This paper examines two landmark post-9/11 cases — Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Padilla v. Rumsfeld — in which American citizens were designated enemy combatants and held in indefinite military detention without formal charges. Tracing the litigation from district courts through the Fourth and Second Circuits to the U.S. Supreme Court, the paper analyzes key issues including next friend standing, the scope of executive war powers, the Non-Detention Act, and the constitutional right to habeas corpus review. The paper concludes that while Article III courts ultimately refused to permit unchecked indefinite detention of American citizens, meaningful judicial relief came only after years of delay, during which both detainees allegedly endured inhumane conditions.
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Congress authorized the President to use all necessary means to prevent future terrorist attacks on the United States, including the use of force against individuals, organizations, or nations responsible for the attacks or who aided those involved (Hamdi III, 2004). This Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF, 115 Stat. 224) gave President Bush the authority to go to war in Afghanistan against Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The two cases examined in this paper — Hamdi v. Rumsfeld and Padilla v. Rumsfeld — both arose from this authorization and raised fundamental questions about the rights of American citizens designated as enemy combatants and held in indefinite military detention.
During military operations in Afghanistan, Yaser Esam Hamdi was captured in the fall of 2001 and transferred the following January to Camp X-Ray at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba (Beattie and Stevens, 2003). While there, it was discovered that Hamdi had been born in Louisiana and had probably not renounced his American citizenship. Accordingly, he was transferred to the Naval Brig at Norfolk Naval Base the following April. The United States then gave Hamdi the status of enemy combatant in order to detain him indefinitely and incommunicado for further interrogations.
The issues initially raised by Hamdi's father on Hamdi's behalf were his right to judicial review and to private meetings with counsel (Beattie and Stevens, 2003). The petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleged that the U.S. government's detention of Hamdi was unconstitutional under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments because he had not been charged, had not appeared before an impartial decision-maker, and had not been assigned counsel (Hamdi III, 2004). In addition, the petition requested that the court order the government to cease interrogations until Hamdi had received the assistance of counsel. In opposition, the government contended that Hamdi's status as an enemy combatant allowed it to detain him indefinitely without charges or formal proceedings.
On May 8, 2002, Jose Padilla, an American citizen, was arrested in Chicago, Illinois as a material witness when he arrived on a flight from Pakistan via Switzerland (Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 2003). The FBI transported Padilla to New York City to appear before a grand jury investigating the September 11 attacks. While there, Padilla was held in a civilian detention facility and provided counsel for his upcoming appearance. On May 22, counsel for Padilla moved to have the material witness warrant vacated before the District Court of the Southern District of New York. The motion was scheduled to be heard on June 11, but on June 9, federal agents — acting on Padilla's new designation as an enemy combatant — took custody of Padilla and transported him to South Carolina, where he was detained in the Consolidated Naval Brig in Charleston. The District Court vacated the material witness warrant, and in response his counsel, Donna R. Newman, filed a writ of habeas corpus on Padilla's behalf.
For the next eighteen months Padilla was held incommunicado in the Naval Brig (Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 2003). The authority for this detention came from the President of the United States, who declared that Padilla was an enemy combatant at the time he entered the United States on May 8, 2002. This designation was based on reliable information that Padilla was a close associate of known Al Qaeda leaders, had planned to attack the United States, possessed information that could help prevent future terrorist attacks, and represented a grave threat to national security. More specifically, the government alleged that Padilla was involved in a plot to detonate a dirty bomb within the United States on behalf of Al Qaeda and had been in Pakistan to receive explosives training.
The issues before the District Court were whether it had jurisdiction to hear the habeas petition, whether Padilla's counsel had standing, and whether Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was properly the respondent (Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 2003). The government's case rested on the contention that enemy combatant status gave the military jurisdiction, not the civilian courts. Counsel for Padilla contended that the President could not indefinitely detain an American citizen arrested on American soil without filing formal charges. Padilla's counsel also claimed that Padilla should never have been transferred to military custody and properly belonged in the federal criminal justice system.
"Circuit courts diverge on standing and war powers"
"Supreme Court upholds habeas rights for citizen detainees"
"Judicial review proved remedial rather than preventive"
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