UAE-Israel Agreement vs. Other Arab Normalization Deals

Introduction

The UAE is not the only state in the Arab world to have normalized relations with Israel—but its normalization is different from what other Arab countries have done. Egypt and Jordan established peace with Israel decades ago, but it was not the kind of warm peace that the UAE has negotiated. Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan have also normalized relations with Israel, but the motives behind their agreements have been questioned by critics. When compared to these other countries, the UAE-Israel Agreement stands apart as unique. This paper explains why that is and what it means for the rest of the Arab world.

Egypt and Jordan: Cold Peace Agreements

Egypt signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1979, while Jordan signed its peace treaty with Israel in 1994. The former was the result of the Camp David Accords, overseen by U.S. President Carter. The latter resulted from two leaders in the Middle East coming together to cement an existing relationship on intelligence matters. Neither peace, however, was viewed with much warmth; rather, each was seen as an outcome of political pressures that necessitated these steps.

Egypt had just acquired a new leader in Anwar Sadat, who was determined to reverse the policies of his predecessor Nasser. Nasser had controlled a command economy in Egypt, which prevented the private sector from developing. Sadat wanted the private sector to grow, and he believed it was in Egypt's best interests to shift from an alliance with the Soviet Union to one with the United States. He therefore instituted the policy of Infitah, which was meant to open up Egypt's economy, and to accomplish this he had to make peace with Israel. Sadat's intention was "not only to transform the economy according to the free-market model, but also to correct the deficiencies of state control and achieve integration with the world economy" (Ates, 2005, p. 134). By choosing peace with Israel, Sadat sought to signal that Egypt was turning over a new leaf. Unfortunately, the economic reforms he intended did not materialize, and Egypt failed to prosper from the new policy. The peace remained somewhat cold, despite the favorable press given to it by the United States during the Camp David Accords.

Since 2013, however, Egypt and Israel have worked more closely on security matters, as they share a common interest in containing Iranian influence in the region—particularly regarding Hamas (Mitchell, 2021). The two countries are also cooperating more closely on energy matters. Still, the Egyptian public largely opposes the normalization of ties between the two countries so long as the Israel-Palestine conflict continues (Mitchell, 2021). Thus, even though the two states' leaders share energy and security concerns, and diplomatic ties have never entirely lapsed even amid the ongoing conflict, the peace remains somewhat cold and lacks the warmth seen in UAE-Israel relations.

The peace between Jordan and Israel has not been much different. It, too, grew from geopolitical necessity. Jordan's King Hussein had been working with Israel's Mossad for years before the peace treaty was signed (Riedel, 2019). At the same time, Israel was holding talks with the PLO, of which Hussein knew nothing (Riedel, 2019). Initially, Hussein was upset by these secret negotiations, but he eventually viewed them as an opportunity, recognizing that "the negotiation of a peace treaty with Israel would also open the way for a rapid restoration of ties with Washington" (Riedel, 2019). Since the Kuwait-Iraq hostilities, Jordan had been lost in the shuffle of geopolitics. Peace with Israel offered a chance to regain some regional leverage. Because Hussein trusted Israel's leader Yitzhak Rabin, the timing seemed right.

Yet, 25 years later, the peace between Jordan and Israel remains cold. Ahren and Rasgon (2019) note that between the two states "security cooperation is in good shape, but trade is declining, diplomatic relations are frosty, and the imminent retaking of 'Isle of Peace' symbolizes ties under growing strain." Moreover, the 25th anniversary of the peace came and went without either side commemorating the occasion (Ahren & Rasgon, 2019). In effect, the peace was merely a security arrangement and did little to extend the relationship between the two countries more broadly. The UAE, by contrast, is working closely with Israel on all fronts—tourism, energy, diplomacy, security, technology, and agriculture—establishing a very warm peace in hopes of increasingly warming the entire region.

Essentially, Egypt and Jordan sought to maintain a level of peace with Israel through their treaties, but this peace was a cold one rather than one that elevated the countries or turned a page in the history books. Both still maintain security ties with Israel, but the ingredients for genuine growth are missing. Cooperation exists in some respects, but overall the peace is viewed more as a maintenance project than as a solid foundation for real development.

Conclusion

The UAE stands to benefit significantly from the Abraham Accords, as it is focused on establishing a win-win situation for itself and Israel. It is building toward the future and has the political stability to pursue that goal successfully. The other countries that have either signed the accords or concluded peace treaties with Israel in the past may have done so more out of ulterior or externally pressured motives than out of any genuine commitment to real development. Some of these countries are not even stable enough to capitalize on such a deal, as is the case with Sudan. Others, like Egypt, have leaders who want to make the relationship work but face a public strongly opposed to any normalization. Major cultural barriers remain in most of the other countries. In the UAE, leaders have worked deliberately to prepare the ground and manage opposition so that the deal can take root and flourish. The result is a qualitatively different kind of agreement—one characterized by warmth, mutual benefit, and a credible foundation for long-term cooperation.

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