Soleimani Assassination: Leadership, Strategy, and International Law

Introduction

On January 3, 2020, the United States launched airstrike attacks near Baghdad International Airport, killing two of the most influential leaders operating across Iran, Iraq, and the surrounding region. The strike killed Qassem Soleimani, the Major General of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Quds Force (IRGC-QF), and Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis, the Deputy Head of the Popular Mobilization Commission and founder of the militia known as Kata'ib Hezbollah (Jahanbani, 2020). The strikes occurred against a backdrop of escalating conflict between the U.S., Iran, and Iraq, following a December 27, 2019 attack by the Iranian-backed proxy Kata'ib Hezbollah that killed a U.S. contractor and wounded several American service members.

The strike triggered widespread criticism of the Trump administration's use of executive powers, diplomatic strategy, and ethical judgment in leadership. Trump was accused of pursuing a poorly planned strategy toward Iran (Blazakis, 2020). This paper focuses on three important issues: (1) whether the executive order by President Trump represented an effective use of his executive powers, diplomatic strategy, and ethical leadership; (2) whether the killing of General Soleimani inhibited or promoted U.S. interests in the region; and (3) whether the act constituted what international law refers to as state-sponsored terrorism.

Soleimani was considered the architect and facilitator of Iran's extensive regional reach. He engineered relationships with a large network of groups across the Middle East and beyond (Parker & Noack, 2020). Although the focus on Soleimani's killing is justified, the significance of Al-Muhandis's death has largely escaped public attention. He played a central role in mobilization efforts in Iraq and was the hallmark of what the Iranian state's priorities were there. Both figures were eliminated in a single strike ordered by U.S. leadership, leaving the world to wonder what would become of the IRGC-QF's role in regional politics — particularly its links with militia groups in Syria and Iraq.

The United States Constitution distributes power among three branches of federal governance through the system of separation of powers. In The Prize Cases (1862), the courts recognized that even without a formal declaration of war by Congress, a state of war could effectively exist. Although no single branch has the unilateral right to wage war against a state, the Militia Acts of 1795 and 1807 authorized the President to exercise statutory powers to suppress an insurrection (Vladeck, 2004).

Analysis of Trump's Order

When the strike on Soleimani was ordered, no formal briefing on the legality of the attack was provided to Congress. Nevertheless, National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien invoked the 2002 Authorization for the Use of Military Force — originally passed to authorize the war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq — and stated that the action was consistent with the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. O'Brien argued that the President had a responsibility to defend the U.S. and its interests against attack (Kennedy & Northa, 2020). However, O'Brien did not specify the nature or imminence of the alleged threat, and the strike was carried out without notifying Congress beforehand.

While it is well established that the President holds legal authority to defend the nation and American citizens from aggression, and while Trump could invoke that authority to justify the strike against Soleimani, this paper concludes that the order did not meet the threshold for sound executive leadership. The President was legally required to notify Congress, and his failure to do so is a significant procedural shortcoming. Since the strike was conducted outside U.S. territory, there was a compelling interest in proceeding as a united government. Trump therefore failed in his executive leadership role on this point.

President Trump's worldview of international relations appears limited. His approach to decision-making lacks tactical sophistication, and his pattern of dismissing key military and political figures in unorthodox ways has undermined his administration's credibility with both domestic and international audiences. Opinion polls among key U.S. allies — including Australia, Germany, France, Jordan, Japan, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and South Korea — reflect a profound lack of confidence in Trump and his administration (Blazakis, 2020). For context, the George W. Bush administration designated the Quds Force an international terrorist organization in 2007, and the Obama administration imposed new sanctions on Soleimani and three senior Quds Force officials in 2011 after linking them to a plot to assassinate the Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States (Blazakis, 2020; Mellish, 2020).

Predictability and credibility are critical qualities in both leadership and international relations — qualities that President Trump does not appear to value. Rhetorical posturing is not policy and produces no lasting strategic benefit. Trump's reputation has been significantly compromised, raising the cost of effective deterrence, coercion, and reassurance. The risk of miscalculation and unintended escalation following the killing of Major General Soleimani is considerably higher as a result (Mellish, 2020). Trump's erratic approach to geopolitics has allowed key adversaries such as Russia, Iran, and North Korea to recalibrate their foreign policies to counter his moves effectively. Moreover, Trump's inner circle appears unwilling to challenge him when he strays beyond the boundaries of sound leadership on critical international matters.

A particularly damaging aspect of the administration's diplomatic record is that its foreign policy appears driven more by financial interests and personal ego than by coherent strategic values. The administration failed to notify any European allies about the killing of Soleimani — the same allies that the United States has historically depended upon for the success of major international missions. This paper therefore concludes that President Trump failed to meet the diplomatic leadership threshold.

Several incidents from Trump's tenure can be used to assess his ethical standing as a leader. These include his discussions with China over a trade deal that overlooked serious human rights abuses, and the effective sheltering of Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman from accountability for the assassination of a prominent critic through an arms deal worth billions of dollars and Boeing aircraft purchases (Mellish, 2020). According to foreign policy experts, Trump is susceptible to transactional trade-offs with foreign governments, and his conduct has only accelerated a longer-standing trend: the drift of U.S. foreign policy away from strategic vision and principled objectives. Trump operates on the assumption that the world responds to base incentives, and he has, regrettably, governed accordingly (Mellish, 2020).

Trump does carry a significant credibility burden, and that problem is not going away. Yet it is also true that Trump does not shy away from difficult decisions. Whatever one thinks of him as a leader, he has demonstrated a willingness to act decisively when faced with hard choices — particularly concerning Iran and Iraq. Many critics argue that Trump lacks a coherent political strategy, and there may be merit to that critique. However, the threat posed by the Middle East to American national security is not something that can be dismissed (Jahanbani, 2020; Mellish, 2020). On multiple occasions during his presidency, Trump has held firm under pressure. The Middle East's instability was substantially perpetuated by General Soleimani, and when Trump had the opportunity to act, he did what his predecessors had been unwilling to do.

On the specific question of ethical leadership regarding the order to kill Soleimani, it is genuinely difficult to render a definitive verdict. Given the broader pattern of Trump's foreign policy and the ethical failures committed at the international level throughout his tenure, a comprehensive judgment on his ethical leadership remains elusive. What can be said is that the decision was not embedded in a coherent ethical framework governing the use of lethal force abroad.

Conclusion

The findings indicate that the order did not represent an effective exercise of executive, diplomatic, or ethical leadership. Trump failed to engage the executive machinery available to him — most notably, his obligation to notify Congress — and the order did not meet the ethical standards expected of a U.S. President operating on the world stage. The strategic effect of the strike on U.S. interests remains inconclusive. While short-term consequences are observable — including a measurable weakening of Iran's regional influence and a recalibration among key regional actors — the long-term effects on U.S. interests in the Middle East remain unclear. Analysts generally argue that the strike will not produce a decisive, lasting improvement in the U.S. strategic position in the region.

Finally, the paper has demonstrated that the strike and assassination of General Qassem Soleimani do not qualify as an act of state-sponsored terrorism under international law. The order was issued by a constitutionally serving President, and General Soleimani does not meet the threshold of an aberrational or non-conventional target in the framework of conventional warfare. These conclusions do not resolve all the legal and ethical questions raised by the strike, but they provide a structured basis for continued debate on the use of executive power and targeted killing in U.S. foreign policy.