Linebacker II and the Diplomatic End of the Vietnam War

Introduction: The Vietnam War at a Crossroads

In 1972, the Vietnam War had entered a point of stagnation, with the United States and North Vietnam still engaged in the struggle to define the nation's identity, political outlook, and international standing. By this late juncture, both negotiations and the ongoing ground war offered no indication that a peace settlement was in sight. This paper examines the strategy adopted by the Nixon administration in order to bring about the war's end. As secret negotiations persisted between the parties, the Nixon administration had clear intentions to end hostilities, win or lose. The secrecy of these negotiations suggests that the American president had little expectation of achieving the kind of victory initially intended by the invasion and occupation. Still, the resolution of the war would not be settled without one more campaign of aggression.

The negotiations at this juncture were carried out between U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho of North Vietnam, and experienced a critical breakdown when the two sides could not reach compromise on an existing treaty draft. In retaliation for what they viewed as an unacceptable peace agreement, "the North Vietnamese published the details of the agreement and stalled the negotiations. Feeling that Hanoi had attempted to embarrass him and to force them back to the table, Nixon ordered the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong in late December 1972" (Hickman, 1). It was thus that on December 18, 1972, President Nixon ordered the initiation of the Linebacker II air campaign.

The Linebacker II Air Campaign

The primary intent of tactically targeting key North Vietnamese infrastructure with a demonstration of overwhelming force was to motivate the opposition to return to the negotiating table and forge a lasting peace agreement. The Linebacker II air campaign was ultimately successful at achieving its short-term goal of bringing about the war's end, with the Nixon policy of employing physically and psychologically devastating overhead force rapidly producing the negotiations needed to end the conflict. However, it also failed as a means of achieving the greater American interest of supporting a stable democratic government in South Vietnam — justifying the overarching claim of this paper that no side can be said to have "won" the Vietnam War.

In no uncertain terms, the air campaign was successful in at least bringing the North Vietnamese back to the negotiation process. According to Kamps (2003), "in just 11 flying days between 18 and 29 December, the Air Force and Navy achieved an objective that had eluded U.S. politicians since 1964 — forcing the North Vietnamese to the peace table on America's terms" (Kamps, 1). Linebacker II's objective had been to create circumstances in which the United States could exit the conflict rather than surrender.

Short-Term Success and Its Limits

The display of force unleashed through this campaign was undeniably effective at making an impact on the northern strongholds of Hanoi and Haiphong. The Vietnamese sustained extensive damage to their economic and military capacity and were likewise given evidence of America's ability and willingness to utilize overwhelming force to achieve its goals (Werrell, 1). With the nuclear option always available just behind an attack of such ferocity, the North Vietnamese were inclined toward negotiation as a means of procuring American withdrawal without further devastation.

There remains considerable doubt as to the actual effectiveness of Linebacker II. The short-term objectives — returning to the negotiating table and initiating a real and total American exit — were achieved. But it has always been a subject of disagreement as to whether the U.S. exit was undertaken with "honor." The Linebacker II assault led to an unusually quick concession on the part of the North Vietnamese. Yet "as soon as Hanoi signaled it wished to resume peace negotiations, Linebacker II raids immediately ceased. Some in the Air Force argued that this was a mistake; if the United States continued the attacks, they maintained, North Vietnam would have to accept a military defeat" (Boyne, NP).

Instead, the United States acted with the uneasiness of cause that had been its Achilles heel throughout the war. Nixon's claims, even toward the end of the war, maintained that support of the democratic order in South Vietnam remained a top priority. In the long and difficult negotiations between Secretary of State Kissinger and his counterparts in the North and South, the U.S. acted on its desire to extricate itself from its commitments in Vietnam in exchange for the freedom of its MIA and POW personnel. In exchange, it tendered a host of concessions on behalf of an unwilling South Vietnamese government. The short-term victories gained by Linebacker II were important from a military strategy perspective but would ultimately be overshadowed by the war's overall failures.