Durkheim vs. Spencer: Division of Labor and Social Order

Introduction

Concurrent with the social science zeitgeist of the nineteenth century, Émile Durkheim and Herbert Spencer studied the evolution of human societies from an evolutionary standpoint. While both occasionally referred to the biological underpinnings of human nature — and thus of society as collective human nature — both also shifted attention towards overarching social structures. Yet neither Durkheim nor Spencer was primarily concerned with formal social structures or institutions such as government, organized religion, or even kinship. Rather, both looked towards the burgeoning field of economics to describe the ways societies evolve from being simple, relatively small, and kinship-based towards being more grounded in the economic expediency of exchange and the production of material goods.

As technologies evolve and societies become more economically productive, the role of institutions like government or religion becomes far less important or necessary. Having lost their function in promoting social order, political and social institutions give way to the overarching institutions that enable social stability and order. It is within this shared evolutionary framework that Durkheim and Spencer agree — and, as this paper will show, also diverge significantly.

On the Division of Labor

Both Durkheim and Spencer viewed the division of labor as a natural outgrowth of increasingly complex societies. Both also approached the division of labor from an evolutionary perspective: as societies grow larger, more industrialized, and more complex, division of labor becomes "the supreme law of human societies and the condition of their progress" (Jones, 1986, p. 1). Spencer likewise viewed "the history of social evolution as a process of increasing size, division of labor, differentiation, and mutual cooperation" (LaPorte, 2015, p. 312). Division of labor is necessary in complex societies for the same reason it is necessary for the production of complex goods or technologies: individuals who specialize can contribute to the production of a whole, whether that whole is a product or society at large.

Durkheim was more optimistic than Spencer in his assessment of human nature and the role division of labor plays in society. For Durkheim, "the division of labor does produce a kind of solidarity, and that the division of labor is highly developed in advanced societies" (Jones, 1986, p. 1). Spencer did not necessarily view division of labor as enhancing solidarity in any direct way. If solidarity results from division of labor, it is because division of labor has utility: it functions as a means to make society run more efficiently (LaPorte, 2015). Durkheim also understood that division of labor may enhance the predisposition of human beings toward individualism, which can become excessive — as with the development of anomie (Lizardo, 2009). Nevertheless, Durkheim remained an optimist, claiming that despite the dualistic nature of human beings, individuality and solidarity have grown stronger together (Pope & Johnson, 1983).

On Social Solidarity

Although both Durkheim and Spencer recognized that complex societies evolve their own, more abstract and informal means of maintaining order and solidarity beyond the need for formal institutions, their views on social solidarity differed considerably. To a degree, both believed that division of labor leads to solidarity, solidarity leads to greater integration, and greater integration can create stability (Jones, 1986, p. 1). Durkheim further distinguished two types of social solidarity: mechanical and organic (Shortell, n.d.). Mechanical social solidarity relies on the enforcement of rules via punitive measures and is the most common form of social cohesion in simpler societies that depend on collective belief systems, collective consciousness, and formal structures. Organic social solidarity, by contrast, emerges in increasingly complex societies and entails "principles of exchange and restitution, rather than punishment," to enforce norms, laws, and cohesion (Shortell, n.d.).

Essentially, Durkheim believed that societies are organic entities whose institutions arise as a process of natural selection, with different parts functioning to ensure the smooth and orderly operation and evolution of society ("Sociology of Emile Durkheim," 2003). Spencer, however, did conceptualize several types of human "superorganisms" — overarching structures in society that can be understood through their functions, including resource production, regulation of power, and distribution of power and resources (Turner & Abrutyn, 2016, p. 7). These are the informal social institutions on which both Spencer and Durkheim agreed in their respective analyses.

Spencer's account of why human beings perpetuate social solidarity was fundamentally different from Durkheim's optimistic view. For Spencer, society is neither organic nor analogous to an organism. Rather, society is comprised of individuals who are primarily self-seeking and egoistic, and their decision to cooperate is based on mutual interest and need. There is no overarching ethic, nor is there a punitive system to enforce norms, rules, and laws. Spencer's society is an "agglomeration of sentient individuals who are pursuing their own needs, wants, and interests" (Corning, 1982, p. 360). For Durkheim, by contrast, society takes on a life of its own and maintains itself through interdependence. Durkheim's model of social solidarity carries no explicit moral imperative, but it is organically inclined toward self-preservation.

Conclusion

Early sociological theories proposed by Émile Durkheim and Herbert Spencer borrowed from evolutionary biology and economics. Both thinkers focused much of their work on analyzing how societies become more complex and what features those increasingly complex societies exhibit in order to maintain social order. Using an economics framework, both understood division of labor to be an evolutionary social structure that facilitated the preservation of social order. Individuals could balance their dual nature — motivated by individual needs yet also by the recognition that the collective society was critical to meeting their goals.

This Spencerian utilitarian perspective was modified somewhat by Durkheim, though not in any fundamental way. Both theorists showed how division of labor and social contracts foster cohesion and solidarity, albeit from different perspectives. Where Spencer saw society as a collection of rational, self-interested actors cooperating for mutual gain, Durkheim saw it as an organic whole sustained by functional interdependence. Together, their complementary and competing visions remain foundational to the sociology of complex societies.

References

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Hossain, D. M., & Mustari, S. (2012). A critical analysis of Herbert Spencer's theory of evolution. Postmodern Openings, 3(2), 55–66.

Jones, R. A. (1986). The division of labor in society. In Emile Durkheim: An Introduction to Four Major Works (pp. 24–59). Sage Publications.

LaPorte, T. R. (2015). Organized Social Complexity. Princeton University Press.

Lizardo, O. (2009). Taking cognitive dualism seriously. Sociological Perspectives, 52(4), 533–555.

Pope, W., & Johnson, B. D. (1983). Inside organic solidarity. American Sociological Review, 48(5), 681–692.

Shortell, T. (n.d.). Division of labor and social integration. http://www.brooklynsoc.org/courses/43.1/durkheim.html

"Sociology of Emile Durkheim." (2003). http://uregina.ca/~gingrich/250j1503.htm

Turner, J. H., & Abrutyn, S. (2016). Returning the 'social' to evolutionary sociology. Sociological Perspectives, 60(3), 529–556.