Voluntary Acts and Criminal Liability: Three Case Studies

State v. Burrell: Voluntary Acts and Manslaughter

In the State of New Hampshire, Marc Burrell was convicted in a jury trial on the count of manslaughter. State v. Burrell refers to Burrell's appeal of that original conviction. The grounds of his appeal were that the jury was improperly instructed on the parameters of criminal liability. In the original case, Burrell had accidentally shot someone.

Crucial to the Burrell case is the definition of a "voluntary act" under criminal law. Under New Hampshire criminal codes, "[a] person is not guilty of an offense unless his criminal liability is based on conduct that includes a voluntary act or the voluntary omission to perform an act of which he is physically capable." RSA 626:1, I. Because Burrell's act could be considered involuntary, he appealed on the grounds that criminal liability had not been properly proven. Burrell claimed that the jury did not sufficiently distinguish between a voluntary and an involuntary act.

The courts ruled against Burrell, holding that the trial judge was not required to give the jury the level of specific instruction Burrell had requested. "As long as the trial court adequately instructs the jury on the applicable law, the court is under no obligation to include the specific language requested by a party" (State v. Burrell).

Contextual evidence does matter when determining whether an act was voluntary. Burrell claimed that only his last act — the act that ultimately caused the victim's death — had to be shown to be voluntary in order for him to be criminally liable. However, there were a series of events precipitating the fatal shooting, including playing Russian roulette, consuming alcohol, and other risk factors, all of which were voluntary in nature. These preceding choices are relevant to the voluntariness analysis and support the court's conclusion.

State v. Newman: Sleep Driving and Involuntary Conduct

The appellant, Newman, claimed that he suffered from a sleepwalking disorder that rendered his behavior involuntary. Newman had been convicted of driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII), which in the state of Oregon entails criminal liability. In his appeal, ultimately heard by the Oregon Supreme Court, Newman relied on ORS 161.095(1), which "requires proof that a person engaged in the voluntary act of driving for criminal liability" (Payment, 2013).

The State argued that ORS 161.095(1) does not apply to vehicular codes, and that those vehicular codes were the proper grounds for Newman's conviction. The State contended that whether the DUII occurred voluntarily was therefore irrelevant. However, the State did reverse and remand, ultimately acknowledging that the critical voluntary act at issue was not the intoxication but the driving.

Newman argued that "sleep driving" constituted an involuntary act. One of the key facts in the case was that Newman had been drinking with friends earlier in the evening and had actually arranged for a designated driver to take him home. The DUII occurred later, while he was sleep driving. Medical evidence and physician testimony helped bolster Newman's case, as individuals with Newman's disorder are not acting voluntarily while asleep.

The Oregon Supreme Court focused centrally on the theme of voluntary acts. A person who is sleeping is by definition not conscious, and therefore any acts occurring in that state cannot be voluntary. While the court referenced the prior case of State v. Miller (1990), in which the relevant voluntary act had been intoxication, the court held that in Newman's case the voluntary act critical to criminal liability was the driving, not the intoxication.

Commonwealth v. Pestinikas: Omission, Duty, and Criminal Liability

Sleep driving is difficult to prove, but the courts in this case appear to have been satisfied with the level of proof that Newman was indeed unconscious at the time. Under those circumstances, the sleep driving precluded actus reus generally. Based on the scientific evidence presented, sleep driving does appear to be a genuine phenomenon, however difficult it may be for many people to accept.

Walter and Helen Pestinikas agreed to serve as Joseph Kly's caregivers, having cleared their role with nurses and other healthcare workers. The arrangement between Kly and the Pestinakases appears to have been informal and purely oral. Kly originally hired the couple for funeral arrangement consultation, but later agreed to allow them to serve as his primary caregivers following a hospitalization. Evidence presented at trial showed that the Pestinakases had been withdrawing money from Kly's bank account while failing to provide the care they had agreed to supply. Kly was housed off site, "subjected to the elements and did not have access to a refrigerator or running water" (Isaac, 2010). The jury determined that even in the absence of a formal written contract, the Pestinakases were criminally liable. After Kly was found dead, the couple was charged and convicted of third-degree murder. They appealed.

The absence of a formal written contract is a troubling issue in this case, but ultimately the Pestinakases were grossly negligent and their conduct led directly to Kly's death. The jury based its decision on 18 Pa.C.S. § 301(b), which establishes that omission can serve as a basis for criminal liability. That statute also stresses the importance of voluntary acts. The Pestinakases voluntarily entered into a verbal agreement with Kly to serve as his primary caregivers; they did not fulfill that obligation; and they voluntarily neglected and omitted to perform their caregiving duties — all of which contributed to his death.

The courts demonstrated how the case involves a confluence of criminal and civil law, with civil law governing the nature of the contract. The courts also distinguished between legal duty and moral duty, and upheld the legal validity of the informal contract. Ultimately, the courts determined that the failure to fulfill the terms of the civil contract was sufficient to sustain the jury's original conviction. The majority opinion further argued that it was not merely omission but deliberate intent that caused the death. In the dissenting opinion, Judge McEwen argued that the omission clause was insufficient and that the appellants were correct that the original jury had been misinformed about how to interpret omission and voluntary acts.

The Pestinakases did bear a moral duty to care for Kly, as confirmed by healthcare worker testimony. Their legal duty can accordingly be inferred from their informal contract. By agreeing to care for Kly and accepting payment to do so, the Pestinakases demonstrated full awareness of their obligations under that arrangement. Their deliberate failure to provide the agreed-upon care is the crucial element in establishing criminal liability in this case.

Conclusion

Across all three cases, the voluntary act requirement emerges as a flexible but consequential standard. Whether criminal liability arises from a reckless chain of choices, unconscious behavior, or the deliberate omission of a contractual duty, courts must carefully parse what "voluntary" means in context. Burrell illustrates that preceding voluntary conduct can support liability even when the final act appears accidental. Newman demonstrates that genuine unconsciousness can negate the voluntariness required for conviction. Pestinikas shows that voluntary omission — particularly when tied to an assumed duty of care — can be just as culpable as an affirmative act. Together, these cases reflect the nuanced role the voluntary act doctrine plays in distinguishing criminal responsibility from mere misfortune.