UK Government Response to Post-9/11 Islamic Terrorism

Introduction

Terrorism, in the context of the United Kingdom, is not new. Developed through the past century in response to increasing rates of terrorism, the United Kingdom's modern counter-terrorism strategies encompass elements of both continuity and change. Despite significant development, there has been no fundamental change to the underlying structure, as terrorism agencies carry out similar functions in response to the challenges of globalization and the Islamic radicalism that drives rising rates of terrorism (Curtis, 2010). The effects of terrorism are varied, ranging from social and economic to political consequences that affect the overall performance and competitiveness of a state's economic prospects.

Based on this, a central question for the United Kingdom — as well as other regions of the world — has been the readiness of agencies' modus operandi in countering Islamic and other forms of terrorism. To date, significant intelligence work has prevented up to twelve terrorist plots in Britain. Despite these successes, the failure to prevent attacks such as September 11 in the United States is considered a significant failure of security intelligence to maintain the health of the state (Foley, 2009).

This essay assesses the response of the UK Government to the post-September 11 threat of Islamic terrorism. It is structured into three parts. The first section provides a brief analysis of the conceptualization of intelligence failure prior to the attacks, which the UK used to develop responsive counter-terrorism strategies. The second section analyzes the involvement of UK agencies before and around the September 11 attacks, while the third section assesses the UK's response to post-September 11 attacks. Cumulatively, the analysis aims to create an understanding of the manner in which the UK has responded to Islamist attacks post-September 11, and the ways in which the UK has invested in addressing the weaknesses identified from other states to build a better intelligence system capable of preventing future occurrences of similar or more devastating terrorist events.

Conceptualizing Intelligence Failure and the September 11 Attacks

Significant evidence shows that no universally accepted definition of intelligence failure exists, as it can occur at various levels and comes in different forms. Field (2009) defines intelligence failure simply as a process whereby there is a "warning failure" at some point in the intelligence cycle — where intelligence information is collected, analyzed, or disseminated without generating a substantial warning of an impending attack. Issues such as assuming the reliability of sources during the initial collection and analysis of intelligence information, alongside the use of deception techniques, contribute to intelligence failure. According to Andrew (2009), organizational inertia and structure can also compound the failure by preventing agencies from challenging dominant assumptions, thereby increasing vulnerability to Islamic terrorist attack. Combining these factors made the United States more vulnerable to the September 11 attacks.

Intelligence failure may also occur at the level of dissemination, where information is circulated to liaison partners, other intelligence agencies, policy makers, and external bodies. According to Hitchens (2003), collectors of intelligence information who allow political considerations to shape their results have most frequently made the most significant mistakes. The political nature of intelligence information makes it difficult for responsible agencies to convince policy makers of its credibility and reliability, thereby increasing the likelihood of terrorism going undetected.

Notwithstanding this, Walker (2002) argues that it is necessary to consider the limits of intelligence in order to better understand the concept of intelligence failure. The concept of the "limits of intelligence" holds that intelligence agencies cannot prevent intelligence failures in all cases. As such, it creates a different understanding of intelligence failure as an intermingled process consisting of both successes and failures, underscoring the need for the adoption of responsive strategies to terrorism — particularly post the September 11 attacks in the UK.

As stated by Benthem (2001), the above considerations make it apparent that there was a need for the United Kingdom to assess and reform its response to terrorism post-September 11. Although Islamic terrorism is not considered a "security agency," terrorist organizations do not enhance their capabilities using deception knowledge and the signals intelligence techniques employed by the UK. Nevertheless, evidence of intelligence failure can occur at any level of the intelligence cycle, all of which contributed to the September 11 attacks (Curtis, 2010).

UK Intelligence and Islamic Terrorism Before September 11

Celso (2014) identifies that for decades, UK governments maintained a colluded relationship with radical Islamic forces to sustain particular foreign policy objectives. This relationship began during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979–89), when the United Kingdom and the United States provided diplomatic, financial, and military backing to Islamist organizations. That conflict gave the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks the opportunity to forge connections with Al-Qaeda, connections that later facilitated the orchestration of terrorist attacks against the West.

Significant evidence indicates that the United Kingdom has adopted various strategies to counter Islamic terrorism over time. For instance, the ASCRIBE initiative countered the growth of serious organized crime through enhanced definition of the roles of counter-terrorism agencies. Similarly, the UK Government created MI5 to counter the threat of Islamist terrorism. Considering this history provides important context for analyzing the lessons the UK learned from its past relationship with Islamists prior to the September 11 attacks, and thereby better understanding the responsive strategies adopted after the attacks (Walker, 2002).

The UK Government's Response to Post-September 11 Islamic Terrorism

The UK's previous encounters with Islamic terrorists provided it with significant insights into the weaknesses of its intelligence system and the need for responsive strategies. However, Hewitt (2008) argues that the UK Government's initial response to the September 11 attacks displayed a "reactive," politicized, and short-term mentality. This is evidenced by the quick move to introduce legislation such as the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, which focused on preventing terrorist attacks across the UK. The main characteristic of the act was its provision for the deportation and internment of non-UK citizens believed to be involved in activities contributing to terrorism. The act also advocated for stricter immigration and border controls to prevent terrorists from entering the country. The government's tendency to view terrorism as a "foreign" entity manageable through "foreign policy" signified the reactive and short-term nature of the strategies it initially adopted (Segell, 2006).

