This paper addresses a tactical scenario in which U.S. forces must restore central government control of a provincial capital and citadel while retaining the loyalty of local supporters and neutralizing a mutinous battalion commander and allied militias. Drawing on FM 3-0, FM 3-90, and FM 5-0, the paper analyzes how Army doctrine governs encirclement operations, information superiority, and operational preparation. The analysis argues that offensive action should serve as a last resort, with encirclement used to pressure the enemy into negotiations over pay and promotions for his troops. Priorities include seizing a key bridge, securing a water treatment plant, and capturing a rail line with minimal casualties and property damage.
The tactical problem lies in carrying out higher headquarters guidance and restoring central government control of the provincial capital and citadel while simultaneously retaining the loyalty of all supporters of the central government and neutralizing the threat posed by the militias.
FM 3-90 specifically addresses offensive operations against an encircled enemy. This does not preclude the use of negotiations to persuade the enemy commander to surrender peacefully. However, if offensive operations are initiated, FM 3-90 is the defining manual for planning the basic operation. As the manual defines them, encirclement operations are "operations where one force loses its freedom of maneuver because an opposing force is able to isolate it by controlling all ground lines of communication and reinforcement (FM 3-90 Tactics, D-0)." The operation is not a "separate form of offensive operations but an extension of an ongoing operation (ibid., D-1)." Therefore, doctrine would allow U.S. forces to encircle New Olaf while still negotiating. If the enemy engages in offensive or defensive operations, friendly forces would not have far to go in a movement to contact. However, this is only if Ethelred makes the first move — which is why a friendly U.S. commander would conduct the encirclement but not initiate the second phase of offensive operations (ibid., D-2).
Since Ethelred attended U.S. Army service schools such as the Command and General Staff College, he should recognize that it is not the U.S. intention to harm him or his troops unless absolutely necessary.
U.S. forces control all lines of communication going into and out of New Olaf and can cut off supplies at any time. However, Ethelred's battalion and the militias control the water processing plant that produces 80% of the capital's potable water, as well as a rail line controlling over half of the capital's food supply — meaning the rear logistics of friendly forces and civilian areas could be compromised. This strategic significance logically explains why Ethelred occupied New Olaf: it gives him leverage in dealing with the government.
The national government has requested that U.S. forces from FOB Viking retake New Olaf, but not at the cost of alienating loyalists in the provincial capital. Since Ethelred can sustain only approximately 72 hours of effective offensive operations, he is most likely seeking to negotiate for pay and promotions for his troops and the militias — which is why he has taken the governor and the mayor hostage. For these reasons, offensive operations represent a last resort rather than a first response, unless friendly forces are fired upon or unless time runs too long, given that the capital must be secured within four days.
FM 3-0 provides detailed guidance on information gathering, which performs an enabling function in all operations by building information superiority. Planning and preparing to achieve information superiority will be of paramount importance, using as much of friendly forces' technological advantage as possible to jam or impede the enemy's command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) capabilities if it comes to a fight (FM 3-0 Operations, 11-2–11-23). This approach will allow the town to be taken with a minimum of casualties — ideally at night, when the population is asleep and when superior U.S. night vision equipment and technology provide a decisive advantage. Minimizing casualties and property damage will help convince loyalists that U.S. forces are doing everything in their power to protect the civilian population.
FM 5-0 is referenced because of its guidance on river crossing and crowd control procedures as part of an offensive operation. In the hours leading up to the movement to contact, it will be necessary for units unfamiliar with crowd control and small boat operations to practice those tasks in order to be fully prepared when it is time to depart FOB Viking. As the manual notes, "Leaders can also allocate time for maintaining proficiency on individual Soldier skills (such as zeroing individual weapons, combat lifesaving tasks, language familiarization, and cultural awareness) during preparation (FM 5-0 The Operations Process, 4-1)."
"FM 5-0 preparation, river crossing, and key objectives"
The higher echelon's directives are not a straitjacket but can be worked out with a judicious use of assembled force alongside ongoing, yet time-limited, negotiations with the enemy. It is important to take New Olaf without alienating loyalists. The town must be seized with minimum casualties and maximum preservation of property. The railroad and water plant must be taken intact to ensure an adequate food and water supply to the capital so that the government cannot be starved out by the mutineers.
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