U.S. Military Intervention Strategy in Pakistan: Options & Risks

The Threat Landscape in Pakistan

In April 2009, a potentially troubling era dawned in Pakistan's Swat Valley, where a top Islamist militant leader — emboldened by a peace agreement with the federal government — laid out an ambitious plan to bring a "complete Islamic system" to the surrounding northwest region and ultimately the entire country (Constable). Speaking to thousands of followers in an address aired live from Swat on national news channels, cleric Sufi Mohammed bluntly defied the constitution and federal judiciary, declaring he would not allow any appeals to state courts under the system of sharia, or Islamic law, that would prevail there as a result of a peace accord signed by the president.

Richard C. Holbrooke, the U.S. special envoy to the region, said in an interview broadcast on CNN that the decision by insurgents to keep fighting despite the peace deal should be a "wake-up call to everybody in Pakistan that you can't deal with these people by giving away territory as they creep closer and closer to the populated centers of Punjab and Islamabad" (Constable).

The evidence suggested that extremist forces had drawn the opposite lesson from their victory in Swat and were gearing up to carry their armed crusade for a punitive, "hatred-of-women" form of Islam into new areas. There were numerous reports of Taliban fighters entering districts south and west of Swat, where they brandished weapons, bombed and occupied buildings, arrested aid workers, and killed female activists (Constable).

In the northwestern town of Mardan, insurgents attacked girls' schools, forced CD shops to close, ordered barbers not to shave beards, and bombed the office of a nonprofit aid agency, killing a female worker. Taliban commanders accused the agency of "propagating obscenity." Taliban fighters also occupied the Buner district for several days, closed a religious shrine, and burned DVDs in the streets. They then toured the region in a convoy of trucks, even entering a secured army area while displaying heavy weapons (Constable).

"The inescapable reality is that another domino has toppled and the Taliban are a step closer to Islamabad," the Pakistan-based News International newspaper warned.

Against this backdrop, U.S. military planners convened a high-level review. The following represents the substance of that strategic brief, prepared by the Department of Homeland Security, covering the greatest risks to the United States, key objectives, current concerns, and available options — both military and diplomatic — for intervention.

Greatest Risk to the United States

Terrorism is currently the preeminent threat to U.S. and coalition national security. Pakistan is the frontline in the battle against terrorism, as its tribal areas have become a safe haven for al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Pakistani efforts in the war on terrorism have suffered due to a lack of resolve and military capabilities, as well as a general distrust of the United States. To combat and diminish the threat posed by al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the coalition must pursue a strategy of constructive engagement and unconditioned inducements (Minor).

The consequences of a possible intervention into Pakistan are extremely unpredictable. The alleged al-Qaeda militants are embedded in complex tribal networks in a remote mountainous area. Military action could inflict severe casualties and damage on these traditional communities and inflame anti-American sentiment across Muslim Pakistan. It might also accelerate the disintegration of the U.S.-backed Pakistani government, which currently possesses nuclear weapons. The Pakistani military has steadfastly opposed direct American intervention for many years (Hayden).

Nevertheless, plans have been drawn up by the U.S. military's Special Operations Command for deploying Special Forces troops in Pakistan's frontier regions for the purpose of training indigenous militias to combat forces aligned with the Taliban and al-Qaeda (Van Auken). Citing unnamed military officials, reports indicate that the proposal would "expand the presence of military trainers in Pakistan, directly finance a separate tribal paramilitary force that until now has proved largely ineffective and pay militias that agreed to fight al-Qaeda and foreign extremists" (Van Auken).

The prevailing and primary interest of the United States is the national security and protection of its citizens. Former U.S. Director of National Intelligence John Negroponte identified al-Qaeda as the single greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its interests. The July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate revealed that al-Qaeda's central leadership "in the past two years has been able to regenerate the core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks in the Homeland." In addition to regenerating its core capabilities, al-Qaeda is working "more efficiently as a beacon for other terrorist organizations around the world" (Minor).

Mike McConnell, Director of National Intelligence, stated that a future al-Qaeda attack on the U.S. "most likely would be planned and come out of the [al-Qaeda] leadership in Pakistan." Dr. Rohan Gunaratna described the Afghanistan/Pakistan border as a "terrorist Disneyland." The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan contain numerous terrorist training camps, many associated with al-Qaeda. Dr. Gunaratna indicated that the 30–40 terrorist groups training in Afghanistan prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, subsequently moved to the FATA. The survival of the Taliban in the FATA has been "singularly responsible for the continuing regeneration of al-Qaeda as an organization because it has permitted the leadership and the operatives of this terrorist group to safely 'dissolve' into a larger environment either that is hospitable to them directly or that protects them by disguising their presence amidst a larger pool of Taliban adherents." Pakistan therefore represents the front line and a vital component in the U.S. war on terrorism (Minor).