This paper examines the hypothesis that strong and weak states are more inclined than mid-ranked states to break or circumvent international law when it conflicts with their national interests. It outlines a multi-method research framework combining historical analysis, statistical correlations, and case studies to assess the relationship between a state's position in the international system and its propensity to violate international legal norms. The paper defines key variables β including what constitutes "strong" and "weak" states and what breaking international law entails β and addresses methodological challenges such as the non-public nature of many violations. It also considers the normative paradox in which states may breach international law precisely to uphold its underlying values.
The hypothesis of this thesis deals with the effects that international law has on states' behavior on the international stage. It aims to contribute to the academic debate by attempting to prove that both strong and weak countries tend to break or circumvent international law, since a global system of regulations often hinders their national interests. The thesis also offers analysis of the level of influence that the international system of laws has had on the internal and external behavior of states.
Before describing the methodology this thesis will follow, the three core terms of the hypothesis should be explained: strong countries, weak countries, and breaking or going around international law. When constructing a hypothesis, one must take into account its testing through observable implications β this is why this chapter begins by focusing on the elements of the hypothesis in order to better understand the variables at stake.
The basis of this thesis lies in the fact that many countries, although strongly supporting the values and rules of international law, often break or circumvent it in pursuit of their goals. Some countries do this after considering a large number of variables; others act on political impulse without any medium- or long-term analysis. The dependent variable of this hypothesis is that the breaking of international laws is a direct result of decisions made by a certain type of state. The outcome β an action by a state against the law β can be explained by the position that state holds in the international system. This independent, or explanatory, variable will be tested throughout the thesis, which seeks to answer the following sub-question: are extreme-positioned states (strong and weak) more inclined to break international law?
Several problems may arise when analyzing a subject as delicate as the breaking of international law. The correlations this thesis will attempt to identify β strong and weak states as the main actors in violations of the law β will be based on a series of observable actions by these types of states. The analysis will focus on these types and, while touching upon states occupying middle positions, it will not attempt a full-scale correlation of all states as breakers of international law, as that is beyond the scope of this thesis.
Other problems in finding answers lie in the nature of the process itself: breaking international law is sometimes not a public matter, and many activities carried out against globally recognized laws are not readily accessible. The second step of the thesis will therefore focus on defining the key concepts of the research questions β strong states, weak states, and what breaking international law actually means β while also examining the laws themselves as potential sources of the problem.
The first step will focus on identifying significant cases from both strong and weak states in which these actors have broken international law and examining the reasons why. In order to address the broader research question β "To what extent does international law affect state behavior?" β this phase will also focus on why these types of states disobey laws. It is evident that the conditions to which they are subject can become unacceptable, prompting a change in behavior. States' behavior is often shaped by the international framework in which they operate, and an important part of this thesis will examine this influence β specifically, whether the presence or absence of that influence produces a reactive rejection of the law and what it represents.
The correlations developed in this thesis will pay particular attention to cases where national interest, systemic pressures, or historical context led states to prioritize goals over legal compliance. The United Nations Charter and associated instruments provide the baseline legal framework against which such behavior will be measured, since they represent the most widely recognized codification of international legal obligations in the modern era.
"Historical method applied to international law violations"
"Statistical correlations and state-level case study examples"
"States breaking law to uphold its underlying values"
You’re 45% through this paper. Sign up to read the remaining 3 sections.
Sign Up Now — Instant Access Already a member? Log inAlways verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.