This paper examines the evolution of capital punishment jurisprudence in the United States Supreme Court, tracing landmark decisions from the late 1960s through the early 2000s. Beginning with early procedural cases such as U.S. v. Jackson (1968) and progressing through foundational rulings in Furman v. Georgia (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia (1976), the paper analyzes how the Court refined the constitutional boundaries of the death penalty under the Eighth Amendment. It also explores later decisions that prohibited capital punishment for specific populations, including the mentally disabled (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002) and juvenile offenders (Roper v. Simmons, 2005), illustrating how shifting public sentiment has shaped the Court's interpretation of cruel and unusual punishment.
Capital punishment has been in existence for centuries. As far back as the eighteenth century B.C., the use of the death penalty appeared in the Code of King Hammurabi (Death Penalty Information Center [DPIC], 2010). The utilization of the death penalty for designated crimes continued through the years and became incorporated in Britain's penal system (DPIC, 2010). Britain's use of capital punishment then carried over into colonial America (DPIC, 2010). Since that time, the death penalty has been a part of the American criminal justice system. However, its use has not been without strong opposition. This paper explores the Supreme Court cases addressing this controversial topic and discusses the evolution of jurisprudence on the subject matter.
Much of the legal support or opposition for the use of the death penalty has been at the state level. Where the death penalty has been abolished, it has been by individual states. Beginning in the nineteenth century, some states began outlawing capital punishment (DPIC, 2010). However, this was not a permanent change, as national security concerns in the early twentieth century led to a reinstatement of the death penalty in some states, and the 1930s saw the highest number of executions (DPIC, 2010). By the 1950s, there was a drastic reduction in the execution rate (DPIC, 2010). The international community, and in particular many allied nations, limited or abolished the death penalty (DPIC, 2010). While the United States did not follow suit, there were fewer executions from that point forward.
Supreme Court capital punishment cases began in the late 1960s. The first cases dealt more with issues of administration of the death penalty rather than with the legality of its usage. For example, the first capital punishment case, U.S. v. Jackson (1968), dealt with the imposition of the death penalty in kidnapping cases only upon the recommendation of a jury. The Supreme Court found that rule unconstitutional because it incentivized defendants to forgo their right to a jury trial in order to avoid a potential capital sentence (U.S. v. Jackson, 1968). After that, Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) addressed jury selection in capital cases, and McGautha v. California (1971) rejected concerns that juries were not given adequate standards for imposing the death penalty.
Furman v. Georgia (1972) first addressed the legality of the death penalty as a whole. The case consolidated three separate capital cases, two of which involved rape and one of which involved murder (Furman v. Georgia, 1972). The Supreme Court considered the argument that the death penalty was cruel and unusual and therefore unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment (Furman v. Georgia, 1972). The central concern of the Furman Court was that unfettered jury discretion in imposing the death penalty led to arbitrariness in its application. By the reasoning of the Supreme Court, 40 state death penalty statutes were rendered void (DPIC, 2010), effectively creating a moratorium on capital punishment.
States attempted to overcome the obstacles created by Furman v. Georgia by reworking their capital statutes. However, finding a constitutional means of imposing the death penalty was not an easy task. Some states moved to the opposite extreme of unfettered discretion by mandating the death penalty for designated crimes. For example, in Woodson v. North Carolina (1976), the Supreme Court heard a challenge to North Carolina's mandatory capital punishment statute for first-degree murder. The Court ruled that this type of penal law was unconstitutional because it did not provide the "respect for human dignity underlying the Eighth Amendment" (Woodson v. North Carolina, 1976, p. 281). In order to provide a minimum level of respect for human dignity, Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) held that the death penalty cannot be mandated and that the individual circumstances of a crime must be considered before imposing such a punishment.
After some failed attempts at reinstating the death penalty (DPIC, 2010), the Supreme Court upheld new capital punishment statutes in Gregg v. Georgia (1976). There, the Court explicitly stated that the death penalty "for the crime of murder does not, under all circumstances, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments" (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, p. 154). The decision in Gregg v. Georgia (1976) marked the next phase in the Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence by affirming the punishment's constitutionality under a revised framework.
The difference between the death penalty statutes at issue in Gregg and those addressed in Furman v. Georgia (1972) and Woodson v. North Carolina (1976) is that the imposition of the death penalty was now subject to guided discretion. Rather than giving the jury unlimited discretion in sentencing or, at the other extreme, mandating capital punishment without any regard for individual circumstances, the death penalty was an available sentence accompanied by guidance for its imposition (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976). The new statutes required the jury to make specific findings about the circumstances of the crime or the defendant's character before sentencing an offender to death (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, p. 155). As an added layer of protection, the state reviews death penalty cases and compares them with similar prior cases to ensure consistency (Gregg v. Georgia, 1976, p. 155).
"Racial disparity challenge under equal protection clause"
"Categorical bans on executing vulnerable populations"
The Supreme Court has heard numerous cases regarding capital punishment over the past 50 years, and it is unlikely that litigation will cease while the death penalty remains in existence. The Court originally focused on refining how capital punishment was administered — as seen in cases such as U.S. v. Jackson (1968) and Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968). When it first considered the overall legality of the death penalty, the Supreme Court was still unwilling to declare it unconstitutional (Furman v. Georgia, 1972). However, with more recent decisions regarding the mentally disabled (Atkins v. Virginia, 2002) and juveniles (Roper v. Simmons, 2005), the Court has shown a willingness to identify situations in which the death penalty is categorically unconstitutional.
You’re 53% through this paper. Sign up to read the remaining 2 sections.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.