European Parliament and ECJ: Jurisdiction and Annulment Powers

Overview of the European Parliament and the ECJ

The European Parliament (EP) and the Council of the European Union are the legislative branches of the European Union. The EP is the directly elected parliamentary institution of the EU and, as such, is the largest transnational directly elected institution in the world. It is one of the most powerful representative legislative bodies in the world, despite the fact that its powers are limited because each member state is sovereign. The Treaty of Maastricht divided the European Union into three distinct pillars: a Community (EC) pillar, a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar, and a Police and Judicial Cooperation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) pillar.

The EP's involvement is practically limited to the EC pillar, though it does retain some limited power and influence in the CFSP and PJCC pillars. Because the EP's influence is strongest in the EC pillar, it has a significant degree of control over the EU's economic affairs. The European Parliament legislates in a wide range of areas, including customs, economic markets, agricultural policy, social policy, fisheries policy, economic competition, education, culture, citizenship, immigration, political asylum, consumer protection, healthcare, research, and environmental law. Despite its virtual confinement to one pillar, the EP wields significant power — for example, it controls the EU's budget and can veto appointments to the European Commission.

The Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ) is the highest court in the European Union. It does not exercise jurisdiction over individual member nations' domestic laws and legal disputes, but rather over matters of European Union law. Its role is to interpret EU laws and to ensure their uniform application across member nations. The ECJ predates the modern formation of the EU; it was initially established as part of the European Coal and Steel Community, with the goal of resolving related disputes and questions. Its jurisdiction expanded in 1957 with the establishment of the European Economic Community and the European Atomic Energy Community. When the EU was created in 1993, the ECJ's jurisdiction remained substantially similar to what it had held prior to that creation, since the ECJ is largely involved in the Community pillar of the EU.

The ECJ also has lower courts. The Court of First Instance hears suits brought by non-EU employees, while the Civil Service Tribunal hears suits brought by EU employees. The ECJ has broad jurisdiction over Community disputes — but not national ones — and those disputes may be brought by and against member nations.

Extending the Borders of Parliament's Jurisdiction

Because the ECJ's primary function is to interpret EU laws and ensure their consistent application throughout the EU, the ECJ and the European Parliament are interdependent. However, that does not mean the EP and the ECJ always work toward the same goals. On the contrary, the EP has shown an interest in expanding its own power, and that interest sometimes conflicts with the ECJ's role. The ECJ has the duty to interpret the EU's treaties and the laws and provisions promulgated by EU institutions. Member nations can be at fault for failing to adhere to treaty provisions, but the EP can also overstep its boundaries by attempting to exert greater influence and power than the treaties allow.

While the EP has shown a desire to extend its jurisdiction, the ECJ has a duty to ensure that the EP does not go beyond the legal limits of its power. Three cases directly address the EP's jurisdiction and demonstrate the ECJ's role in extending or limiting it. In Les Verts, the ECJ determined that it had jurisdiction to review decisions made by the EP, even where such jurisdiction was not specifically conferred by law. While that decision did not overtly limit the EP's power, it did give the ECJ the power of judicial review, which has the potential to significantly constrain the EP's ability to adopt measures. In Chernobyl I, the EP brought an action to annul a regulation adopted by the Council of Ministers, which objected on the grounds of inadmissibility because the EP did not have authority to bring such an action under Article 146. However, the ECJ determined that the EP could bring an action for annulment against an act of the Council or the Commission, provided that such action was aimed solely at safeguarding the EP's prerogatives. Despite the ECJ's apparent willingness to extend the EP's jurisdiction, the court has also imposed limits. In Comitology, for example, the ECJ refused to grant the EP the power to bring an action for annulment where other available remedies gave the EP a substantial opportunity to challenge a Council action and where the action was not taken to safeguard the EP's prerogatives.

Les Verts: ECJ Review of EP Measures

In Case 294/83, Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v. European Parliament, Judgment of the ECJ of 23 April 1986, European Court Reports 1986, p. 1339 (Les Verts), the ECJ was called upon to determine an action brought under the second paragraph of the EEC Treaty. The applicant requested that the ECJ declare void the decision of the Bureau of the EP concerning the allocation of general budget appropriations, as well as a related decision of the Enlarged Bureau of the EP governing the use of those appropriations for reimbursement of expenditures related to the 1984 European elections. Before resolving that dispute, the ECJ had to determine several threshold issues touching upon the European Parliament's power.

Most significantly, the ECJ had to determine whether it had jurisdiction to hear and determine an action for annulment brought under Article 173 of the EEC Treaty against a measure adopted by the EP. The ECJ concluded that it did. First, it reasoned that both the 1982 decision and the 1983 rules were adopted by organs of the EP and were to be regarded as measures directly adopted by the EP. The ECJ recognized the applicant's position that the ECJ's power to review the legality of measures adopted under Article 173 could not be limited to measures adopted by the Council and the Commission without creating a denial of justice. The EP itself acknowledged that the ECJ could review the legality of measures besides those adopted by the Council and the Commission.

The EP did not dispute that the ECJ had the power of judicial review in areas where such review was specifically conferred by treaty. However, the EP contended that if Article 173 was broadly interpreted so as to allow an action for annulment, then the EP should also have the capacity to bring similar actions against the Council and the Commission.

The ECJ reasoned that the European Economic Community (EEC) was a community based on the rule of law, because its member states and institutions were subject to judicial review to determine the constitutionality of their actions in light of the governing treaties. Articles 173, 184, and 177 together provide a complete system of legal remedies and procedures.

Article 173 specifically refers only to acts of the Council and the Commission. However, the ECJ had previously decided that the Treaty made a direct action available against all institutionally adopted measures that were intended to have legal effects. The fact that the EP was not mentioned in Article 173 was due to the fact that, under the EEC Treaty, the EP had merely been granted the power of consultation and political control — not the power to adopt measures. Furthermore, under Article 38 of the ECSC Treaty, when the EP was given the power to adopt binding measures, those measures were not made exempt from actions for annulment. Under the EEC Treaty, such actions are governed by Article 173. Therefore, the ECJ had jurisdiction to entertain the action.

Conclusion

Though the ECJ has obviously engaged in judicial activism in relation to the EP's powers to bring actions for annulment and exert influence over other governmental institutions, fears that the ECJ has unduly increased the EP's power seem largely unfounded. After all, the Treaty of Nice makes clear that EU member states agree that the EP should have the power the ECJ extended to it. Moreover, the ECJ is not the type of activist court that substitutes judicial for legislative law-making. On the contrary, changes have "been lackluster in both ambition and result, incremental rather than radical."