The Kellogg-Briand Pact: An Empty Promise of World Peace

Introduction

The Kellogg-Briand Pact, originally signed on August 27, 1928, was an effort by a coalition of nations to effectively eliminate war. More properly known as the Pact of Paris, the Pact denounced war as an instrument of national policy and stated that conflicts should be resolved through pacific means only. The Pact was one of several attempts following World War I to ensure everlasting peace for all nations and was, in theory, a solid effort to encourage nations to find peaceful solutions to problems. However, in practice, the Pact was no more than an empty promise.

This paper discusses the origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the reasons for its signing by those nations primarily responsible for its inception. It also examines the conflicts that erupted after the Pact's signing, showing how countries easily avoided repercussions for violating it. Finally, this paper argues that, although the Pact did influence later documents and treaties, the Pact itself was ineffective at reducing armed conflict.

Origins of the Kellogg-Briand Pact

The Kellogg-Briand Pact originated through a suggestion by French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand, but the true foundation for the treaty lay with the peoples of the signing nations. Following the immense destruction of World War I, Europe and the United States craved a world of peace. By 1929, any treaty designed to create peace among nations was to be seriously considered. The World Court, the Geneva Protocol of 1924, and the Locarno treaties all reflected the world's new interest in lasting peace (Ferrell, 105).

For the United States, the desire for peace was further intensified by its absence from the League of Nations. Since the League was one of the few organizations designed to promote peace, the American public began to pressure the government to establish a comparable solution. When French Foreign Minister Briand proposed a mutual treaty of peace, the American Committee for the Outlawry of War and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace — both large and influential organizations in the United States — helped ensure the agreement's signing (Ferrell, 106).

On April 6, 1927, Briand proposed a bilateral pact that would effectively outlaw war between France and the United States. In the midst of the peace movement, U.S. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg suggested expanding the proposal significantly. Kellogg called for a multilateral treaty that all nations could sign, which would "renounce war as an instrument of national policy" (Ferrell, 106). While this was a positive development, there were complications to be resolved among the signing nations, since many were already bound by separate peace treaties with neighboring states (Ferrell, 107).

On August 27, 1928, the Pact of Paris — the Kellogg-Briand Pact — was signed by eleven nations, including representatives from Germany, the United States, Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. By the time the Pact was officially proclaimed on July 24, 1929, four more countries had signed: Japan, France, Belgium, and Poland. In the end, over sixty nations had ratified the Pact, including China, Russia, Spain, Egypt, Cuba, and Finland, among others ("Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928," 2343).

Treaty Language, Exceptions, and Built-In Weaknesses

It is important to note that had the original concept of Briand's Pact been maintained, and had all signing nations upheld it, war would have been virtually eliminated (Borchard, 243). The original treaty called for a condemnation of war as a solution to international controversy and the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy. The treaty also bound all parties to finding a peaceful solution to all disputes and conflicts, with no expiration date (Committee on Foreign Relations, 3).

However, the notes submitted by signatory countries at the time of signing revealed numerous admitted exceptions to the treaty — exceptions that were at least partly responsible for the Pact's later failure. England noted that the phrase "renunciation of war" was acceptable only insofar as it was understood that certain regions of the world constituted a "special and vital interest," and that those regions would continue to be defended by force if necessary (Committee on Foreign Relations, 4). In doing so, England introduced the concept of war in self-defense of national interests.

Great Britain and France both further noted that the Locarno treaties would need to be honored, since those agreements with other European nations predated the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Both countries therefore signed with the understanding that they could still fulfill their Locarno obligations — including coming to the aid of any Locarno signatory that was attacked. All parties agreed that if one signatory violated the treaty, all others would be released from their obligations. This meant that violating one treaty could simultaneously trigger and dissolve obligations under the other (Committee on Foreign Relations, 4).

Still further, negotiations affirmed that each country was free to define "self-defense" according to its own interpretation. Without any agreed definition of "self-defense" or "aggravated war," it was effectively impossible to outlaw any particular form of armed conflict. Rather than defining all war as aggression, the treaty inadvertently created a legally tolerated category of war. The lack of genuine definitions made the treaty's central aim — the outlawry of war — an impossibility (Borchard, 243).

The Kellogg-Briand Pact, while influential in shaping later treaties and foreign policy, was largely unsuccessful in renouncing war. Instead, the Pact simply encouraged warring nations to relabel their conflicts — as "policing actions" or acts of "self-defense." Because the Pact stipulated no sanctions for violations, even nations that clearly breached the agreement faced no meaningful punishment from the other signatories (Borchard, 244).

Conclusion

The Kellogg-Briand Pact was without question the most thorough attempt at world peace before 1929. The ideas behind it were sound and reflected the dominant opinion following World War I — that all nations should renounce war. Without the Pact, it is unclear whether the evolution toward the United Nations would have been as successful as it proved to be. Had the treaty been followed as originally designed, there might never have been another act of aggression among its signatories.

However, as this paper has demonstrated, virtually every signatory nation violated the Pact's basic principles at one point or another. Without clear procedures and clear definitions, the Kellogg-Briand Pact was a powerless document. "Police action" became the new term for war, and "self-defense" was stretched to legitimize conflicts that the Pact was intended to prohibit. As with so many other attempts at world peace, the signing nations discovered that without a concise plan of action and the genuine commitment of all parties to uphold its intentions, even the most ambitious treaty remains forever empty.

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