Essentialist vs. Constructionist Views of Gender and Sexuality

Introduction

During a period in history when gender lines are blurring and conceptualizations of sexuality are changing, identifying how these trends affect modern society has assumed new importance and relevance — especially given the legal implications of these trends for Americans today. It is also important to note, however, that these same trends occurred in many ways in parts of the ancient world, where pansexuality was the norm rather than the exception. The purpose of this paper is to provide a review of the relevant literature to describe the issue of essentialist versus constructionist views of gender and sexuality, and to determine the extent to which these views and modern terminology may be useful in evaluating gender and sexuality in the ancient world. Drawing on specific examples and case studies, the paper makes an evidence-based argument that essentialist views of gender and sexuality are inappropriate regardless of the historical period, and that constructionist views provide a more accurate picture. A summary of the research and important findings are presented in the conclusion.

Essentialist Views of Gender and Sexuality

Some authorities argue that the essentialist view provides valuable insights concerning the manner in which people develop individualized conceptualizations of their own lives and of other people in their immediate social sphere, as well as people who belong to other social groups (Pereira and Estramiana 809). On its face, these views seem fairly intuitive, since most people tend to identify with those who look, act, and sound like themselves — but essentialist views go much further in their categorizations. As Pereira and Estramiana point out, "One of the central ideas of essentialism is that social categorization depends as much on similarity (clearly seen in appearances) as it does on belief (expressed by whoever is making the categorization). [From this perspective], members of the same group share a deep structure and, in the process, distinguish themselves from members of other social groups" (810). In other words, essentialist views are imposed on others by outsiders rather than being a worldview accepted and shared by members of a given group.

This point is reinforced by Pereira and Estramiana, who advise that even when applied in an effort to be entirely objective, the essentialist view is fundamentally impositional in nature and scope, and is therefore highly subjective and subject to the individual beliefs of outsiders. As they note, "Those characteristics which are assumed as shared by the group impose a series of predicates upon whatever it is that constitutes the 'essence' of the group" (811).

While it is not possible to identify any specific "essences" of a given group, this is not important for the formulation of essentialist views, because outsiders to the group believe in their existence — and this is the "essential" issue involved (Pereira and Estramiana 811). Some indication of the powerfully persuasive beliefs that essentialist views convey can be found in worn-out axioms such as "the more things change, the more they stay the same," "bad things happen in threes," and "spare the rod and spoil the child." These so-called essences also carry serious implications when it comes to longstanding social beliefs and stereotypes concerning marginalized groups, due to what Pereira and Estramiana call the accentuation effect: "Essentialism may be understood as a subtle form of the accentuation effect. This effect provides the necessary basis for increasing the perception of similarity among members of the same group, as well as accentuating differences with members of other groups" (811).

In sum, the essentialist view not only categorizes other people into various pigeonholes — the process also tends to exaggerate perceived differences that contributed to the categorization in the first place, while diminishing differences that do not support it, making the categorization a fait accompli with respect to explaining behavior. As Pereira and Estramiana conclude, "For essentialists, interpersonal similarities contribute to the process of social categorization; people are not only included in a social category as a result of their likeness or similarity to others who belong to this category but also as a result of speculation made regarding these people's 'deeper' qualities and on the causes of their behavior" (809).

The Social Harms of Gender Essentialism

The imposition of categories and speculations concerning "deeper" causes of behavior — based on casual observations and prevailing stereotypes — are spurious at best. Some authorities argue that the essentialist view is not only inappropriate but actively harmful when applied to issues of gender and sexuality. As Boskey maintains, "Gender essentialism is the widely discredited and outdated idea that men and women act differently and have different options in life because of intrinsic or essential differences between the sexes" (2). Certainly, the biological differences between men and women mean that women continue to bear the burden of childbirth, but this does not necessarily mean they act differently as a result.

Notwithstanding the gains achieved by women in overcoming longstanding social and professional barriers, it is reasonable to suggest that modern patriarchal society continues to impose a number of limitations on women that provide more legitimate explanations for any differences in life choices and behavior. This assertion is supported by Boskey's observation that gender essentialism "is the idea that men and women are fundamentally different for reasons that are unchangeable [and] is often used to excuse gender-based biases in society" (3). Although clearly not immutable, such gender-based biases are highly resistant to meaningful change — a fact supported by the persistent underrepresentation of women in many male-dominated professions, especially in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). As Boskey concludes, gender essentialism "can be used to justify the idea that jobs traditionally held by women are often accorded less respect and lower pay. Gender essentialism is both informed by gender stereotypes and reinforces them. It can have numerous effects on society" (5).

Among those effects is the tendency for males and females to conform to socially imposed roles and behaviors. As Witt notes, gender essentialism "can also have a significant influence on our self-conceptions or practical identities [that] are formed in relation to the social positions that we occupy" (23). In addition, gender essentialism can have an even more insidious — if less discernible — effect on how men and women view themselves and each other.

Despite the fact that more and more people are shaking off the constraints of obsolete views about gender and sexuality, gender essentialism remains firmly in place. Boskey emphasizes that "this outdated concept can promote assumptions about how relationships 'should' work that are rooted in essentialist notions of gendered behavior" (6). As a salient example, Boskey cites the tendency for otherwise well-informed people — even close friends — to impose social concepts of gendered behavior on others, including those who have clearly elected to pursue an alternative lifestyle. According to Boskey, "For example, asking a married lesbian couple, 'Which one of you is the husband?' assumes that the traditional male role is necessary for a successful marriage. That further implies that one of them must be performing the male role, whatever that means" (7). Indeed, the "whatever that means" remains at the core of the problem, since what it means to be a man or a woman — or a boy or a girl — is fluid and defined by time and place.

Throughout history, some people have rejected socially imposed categorizations of their gender identities and sexuality, but they have done so largely at their peril. As Paape points out, "Gender is not something natural or that one is born with, but rather a performance regulated by social norms and institutions, like schools, that utilize rituals such as the prom to reinscribe heteronormative gender and sexuality roles. However, departing from these conditioned norms results in policing or surveilling of bodies, thus determining who is included or excluded" (6). Bucking powerful social norms has never been the safest or most rewarding approach to life, but there is a growing recognition in modern society that essentialist views about gender are no longer appropriate or acceptable. As Boskey puts it, "Gender essentialism is not supported by evidence. Instead, it is a common system of biases that affect how the world works [and] people who identify as non-binary explicitly reject the notion of gender essentialism by foregoing either male or female identities" (7).

Conclusion

The research showed that the essentialist view of gender and sexuality is impositional in nature, literally imposed on others by outsiders based on similarity in appearance, behaviors, and perceived beliefs. As such, the framework is inherently flawed: it reinforces longstanding gender myths, stereotypes, and institutions that favor males in patriarchal societies. The research also showed, however, that times are changing. The formerly distinct lines drawn around gender — and around what were regarded as acceptable roles and behaviors — are diminishing in favor of a more enlightened view that accepts people for who they are, irrespective of their appearance and sexual preferences. The constructionist framework, grounded in empirical observation and social interaction, provides a far more accurate and equitable lens through which to understand both modern and historical expressions of gender and sexuality.