UAE–Israel Abraham Accords and Middle East Stability
This paper examines the Abraham Accords between the United Arab Emirates and Israel as a potential stabilizing force in the Middle East. It explores the pragmatic and idealistic pillars of the agreement, including anticipated benefits in tourism, trade, economic integration, and security cooperation. The paper surveys the broader trend of Arab states normalizing ties with Israel—including Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and potentially Saudi Arabia—while acknowledging opposition from Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and some Gulf states. It argues that policies of tolerance and moderation, rather than entrenched antagonism, offer the most viable path toward regional peace, and that the UAE's example may gradually reshape the Middle East's geopolitical landscape.
- Introduction: UAE pivots toward Israel via Abraham Accords
- Stability Through the Abraham Accords: Pragmatic and idealistic pillars of the Accords
- More Arab States Normalizing Relations with Israel: Bahrain, Sudan, Morocco, and others follow UAE
- No More Obstacles to Peace: Tolerance and moderation as path to stability
- Conclusion: Collaboration as foundation for regional peace
✍️ How to write this paper — guide, tools & examples ▾
What makes this paper effective
- It balances idealistic and pragmatic perspectives on the Abraham Accords, citing Abdulla (2021) to frame both pillars clearly rather than presenting a one-sided view.
- It surveys a wide range of state actors—UAE, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait, Iran—giving the argument geographic and political breadth appropriate for a geopolitics essay.
- It engages with counterarguments (opposition from Iran, Hamas, Hezbollah, and skeptical Arab communities) before systematically addressing them, demonstrating argumentative fairness.
Key academic technique demonstrated
The paper consistently grounds its normative claims in cited evidence, then uses that evidence to build toward a policy conclusion. For example, it cites Kushner's prediction of full Arab League normalization, Pompeo's statements on Israel's right to exist, and Hoffman's analysis of Iran-containment motives—each supporting a discrete analytical point before being synthesized in the conclusion. This source-to-argument technique keeps the analysis anchored and avoids unsupported assertion.
Structure breakdown
The paper opens with a framing introduction establishing the UAE's strategic pivot. The second section analyzes the dual pillars of the Accords—pragmatism and idealism—and their implications for regional stability. The third section broadens the lens to other Arab states normalizing ties with Israel, surveying individual country positions. The fourth section addresses potential obstacles to peace and argues they can be overcome through tolerance and moderation. A concise conclusion synthesizes the key findings and reaffirms the central thesis.
Introduction
The UAE is now looking to stabilize the future of the Middle East as it pivots toward a formal relationship with Israel through the Abraham Accords. The hope is that this new relationship will support growth through tourism, technology sharing, economic integration, and security cooperation. Stability in the Middle East has long been a pernicious problem, with some states and regional actors opposed to peace at virtually any cost. These groups have been growing in power and influence for years, but the UAE has also grown steadily, and its wealth from oil exports has made it an equally powerful and influential state. However, the rising risk of war, terror, attack, and subversion remains. The UAE has therefore viewed this moment as a prime opportunity to forge an alternative path that deviates from the historical norm.
Even though Israel has worked closely with some Gulf States on security matters for years, no relationships had been formally recognized. There has always been hesitancy for any Gulf State to appear too close to Israel, for fear of upsetting Arab populations. The UAE has now declared plainly that it is tired of Arab leaders leading their populations by the nose—taking money from other Arab states while doing nothing for the people they are supposed to be helping. This has been the UAE's major criticism of Palestinian leaders. Its hope, with the Accords in place, is that they will bring other communities out of the cold misery of in-fighting and terror to the table of peace and win-win solutions that benefit everyone.
Stability Through the Abraham Accords
Although some view the Abraham Accords as idealistic in nature, the formalization of ties with Israel carries pragmatic benefits that will ensure the vitalization of both the UAE and Israel for years to come. New investments will be made, trade will flow in both directions, tourism will be supported in ways that benefit local communities of both states, and cultural understanding will begin to be achieved. All of this is possible thanks to an open-minded relationship between the leaders of the two states. It is this kind of trust and willingness to collaborate that can serve as the foundation for stability, even in a region as full of problems as the Middle East. States have to start somewhere in putting the past behind them and building a new future, and that start—however imperfect—can at least be said to exist in the Abraham Accords.
