Essentialist vs. Constructionist Views of Gender and Sexuality

Introduction

During a period in history when gender lines are blurring and conceptualizations of sexuality are changing, identifying how these trends affect modern society has assumed new importance and relevance — especially given the legal implications of these trends for Americans today. It is also important to note, however, that these same trends occurred in many ways in parts of the ancient world, where pansexuality was the norm rather than the exception. The purpose of this paper is to provide a review of the relevant literature to describe the issue of essentialist versus constructionist views of gender and sexuality, and to determine the extent to which these views and modern terminology may be useful in evaluating gender and sexuality in the ancient world. Drawing on specific examples and case studies, the paper makes an evidence-based argument that essentialist views of gender and sexuality are inappropriate regardless of the historical period, and that constructionist views provide a more accurate picture. A summary of the research and important findings are presented in the conclusion.

Essentialist Views of Gender and Sexuality

Some authorities argue that the essentialist view provides valuable insights concerning the manner in which people develop individualized conceptualizations of their own lives and of other people in their immediate social sphere, as well as people who belong to other social groups (Pereira and Estramiana 809). On its face, these views seem fairly intuitive, since most people tend to identify with those who look, act, and sound like themselves — but essentialist views go much further in their categorizations. As Pereira and Estramiana point out, "One of the central ideas of essentialism is that social categorization depends as much on similarity (clearly seen in appearances) as it does on belief (expressed by whoever is making the categorization). [From this perspective], members of the same group share a deep structure and, in the process, distinguish themselves from members of other social groups" (810). In other words, essentialist views are imposed on others by outsiders rather than being a worldview accepted and shared by members of a given group.

This point is reinforced by Pereira and Estramiana, who advise that even when applied in an effort to be entirely objective, the essentialist view is fundamentally impositional in nature and scope, and is therefore highly subjective and subject to the individual beliefs of outsiders. As they note, "Those characteristics which are assumed as shared by the group impose a series of predicates upon whatever it is that constitutes the 'essence' of the group" (811).

While it is not possible to identify any specific "essences" of a given group, this is not important for the formulation of essentialist views, because outsiders to the group believe in their existence — and this is the "essential" issue involved (Pereira and Estramiana 811). Some indication of the powerfully persuasive beliefs that essentialist views convey can be found in worn-out axioms such as "the more things change, the more they stay the same," "bad things happen in threes," and "spare the rod and spoil the child." These so-called essences also carry serious implications when it comes to longstanding social beliefs and stereotypes concerning marginalized groups, due to what Pereira and Estramiana call the accentuation effect: "Essentialism may be understood as a subtle form of the accentuation effect. This effect provides the necessary basis for increasing the perception of similarity among members of the same group, as well as accentuating differences with members of other groups" (811).

In sum, the essentialist view not only categorizes other people into various pigeonholes — the process also tends to exaggerate perceived differences that contributed to the categorization in the first place, while diminishing differences that do not support it, making the categorization a fait accompli with respect to explaining behavior. As Pereira and Estramiana conclude, "For essentialists, interpersonal similarities contribute to the process of social categorization; people are not only included in a social category as a result of their likeness or similarity to others who belong to this category but also as a result of speculation made regarding these people's 'deeper' qualities and on the causes of their behavior" (809).