The Moral Argument for Theism: Knowledge, Reason, and God

Introduction

The moral argument consists of four components: moral facts, moral knowledge, moral transformation, and moral rationality. As Baggett and Walls point out, the most pertinent moral facts are concerned with moral duties and values, particularly what is known as intrinsic human value.¹ The question raised, of course, is where does intrinsic human value come from if not from God? Nature itself seems incapable of instilling in the human being this universal sense of value. This is a particular fact that must be addressed in order to understand why the moral argument is necessarily a theistic argument—which is what this paper will argue.

Moral knowledge, transformation, and rationality all support the argument as well. Moral knowledge is itself a sense of the universality of morality—the absolute validity of the platitudes of practical reason, as Baggett and Walls define it.² Moral transformation refers to what Evans identifies as the relation between moral duty and personal transformation: the need for one to conform and transform one's life so that it aligns with the moral precepts that one can come to know through rational ascertainment of the facts of morality.³ Rationality thus plays a part in the moral argument because "rationality expunged of the relevance of morality is a thin, myopic, and emaciated notion indeed."⁴

All four components work together, overlap, and are integrated to form the whole of the moral argument—so much so that one cannot speak of just one component without touching on the others. This paper will address these components while explaining and responding primarily to objections concerning moral knowledge, which is how one can come to theism. Knowledge of morality is a stepping stone to knowledge of God, since morality itself—the objective moral order—comes from God.

Moral Knowledge and Its Naturalistic Limits

Moral knowledge is typically viewed as an end in and of itself by atheistic philosophers. They see moral knowledge as simply a facet of the human experience—an organizing principle for human societies, which have evolved over time and place. The basis of their argument is that one can be moral without believing in God. That claim, however, is something of a non-sequitur where the question of faith is concerned, for that is a different matter altogether. The issue that theist philosophers raise is that morality itself cannot have come from anywhere other than God. If morality is used as an organizing principle, it is used in the same way that one uses stone for building or wood for fire: these things are external to oneself and provide practical uses. The same is true of morality. It exists in an objective sense, external to human beings, which is why human beings can collectively know it, recognize it, understand it, and use it—for whatever end they choose, whether as an organizing principle or as a means of personal transformation.

Justification

In order to organize or grow, one must have a sense of the moral order that exists in the world. The question behind the moral argument, however, is what one is to make of that moral order in terms of its origin—that is, where does it come from? Is it invented by man, or is it rather simply perceived by man, who created it and passes it down from generation to generation, adjusting it to suit himself or his society? Or does it remain objective and unchanging, calling for all to adapt themselves to it and conform to the order it represents?

Naturalism will allow one to arrive at moral beliefs, but it does not lead one to moral knowledge.⁵ In other words, the naturalist or atheist may hold moral beliefs, but those beliefs are not justified by anything beyond the individual's own subjective opinion. If faith rests upon reason, where is the reason for the naturalist's belief in morality? The naturalist may say that the reason lies in the simple fact that one can discern the goodness of morality, which is reason enough to believe in it. Yet it is worth dissecting this argument further. On what grounds is the goodness of morality based? Does the subjective opinion of each individual determine the goodness of morality? If so, there can be no uniformity or universal morality. Morality for one person may differ from that of one's neighbor, and without a shared sense of morality there can be no organizing principle.

This is very much what one observes in the fragmented and tribal societies of today: individuals and groups with their own senses of morality, each defining it according to their own beliefs. What justifies those beliefs? Simply the individual's or group's collective will. The will of the person or the people judges this or that action, behavior, perspective, or belief to be good because it satisfies the person's or group's desire for goodness that aligns with their own viewpoint. It is justification by way of egoism. Essentially, the morality of the naturalist and the atheist is the morality of egoism.⁶

The Problem of Egoism and Utilitarian Morality

But is egoism sufficient philosophical justification for moral belief? It is ultimately subjective and leads to conflict and division, as every ego stands in the way of someone else's. The philosophies of naturalism have gone to considerable lengths in their attempt to square the circle. Utilitarianism was Mill's attempt to explain the morality of the good by defining it as that which benefits the greatest number of people—the common good. He applies a democratic principle to his depiction of morality, reducing morality to a tool of pragmatism: whatever makes the most people in society happiest is declared good. Yet this says nothing about the remainder. If 51% of the population is happiest with one elected official and 49% opposes that official, the resulting situation will be rife with conflict and moral disagreement. Morality by definition must enjoy a consensus—and that consensus must be universal. Morality must be external and objective, or else it has no influence, no utility, and no shared meaning.⁷

The central problem with the moral beliefs of modern philosophy is the absence of universality: objectivism is rejected in favor of subjective morality—morality that applies only to one's own existence. It is an existential and postmodern philosophy that eschews the use of reason when seeking justification for the existence of morality. Dostoevsky famously remarked that if there is no God, everything is permitted. What he meant was that there can be no morality, no immorality, no law, and no violations if there is no lawgiver—and man himself does not suffice as an adequate lawgiver, for man can be overthrown, at which point a new morality is installed whose logical underpinning is "might makes right." That logic, however, does not square with objective morality, for as Baggett and Walls point out, true morality will eventually lead one to make self-sacrifice,⁸ which flies in the face of egoism and exposes the self-contradictory character of that moral philosophy.

Conclusion

The concept of moral knowledge is such that it supports the moral argument along with the elements of facts, transformation, and reason. Knowledge is that which is obtained by consenting to the facts, and it is the step that leads to transformation and faith, itself based upon reason. The moral argument must inevitably come down to theism. Without God, there can be no morality, for the justification required for all existence is the existence of a prime mover—an eternal being that has no beginning and no end. If one is going to acknowledge an objective moral order, one must acknowledge an orderer. If one is not going to acknowledge an objective moral order but rather consents only to the idea that might makes right, one must still admit that there is nothing mightier than God.

Bibliography

Baggett, David and Jerry Walls. God and Cosmos. Oxford University Press, 2016.

Baggett, David and Jerry Walls. Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Evans, Stephen. God and Moral Obligation. Oxford University Press, 2013.

Notes

¹ David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 116.

² David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 245.

³ Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation (Oxford University Press, 2013), 87.

⁴ David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford University Press, 2011), 169.

⁵ David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 209.

⁶ Stephen Evans, God and Moral Obligation (Oxford University Press, 2013), 72.

⁷ David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 245.

⁸ David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 255.

⁹ David Baggett and Jerry Walls, God and Cosmos (Oxford University Press, 2016), 183.

¹⁰ David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford University Press, 2011), 166.

¹¹ David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford University Press, 2011), 166.

¹² David Baggett and Jerry Walls, Good God: The Theistic Foundations of Morality (Oxford University Press, 2011), 166.