This paper explores the difficulties faced by Middle Eastern empires — primarily the Ottoman Empire and Persia — in adapting to the intellectual, technological, economic, political, and social challenges posed by the West during the eighteenth through early twentieth centuries. Drawing on Gelvin's framework of "defensive developmentalism," the paper analyzes why reform efforts largely failed, how local populations reacted to Western incursion, and what role great-power competition played in shaping Persia's fate. It also examines major reform movements, including those of Mehmet Ali and the Young Turks, and assesses the degree to which Middle Eastern societies adopted Western institutions and ideas in their efforts to survive European imperial expansion.
The Middle Eastern empires had to adapt to the various challenges presented by the West in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries once it was clear that the balance of power in the affairs of the region had shifted to the West — meaning the powers in the West could be neither ignored nor controlled. By the end of the eighteenth century, the balance of power had shifted against the Ottoman Empire and toward the European Christian states. The Ottomans had shown a progressive shift away from Europe and toward the East, and this was a major change in thinking. During the first three centuries of its existence, the Ottoman Empire had concentrated on the conquest and control of Christian lands, moving Islam westward, and the power and glory of the Empire had derived from this.
By this time, the Ottoman Empire was governed by the doctrines set in place by the Hatt-i Serif of Gulhane (1839) and the Islahat Fermani (1856) (see Khater, 2003), though the move to establish equality throughout the empire was not fully implemented and did not satisfy either Muslims or Christians. The fact that the empire was seen as in decline caused its leaders to place greater emphasis on their leadership of Islam so that they could demonstrate power in Asia even as it waned in the West. As Gelvin (2005) writes, "Their goal was to strengthen their states in the face of internal and external threat and to make their governments more proficient in managing their populations and their resources. The process is known as developmentalism" (pp. 72–73).
This process affected different parts of society in different ways. Ottoman society was divided into two groups: the large mass of subjects who produced wealth by engaging in industry, trade, and agriculture and who paid taxes to the ruler; and a small group of rulers who acted as instruments of the sovereign in collecting his revenues and using them to support him. The purpose of the state was to (1) organize the exploitation of the ruler's wealth; (2) provide for the expansion and defense of this wealth; (3) keep order; and (4) promote Islam. Social mobility was possible in this system based on ambition, ability, and good fortune, and members of the ruling class were not born into it. The ruling class consisted of Muslims and Ottomans loyal to the sultan who had apprenticed themselves to a member of the ruling class. The ministers of the Imperial Institution ruled the state, but over time they were seriously weakened by political and factional struggles as well as by their relatively short terms in office. The military institution maintained its power through intimidation and violence and by placing members in high positions, but it too lost power because of internal anarchy and the decline of the corps as a military instrument.
Gelvin (2005) notes how many of the initiatives placed under the label of developmentalism failed for various reasons, including local resistance, poor planning, and simple circumstance. Gelvin sees developmentalism as a defensive posture and finds that it was ultimately counterproductive. He cites the financial element as an example, noting the way leaders financed more modern armies by expanding the growth of cash crops for export to Europe while also borrowing money from Europeans to pay for railroads and ports to transport those crops: "Thus, to resist European military expansion, Middle Eastern rulers actually encouraged European economic expansion into, and the further peripheralization of, their domains" (p. 76).
The shift in power to the West caused the leaders of the Ottoman Empire to try to regain their footing by building up their military, increasing trade, and re-asserting a degree of control in their international dealings. However, they did so in a way that bolstered Western hegemony and made them more dependent on trade with the West. This was clearly not intended, but it occurred in part because the approach of developmentalism had not been fully thought through in all of its ramifications.
The reaction of the various countries in the Middle East to Western incursion was broadly similar: each country sought a way to control the political, social, and economic realms in the face of this new challenge, attempting to return to an earlier period when Islamic countries controlled their own destiny.
The Egyptian government set out to control all aspects of agriculture: "It encouraged the planting of cash crops, particularly cotton. It set up a government monopoly . . . that bought cotton from the cultivators and sold it to European agents. It invested in industries associated with cotton, such as ginning and spinning" (Gelvin, 2005, p. 77). Such changes had social consequences, as women now worked in the factories while men performed forced labor for the government.
The Ottoman leadership also sought to institute many of the same kinds of changes but found this more difficult to accomplish because of the size of the empire and the diversity of its peoples. Some groups viewed the changes taking place in harsher terms and believed that Islam and the Islamic world had fallen on hard times: "Many attributed the predicament in which Islamic societies had found themselves to the fact that those societies had abandoned the original teachings and doctrines of Islam" (Gelvin, 2005, p. 125). The conflict — then as now — was often between modernization on the one hand and a desire to return to more fundamental principles. This desire to revive the old ways was a direct response to the perception that what was being borrowed from the West was not Islamic and may have been detrimental to the welfare of the people.
The Persian state under the rule of the Qajars fared differently than the Ottomans facing the same Western intrusion. The Qajars had come to power relatively recently, and both their country and their dynasty were targeted by the Russians and the British alike.
Gelvin (2005) notes that the Persians could often benefit from the competition between two rival imperialist powers on its borders. The British introduced the first telegraph line into Persia to improve communications between India and London, and Persia made use of the same system. The British established the first modern bank in Persia, and the Russians created another to compete. At the same time, each imperialist power discouraged Persia from borrowing from the other and prevented the other from building a north–south railway in Persia until 1927.
In economic terms, the Qajars tried to modernize the country's commerce by making deals with European financiers and adventurers, though such agreements were often made and then canceled. Concessions granted to the British and then canceled by the shah frequently cost the Persian government considerable money and produced deficits, leading to more foreign borrowing. Revolts against certain concessions were always social and economic in character.
Britain and Russia conspired to divide Persia into different spheres of influence. By the time of World War I, the British held the southern part of Persia and the Russians the north. One of the major concessions made by Persia at this time would have lasting effects: the country granted an Anglo-Australian adventurer the right to find and remove petroleum and petroleum products, leading to the purchase of this concession by the British government and the creation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Gelvin, 2005, p. 86).
The manipulations of the British and Russians over Persia would have a lasting effect on several fronts but did not truly settle the question of Persian sovereignty or grant Persia more meaningful power through its developmentalism than was achieved elsewhere in the region. British involvement in the region was solidified by the oil concession and would shape similar arrangements throughout the region thereafter.
"Ottoman decline, bankruptcy, and key reformers' limited success"
"Western institutions adopted and adapted across the region"
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