies, along with the UN, continue research into the causes of terrorism, coordinate intelligence exchange, and provide crisis mediation services. UN member states are enhancing their counter-terrorism in three particular ways: through treaty observance, through the work of the UN Security Council and specialized agencies, and through systems to identify, track, and seize the financing of international terrorism. Treaties are being developed to get member states to become more aggressive in preventing the recruitment of terrorists and denying terrorist groups the ability to train or raise finances for their continued operation.

Counter-Terrorism Financing and Money Tracking

A major operation by the UN to counter terrorists is designed to defeat their financing. In North America, there is significant momentum behind this initiative. Canada's finance minister, in December 2001, spoke of terrorism in the twenty-first century as rooted on two fronts: violence against innocent people, and second, the capacity to finance that violence. As a result, states must respond on both fronts. Canada and others have committed to destroy terrorist capacity to wield military might against innocent people and to strip from their grasp the capacity to finance that violence.

International efforts to counter terrorist activity can be set against a shift from terrorist groups often sponsored by states to networks of terrorists not affiliated with particular states. A globalized terrorism must be met by a globalized counter-response, and this is certainly true of efforts to eradicate illicit funding. The former piecemeal and short-term operations by individual states to curb terrorist financing have to be replaced by longer-term strategies and interventionist programs. Termed "electronic combat," the most sophisticated arrangements will need to be operated by a coalition of banks, taxation authorities, and law enforcement agencies. Investments, asset transfers, and stock exchange dealings must be monitored. Suspect funds will be frozen or seized. There will be a watch on "listed persons."

How is all this to be done under a UN mandate when so many nations operate quite different financial regimes? A coordinated search for hidden assets from Vancouver to Bangkok runs across current free-market reliance on bank secrecy, offshore tax havens, and financial corporation confidentiality. In autumn 2001, The Wall Street Journal reported stormy meetings between bankers in the United States and the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank, Alan Greenspan. Banks were legitimately concerned about the privacy of their clients and the continuance of business, to which the movement of money across states and internationally is paramount. More regulation and closer scrutiny by the Federal Reserve could place an undue burden on banks, possibly causing some to go out of business, especially smaller ones.

On a broader front, the all-nation initiative to stem terrorist funding comes up against three formidable obstacles. Most of all, there is the sheer size and complexity of the "money trail." Every day, thousands of money transactions representing trillions of currency values flash between clients and countries in seconds. Looking closely at a web of these proportions by way of security operations is virtually an impossible task. Security agencies can only hope to scrutinize a fraction of it. Then there is the problem that in Muslim countries, much of the money dealing is conducted by the hawala, a Hindi word meaning "trust," where funds pass "on the nod" and without documentation. Third, and again in Muslim countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, there are fundraising institutions subsidizing to a very considerable extent an array of political, social, cultural, and educational objectives. Most of these bodies, in Muslim lands and in the West where Muslims have emigrated, are entirely above board and do much good, reputable work for their dependents. There is, however, what has been called the "greenhouse effect," not a meteorological term but a reference to an umbrella function where some organizations act as a front for nefarious, possibly violent, political activity. Some organizations may be well-intentioned and have no idea of any diversion of funds to enterprises that are engaged in or financing international terror groups.

European Union Counter-Terrorism Framework

These agreements are translated into action by the specialized agencies of the UN. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), the International Maritime Organization (IMO), and the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) will take appropriate steps through consultation and comprehensive projects, each in its specific field. Urgent measures are being adopted to improve the security of air and sea travel. Programs to safeguard vulnerable nuclear, chemical, and biological material from being clandestinely transferred to terror groups have improved since 9/11. However, there are still countries that are sympathetic to or, because of political aims, may allow transfer of these critical materials. Storage and processing sites of regimes that have fallen or are in serious trouble of collapse are of particular concern.

An illustration of the globality of contemporary terrorism is that of the far-reaching counter-terrorism framework the EU was putting into place within days of the World Trade Center attack. The Union's 15 original members have expanded to 25, and expansion may increase in the future. Member states are working earnestly on a wide canvas of economic, political, and social policies and programs with fundamental human rights always a major concern. Appropriately, fighting terrorism is being accorded priority. The EU, following closely the resolutions and advice from the UN, is designing a comprehensive scheme for improved civil and individual protection against terrorist attack.

No elaborate program can guarantee that more than a score of states will interpret directives in similar fashion. Bringing legal and home affairs matters into common focus is a relatively new experience for many European ministers. The last two years have seen them almost breathlessly engaged in a series of summits, workshops, conferences, and media interviews. Most European states had no specific laws on terrorism and had dealt with any terrorist attacks under ordinary criminal law. Now, the European Parliament in Brussels and the EU Court in Strasbourg talk of a homogeneous judicial area. Already, three legal innovations have been tabled and ratified. First, there is to be a common definition of terrorism and its offenses, including murder, kidnapping, financial extortion, and cyber terrorism. Second, a European Arrest Warrant will prevent terrorists from taking advantage of varying European legal systems and will simplify and accelerate extradition procedures. Third, a common, graduated penalty scale will operate, providing for sentences of 2 to 20 years upon conviction. It is only to be expected that a raft of measures such as these raises concern and some protest about apparent diminution of human rights.

United States Strategy and Policy Evolution

Generally, in the case of the United States and its attitudes to countering terrorism, a significant change is recognized. The greatest world power, exceptionally secure, had its vulnerability demonstrated in 2001. No longer could the American approach to terrorism be what it was in the 1980s and 1990s. Two major changes to the U.S. approach to terrorism post-9/11 were developed by the Bush Administration. First was to strengthen the homeland, hence the creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Second was to strike terrorism at their havens abroad, destroying training camps and killing or capturing terrorists in their bases of operation. Focus was on capturing "high-value" targets to piece together the intelligence picture and attempt to thwart future attacks, which has been fairly successful, albeit controversial regarding actions such as alleged torture or enhanced interrogation techniques, black prisons in foreign countries and aboard Navy ships, as well as the opening of the detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

President Bush, shortly after the 9/11 attacks, put the world on notice with the statement: "If you do business with terrorists, if you support them or sponsor them, you will not do business with the United States. The United States will provide a global dragnet. Terrorists have always been in the shadows and they have tried to hide. But terrorism has a face and it will be exposed for the world to see."

President Obama has shifted efforts toward a less boots-on-the-ground approach, relying more on drones. Some would argue that killing U.S. citizens with drones overseas without due process is illegal. However, the courts have ruled that if a U.S. citizen engages in hostile acts against the U.S. with a terrorist organization or an armed foreign force, then they forfeit those rights afforded under the constitution.

Whichever policy Americans pursue—whether more close engagement or more drones and fewer boots on the ground—the one constant is that the Global War on Terror has already been the longest war in U.S. history and is becoming very costly in both blood and treasure. As terrorism progresses from ancient tactics to modern threats posed by groups like ISIS/ISIL, surely both our strategy and the enemy's strategy will continue to change, adapt, and develop.