Not all states view this as a positive move. Iran, the enemy of both the UAE and Israel, sees it as an affront. Hamas and Hezbollah have denounced it. Some Arab communities believe the UAE is abandoning them by joining forces with Israel—but the UAE argues that these communities are viewing the matter through the wrong lens. Stability does not come by holding onto grudges and refusing to forgive or forget. It comes by assessing the needs of the present and working with partners who also stand to benefit from setting aside grievances and exploring how they might gain from new friendships.
Abdulla (2021) notes that the two pillars of the Accords are pragmatism on one hand and idealism on the other. On the pragmatic side, there are deep national interests that both the UAE and Israel can advance by working openly together. On the idealistic side is the notion that the example set by the UAE and Israel will inspire other nations to join their friendship and help bring peace and stability to the region. Abdulla (2021) also states plainly that Israel may be hesitant to pursue peace with Palestine. For instance, Israel's fragile coalition government favors building new settlements on Palestinian land; the majority in Israel oppose the two-state solution; more than 80% are adamantly against the Palestinians having an independent state; and Israel has yet to accept the generous 2002 Arab Peace Initiative adopted by 22 Arab states at the Beirut Summit.
There is thus something to be said for the criticism that the idealistic dimension of the Accords will not produce great results in terms of peace and stability. Yet such a criticism misses the power of pragmatic ideas to produce good outcomes on their own. When other states and communities see how prosperous the UAE's friendship with Israel has become, they may be more willing to see what the UAE has recognized for years: that collaboration is better for stability and enduring prosperity than a commitment to war and aggression. Whether petty grievances can be overcome is another matter. The UAE and Israel both remain hostile to Iran and its desire to obtain nuclear capability. Palestinians still seek an independent state. Hezbollah still sees Israel as the greatest threat to peace. These conflicts are unlikely to be resolved soon—but by setting the pragmatic wheel in motion, there is at least some chance that new ground will be made toward peace and stability in the Middle East.
Conclusion
The UAE has chosen to formalize ties with Israel for the sake of social, economic, and political stability. It has recognized that it is better to make peace with Israel than to remain rooted to an antagonistic position that does nothing to advance regional stability. The Palestinian problem will not be solved overnight, but through a policy of tolerance and moderation, the foundation for a solution may be put in place. Collaboration among states will help bring about a stable future for all.
The UAE is already seeing the economic benefits of its collaboration with Israel: tourism, exports, GDP, and investment are all set to increase. Other states, such as Bahrain, see the benefits of this kind of friendship. Even Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince recognizes that now is the time to change course. Problems persist, as the antagonism between Iran and other states presents an issue that will have to be addressed at some point. But in the meantime, regional stability can be achieved to a meaningful degree through a spirit of open collaboration. It is not a matter of waving a magic wand and making ancient grudges and animosities disappear. It is rather a process of gradual discovery and mutual support that will transform the Middle East over time.
References
Abdulla, A. (2021). The two pillars of the Abraham Accords. Retrieved from
Al Jazeera. (2020). Explainer: Where do Arab states stand on normalising Israel ties? Retrieved from https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/9/22/explainer-where-do-arab-states-stand-on-normalising-israel-ties
Al-Ragawi, M., Amin, M., & Abujehesha, M. (2021). How US bribed Arab states to normalize ties with Israel. Retrieved from https://www.aa.com.tr/en/politics/how-us-bribed-arab-states-to-normalize-ties-with-israel/2108054
Arab News. (2020). Pompeo: Other Arab countries will normalize relations with Israel. Retrieved from https://www.arabnews.com/node/1766591/middle-east
Ephron, D. (2020). How Arab ties with Israel became the Middle East's new normal. Retrieved from https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/12/21/arab-ties-israel-diplomacy-normalization-middle-east/
Hoffman, J. (2020). Why Gulf nations are normalizing ties with Israel. Retrieved from https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/09/24/why-gulf-nations-are-normalizing-ties-with-israel/
Jewish News Syndicate. (2020). Kushner: All 22 Arab League states may normalize relations with Israel. Retrieved from https://www.jns.org/kushner-tells-uae-outlet-that-a-fourth-country-could-normalize-relations-with-israel-in-months/
Rahman, O. (2019). What's behind the relationship between Israel and Arab Gulf states? Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/28/whats-behind-the-relationship-between-israel-and-arab-gulf-states/
Always verify citation format against your institution’s current style guide requirements.