Lone Wolf Terrorism: The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Bombing

Introduction

The 1996 Atlanta Olympic bombing was the act of lone wolf terrorist Eric Rudolph, motivated by an ideological standpoint from which he opposed abortion, homosexuality, corporatism, and the U.S. government's promotion of what he viewed as "the values of global socialism" (Rudolph, n.d.). Rudolph would eventually be captured in 2003 and convicted of the Atlanta bombing along with the bombings of two abortion clinics and a lesbian bar. Prior to his arrest, attention had been placed on security guard Richard Jewell, who discovered the backpack bomb at Centennial Olympic Park and alerted authorities just before its detonation. Jewell became a suspect — at least in the media — during an FBI investigation that included a raid on his home. Jewell's reputation never fully recovered from the suspicion placed upon him following his heroic efforts to save lives. He went on to sue the Bureau and even to testify before Congress about the need for an investigative method that would better protect the rights of people like him. This paper discusses the policy impact of the Atlanta Olympic bombing, how the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should address investigative matters, and how DHS could mitigate the risk of future lone wolf terrorist attacks.

Policy Impact of the 1996 Bombing

Since the 1996 bombing, DHS has published several documents aimed at protecting the public, such as "Mass Evacuations: Planning for Sports Venues," "Christian Extremism as a Domestic Terror Threat," and "Patterns of Radicalization: Identifying the Markers and Warning Signs of Domestic Lone Wolf Terrorists in Our Midst" (Chapman, 2012). The last of these focused on the pattern of radicalization common to three of the most high-profile lone wolf terrorists in U.S. history — Timothy McVeigh, Ted Kaczynski, and Eric Rudolph. The report sought to help "law enforcement to prevent tragedies emerging from the identified population through psychological assistance, evaluation, training, or, in the worst case, detention" (Springer, 2009, p. v). One of the key defining characteristics of the three terrorists was their experience of isolation, loneliness, and sociocultural pressure from their familial environments to conform to strident ideologies (Springer, 2009).

In the more than twenty years that have passed since the Atlanta bombing, DHS has developed a strategy for combating lone wolf terrorism, most recently evidenced by its Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and Targeted Violence (CTTV Framework) and a Public Action Plan designed to identify emerging threats and promote information sharing. This strategic framework and the associated action plan rely heavily on digital information-sharing tools that were not available in 1996 but that, thanks to the arrival of social media and the far more accessible Internet of the digital age, have made information sharing considerably easier.

While the value of monitoring for signs of lone wolf terrorism is indisputable, the problem that Jewell identified was the lack of professionalism in the leaking of his name to the press and his belief that the Justice Department does not hold itself accountable to the degree it should, given its service to the public (The Activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Part III, 1997). In that regard, further policy reform is needed. Issues of trust are important when it comes to federal agencies conducting investigations into terrorism. If the public feels — as was certainly the case with Richard Jewell — that federal agencies lack the necessary ethical and professional standards to engage in investigations of this nature, it will be less likely to assist in the kind of information sharing that the DHS strategic framework and associated action plan call for and depend upon.

Addressing Investigative Matters

One of the important arguments about lone wolf terrorists is that they are never really alone. As Weimann (2016) points out, "they are recruited, radicalized, taught, trained and directed by others" — typically through cyberspace and social media platforms (p. 1). This argument supports the case that DHS should focus attention on information sharing and working within the digital space to comb through publicly available records that might highlight individuals who are susceptible to terroristic indoctrination. However, digital surveillance raises its own ethical questions, particularly regarding individuals' rights to exercise free speech, who determines the line between hyperbolic rhetoric and threatening speech, and how such speech should be monitored, controlled, prevented, or policed (Utset, 2016). The dangers of a government agency spying on American citizens have come up before, notably in Congressional investigations into Operation CHAOS and the spying programs of the intelligence community in the latter half of the twentieth century. Those investigations showed that there was no clear ethical framework governing the monitoring of Americans' lives.

Privacy rights and professional and ethical standards were important elements in Jewell's testimony before Congress. His argument was that investigators should not collaborate with media in framing a narrative during an ongoing investigation, and that anyone who does should be held accountable. Accountability was the primary aim of the testimony: Jewell wanted to bring focus to the need for the Justice Department to exercise a higher degree of accountability if it wanted to foster trust with the American public. He believed that his story — and the tarnishing of his own reputation in the aftermath of the Atlanta bombing — were more than sufficient to draw notice to this important aspect of investigative work.

The two themes tie together. On the one hand, DHS is tasked with preventing lone wolf terrorism, which means it must find ways to promote information sharing so that isolated and dangerous individuals with extremist ideological views and violent tendencies can be identified and dealt with appropriately before a violent assault occurs. On the other hand, DHS must also address the issue of protecting the rights of the public so that the public can trust federal agencies when it comes to information sharing.

Jewell responded to the investigation into his life and background with candor and openness. As a security guard, he identified with law enforcement (Brenner, 1997). Even though the FBI never formally named him as a suspect, the media began drawing increasing attention to him as though he were the prime suspect in the bombing. It quickly appeared that some collaboration between the Bureau and media elements had existed to foster this narrative. This was not the kind of professionalism Jewell had anticipated as an innocent man who believed in the criminal justice process and the right of a person to maintain his innocence until proven guilty in a court of law. What became evident through his trial by media was that the court of public opinion had assumed a powerful position in the theater of justice — and it could cause irreparable harm both to those under scrutiny by federal agencies and to the reputations of those same agencies.

Conclusion

The 1996 Atlanta Olympic Games bombing was carried out by lone wolf terrorist Eric Rudolph. The subsequent investigation quickly placed attention on Richard Jewell, an innocent man, who came to believe that his rights had been violated and that the FBI had acted unprofessionally and unethically. The ensuing lawsuits and Congressional testimony Jewell provided revealed a significant problem with the way federal agencies approach the investigative process. Today, DHS has focused on creating a strategic plan and policy of using the digital environment to share information and monitor the development of potential lone wolf terrorists. However, if DHS does not govern the investigative process and surveillance procedures through authentic leadership and a clear ethical framework, it risks undermining the public's trust in its own practices and its ability to hold itself and other agencies accountable. Without establishing that trust, DHS risks creating an environment in which more lone wolves proliferate. A great many people have already experienced the isolation and loneliness associated with radicalization into lone wolf terrorism. For that reason, there is no time to waste.

References

The Activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Part III. (1997). Retrieved from http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju52836.000/hju52836_0f.htm

Brenner, M. (1997). American nightmare: The ballad of Richard Jewell. Retrieved from https://archive.vanityfair.com/article/share/1fd2d7ae-10d8-474b-9bf1-d1558af697be

Chapman, S. (2012). Looking back: The 1996 Centennial Olympic Park bombing. Retrieved from https://www.hsdl.org/c/looking-back-the-1996-centennial-olympic-park-bombing/

Rudolph, E. (n.d.). Statement. Retrieved from http://www.armyofgod.com/EricRudolphStatement.html

Springer, N. (2009). Patterns of radicalization: Identifying the markers and warning signs of domestic lone wolf terrorists in our midst. Retrieved from

Utset, M. A. (2016). Digital surveillance and preventive policing. Conn. L. Rev., 49, 1453.

Weimann, G. (2016). Lone wolves in cyberspace. Journal of Terrorism Research, 3(2), 1–16.

Winter, J. (2021). The Postal Service is running a 'covert operations program' that monitors Americans' social media posts.