General Lee and Mission Command at Chancellorsville

Introduction

General Lee and Lieutenant General Jackson shared a remarkable degree of mutual trust, and that trust contributed decisively to a Confederate victory at Chancellorsville. However, that victory came at a steep cost: the loss of LTG Jackson, a widely beloved commander throughout the South. While the flanking maneuver authorized by GEN Lee initially appeared sound — grounded in competence, mutual trust, shared understanding, and risk acceptance — the end of the engagement revealed that a failure to communicate adequate mission orders led to a chaotic and tragic outcome for the Confederacy. This paper examines the mission command principles at the heart of the Battle of Chancellorsville and assesses how those principles were applied both effectively and ineffectively.

Mission command is defined in Army Doctrine Publication 6-0 as "the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations." The seven principles of mission command are:

Mission Command Principles

1. Competence
2. Mutual trust
3. Shared understanding
4. Commander's intent
5. Mission orders
6. Disciplined initiative
7. Risk acceptance

Lee's Competence, Shared Understanding, and Mutual Trust

Lee demonstrated superior competence at Chancellorsville. He understood that the morale of Hooker's army was likely low, coming off a defeat at Fredericksburg just a month prior. Hooker had organized his army to take the offensive but then abandoned that objective and adopted a defensive posture. This essentially placed the initiative in GEN Lee's hands, and he chose to engage. Recognizing the importance of striking while conditions were favorable, he organized his forces to determine whether there was a viable way to attack Hooker's army.

This organizational effort also reflected GEN Lee's application of shared understanding. During the evening of May 1–2, he and LTG Stonewall Jackson met to confer. Intelligence arrived during their meeting indicating that Hooker's right flank was exposed — a vulnerability GEN Lee could exploit. It was clear to both commanders that the Confederate force left behind at Fredericksburg would not accomplish much by remaining static, so GEN Lee ordered his army to take the offensive. LTG Jackson was given orders to lead the attack, and General Jeb Stuart was ordered to screen the flanking assault.

GEN Lee had also established deep mutual trust with his subordinates, particularly with LTG Jackson. He understood the risk of dividing his army in the face of a force twice its size, yet he trusted LTG Jackson to accomplish the objective established at their meeting. For his part, LTG Jackson trusted the reconnaissance report provided by his cartographer, Major Hotchkiss, who had identified an open road leading to Hooker's exposed right flank. Jackson informed Lee that he wanted to take his entire corps to attack that flank, and Lee gave his approval without hesitation or doubt. The trust was complete: GEN Lee would keep his two remaining divisions in place to deceive Hooker while LTG Jackson marched his entire corps twelve miles in secrecy to strike the open flank.

In authorizing the flanking maneuver, GEN Lee also demonstrated the principle of risk acceptance. He fully understood the danger of dividing his force, yet he accepted that risk based on a well-reasoned assessment of the situation. Hooker, having settled his five corps into a defensive posture, appeared unwilling to counterattack until GEN Lee either struck or withdrew. Lee concluded, therefore, that the moment to act was at hand. He believed LTG Jackson capable of completing the march despite its difficulty. One of President Lincoln's chief criticisms of his generals — excepting Grant — was their unwillingness to fight aggressively. Lee had in Jackson a subordinate who was eager to fight, and the tactical situation appeared favorable. To forgo the opportunity out of fear of failure would have meant surrendering the offensive and accepting a prolonged standoff. Better to strike unexpectedly, Lee reasoned. The risk was worth taking.

The flanking maneuver was, in fact, strategically less risky than a direct frontal assault. Hooker commanded approximately 70,000 men while GEN Lee had only 43,000 — a nearly 2-to-3 disadvantage in a straight confrontation. However, Hooker's exposed right flank numbered only about 12,000 troops, while LTG Jackson's corps consisted of roughly 26,000 men. Rather than fighting at a numerical disadvantage, the flanking maneuver gave the Confederates approximately a 2-to-1 advantage at the point of attack. Furthermore, Hooker's forces were entrenched and prepared for a frontal assault, making a direct attack potentially catastrophic. The flanking maneuver therefore made sound strategic sense if Lee intended to maintain the offensive and achieve surprise.

Conclusion

McBride, D. & Snell, R. (2017). Applying mission command to overcome challenges. Retrieved from https://www.army.mil/article/179942/applying_mission_command_to_overcome_challenges

Sears, Stephen W. Chancellorsville. HMH, 2014.