HS2 High-Speed Rail: Viability, Costs, and Controversy

Introduction to HS2 and High-Speed Rail in Britain

HS2, or High Speed 2, is a proposed high-speed railway expansion connecting London, the Midlands, and the North of England, with a potential later extension into Scotland. High-speed railways as a concept have been expanding across the EU since the 1980s. Germany, France, and Spain have been aggressive leaders in this field, operating on the belief that for Europe to be truly united economically, its transportation infrastructure must be robust enough to encourage travel both between countries and across longer distances within them. In Britain, the first high-speed line ran from London through the Channel Tunnel — a distance of 108 km. Britain's railway infrastructure dates primarily from the Victorian era, which limits operating speeds to no more than 201 km/h. Movement within Britain, and the need to travel to France, increased by more than 50 per cent since the 1970s, creating new demands on transport and commuting solutions (Atkins 2009).

While the concept of high-speed rail is endorsed by Britain's three main political parties, significant controversy remains over which cities should be placed on the route, the environmental impact of HS2, the railway's actual performance, the affordability of the project, and even whether it would reduce carbon emissions as claimed (Millward 2010). Most of the country agrees, however, that something must be done to improve inter-city links and reduce travel times across the country. According to Transportation Secretary Lord Adonis, the solution is straightforward: it is either high-speed rail or more motorways and more planes ("Cheap fast trains 'are transport future'" 2009).

Hypothesis: The HS2 project, while laudable in some areas of the EU, is not a viable option for the London to central and north Britain corridor, because the business case rests on unrealistic assumptions, the environmental impact remains inadequately assessed, and the strategic benefits are questionable.

The arguments regarding HS2 fall into three major categories: fiscal, environmental, and strategic. On one hand, the government's figures showed a reasonably manageable construction cost, based on comparisons with many previous smaller-scale projects that achieved quick paybacks. The economic reality, according to some critics, is that in a flattening economy, taxpayers are being asked to fund a project whose paybacks may not materialise until 2026 or later. In addition, many of the supporting reports fail to adequately acknowledge the difficult geographic features between London and Birmingham, and even more so at the proposed splits between Birmingham and Manchester and Birmingham and Leeds (Wendover Technology 2010).

Summary of Key Arguments and Evidence

The government also asserts that there is a considerable value-of-time argument to be made, given increasing commute demands. According to a government survey, 70 per cent of respondents believe their time is valuable enough to justify the cost of a high-speed railway. Crucially, it is not only the time spent travelling but also the time spent waiting for the next available service that must be factored into any assessment. Robust routes and fast trains alleviate this problem for most travellers, according to the government (Valuing the Benefits of HS2 (London–West Midlands) 2011).

HS2 would move not only passengers but also needed cargo and rail freight. Demand for freight transport is growing at an exponential rate each year, and the current railway system cannot accommodate the influx of new demand. The West Coast Main Line (WCML) is the busiest long-distance freight route in Britain and still cannot handle traffic from the Channel Tunnel, the Thames Ports, and the Midlands/North West region. This results in additional costs and time delays that are inevitably passed on to consumers. By using HS2, existing lines would be freed up to transport more cargo and lower-priority products, allowing high-speed lines to serve passengers and critical freight (Greengauge 2011).

The government's position is that the past decade has produced a genuine renaissance in rail travel in Britain — passenger numbers increased by over 50 per cent and freight by 40 per cent. The factors driving this growth are road congestion, insufficient airport capacity, and growing environmental concerns. If these trends continue into the 2020s without significant intervention, Britain risks falling behind the EU in its capacity to grow economically. Major infrastructure projects — as demonstrated by the Channel Tunnel — take between 15 and 20 years to plan and construct adequately. Now, therefore, is the appropriate moment to invest in the future of rail in Britain. Doing so will protect the next two generations from facing even higher debt and a diminished standard of public services (Department of Transport 2009).

Other research suggests that the government's economic case is unsound, as it depends on rates of return that are implausible and on unproven synergies of growth — for example, the assumption that because the railway is high-speed, significantly more people will choose to use it. Less expensive solutions are available through alternative transport systems and could likely be implemented more quickly, addressing congestion and urban transport problems now rather than in years or decades. Analysis of transportation trends over the past 15 years suggests that the benefit case is overstated by somewhere between 40 and 150 per cent, depending on the variable examined. Furthermore, the psychographic and demographic profile of the assumed business traveller is inconsistent with the costs of the new line (Bluespace Thinking 2010).

Statistics professors often observe that there are three kinds of lies in the world: lies, damned lies, and statistics. Both sides of the HS2 debate employ highly capable analysts, and while the debate is politically charged, it is unlikely that either faction is deliberately misrepresenting the facts. Rather, in complex policy analysis, it is just as important to understand what was not included in an analysis as what was. It is also reasonable that both sides must make projections and assumptions extending 10 to 15 or more years into the future. The government appears to believe that transportation trends will grow geometrically, while critics believe they will increase only incrementally.

The Government's Case for HS2

The anti-HS2 side contends that the enormous financial and material resources allocated to HS2 could be better deployed elsewhere to achieve quicker solutions to the problems of pollution and overcrowding. There is also a notable political dimension: a clear polarisation exists between advocates of larger central government investment and smaller regional and township councils, most of which oppose the project.

One practical suggestion offered is that simply reducing the maximum operating speed to between 300 and 320 km/h would allow new trains or routes to use existing rail infrastructure, saving millions of pounds and considerable time. Environmentalists are firmly opposed to HS2 — not only because of the available data, but because they believe that data is incomplete. The government appears to have entirely overlooked the global trend toward remote working and virtual computing as a future-shaping force, instead assuming that consumers will simply want more of what they have today, only faster.

There is also no cogent data addressing how consumers will be supported in areas where construction disrupts their homes and communities. Perhaps most strikingly, a geological expert presented evidence that HS2 tunnelling could cause long-term damage to Britain's chalk aquifer system, which supplies water to north London. This potential environmental risk alone demands far more thorough investigation before the project proceeds.

Conclusion

Valuing the Benefits of HS2 (London–West Midlands) 2011, viewed December 2011,

Wendover Technology 2010, Financial Analysis of HS2 Stage One, viewed December 2011, http://stophs2.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Financial-analysis-of-HS2-Final.pdf.