As a component of the UK Government's broader contest strategy, the intelligence community faced significant pressure to consider different approaches to preventing terrorism. One such strategy was increasing the allocation of resources to the intelligence community alongside its structural expansion to enhance effectiveness. After the September 11 attacks, the UK Government increased resource allocation to the intelligence community, resulting in the expansion of agencies' capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorism. This expansion focused on addressing external threats that increased the country's susceptibilities to terrorism (Dokos, 2007).

However, empirical evidence presented by Curtis (2010) shows that the decision to increase resource allocation to the intelligence community disadvantaged other sectors significantly. For example, the decision arguably affected GCHQ, which received only 6% of the total budgetary allocation, thereby increasing the challenges posed by the revolution in global communications systems. The heightened visibility of transnational Islamic terrorism evidenced by the September 11 attacks highlighted weaknesses in the SIGINT networks of security intelligence across the world. It demonstrated that the intelligence systems used by states such as the United States and the UK had analytical deficits, evidenced by disparities in the intelligence information collected and analyzed. In response to these identified weaknesses, the UK Government increased the personnel involved in counter-terrorism efforts and raised overall resource allocation by 40%. Despite these prompt initiatives, Benthem (2001) recognizes that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan provided significant evidence of further weaknesses in the intelligence networks of both the UK and U.S. governments.

The United Kingdom also responded by doubling its resources devoted to preventing terrorism, including transferring some personnel back to London to work with MI5. Similarly, the UK Government recruited security agents overseas who ran disruption operations against terrorist activities and maintained the stability of counter-terrorism liaison arrangements. MI5 received significant budgetary allocations in 2004 that were used to increase intelligence activities such as surveillance of terrorist activities, interception of communications, and agent running, thereby enabling earlier detection and prevention of terrorist activities. According to Curtis (2010), these strategies contributed significantly to the effective regionalization of the intelligence service, allowing intelligence analysts to gain close access to hotspots of terrorism-linked activity. Significant outcomes such as the arrests and convictions in Operation RHYME (the gas limos plot) and Operation CREVICE (the fertilizer bomb plot) attest to the effectiveness of MI5 in countering criminal activity in the UK and elsewhere. As recognition of these efforts, the UK Government doubled the employment capacity of intelligence personnel between 2004 and 2008 (Celso, 2014).

Furthermore, fusion bodies were formed across the UK to facilitate and enhance intelligence efforts across institutional boundaries. In 2003, the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC) was established to set terrorism threat levels for the UK and to collaborate with smaller security bodies such as police units involved in countering Islamic terrorism. The collaboration between intelligence teams of different agencies enhanced the coordination of information across the intelligence community alongside the dissemination and analysis of terrorism-related intelligence. Additionally, the UK Government increased resources allocated to bodies such as the National Security Advice Centre and the National Infrastructure Security Co-ordination Centre, which enhanced efforts to counter Islamic terrorism and protect core national utilities (Benthem, 2001).

Among the other agencies created in response to post-September 11 threats, the UK Government increased provision of resources for the Anti-Terrorist Branch, also known as SO13. The Anti-Terrorist Branch was formed as a unit to investigate terrorist activities and conduct pre-emptive operations. While MI5's role was primarily to collect information on terrorists, the Anti-Terrorist Branch assisted local police by conducting operations aimed at directly preventing terrorist attacks (Andrew, 2009).

Two further intelligence agencies were created to serve as the foreign arm of the UK's intelligence network. The Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), also known as MI6, was given the responsibility of acquiring and providing information relating to the actions and intentions of people outside the British Islands. Essentially, MI6 collects human intelligence across borders using agents and informers who are in constant interaction with people across the world. The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was given the responsibility of collecting signals intelligence relating to terrorist acts and communications. After September 11, the UK also adopted measures to restrict air travel with the aim of reducing security threats, while measures to ensure the safety of public spaces — such as increased police patrols and expanded surveillance — signified the broader change strategies adopted in response to terrorism (Bamford, 2004).

In response to the September 11 attacks, the United Kingdom claimed the need for a "new paradigm" requiring fundamental changes to international laws governing state responses to terrorism. For instance, the Security Council joined the United States in adopting measures such as the fight against Al-Qaeda as a first step toward preventing and pre-empting terrorism. Similarly, the doctrine of pre-emptive war received significant attention, with efforts geared toward eliminating the possibility of terrorist connections within the UK and its allied states (Benthem, 2001).

Conclusion

In assessing how the United Kingdom responded after the September 11 attacks on the United States, it is apparent that significant measures were adopted to prevent terrorism. Despite the existence of intelligence failures, the efforts of the UK's intelligence systems proved effective in providing the desired security outcomes. Analysis of the historical development of UK intelligence shows that the intelligence community has displayed prompt and responsive strategies in cases of terrorism. As such, the strategies adopted by the state signify its dedication to ensuring the safety and well-being of society alongside socio-political stability. It is therefore recommended that, despite the strong performance of UK intelligence agencies, significant further efforts should be embraced to prevent future occurrences of terrorist attacks such as the 7/7 bombings.