This is the description that Blight and Kornbluh provide about the failed air support, which is proven, by their research, to have been promised, but was called back (Blight and Kornbluh 167).
16 April: At about midday, President Kennedy formally approves the landing plan and the word is passed to all commanders in the operation. Assault shipping moves on separate courses toward the objective area. At 9:30 PM, McGeorge Bundy telephones General Cabell to tell him that the dawn air strikes the following morning should not be launched until planes can conduct them from a strip within the beachhead. Bundy indicates that any further consultation with regard to this matter should be with the secretary of state. At 10:15 PM, General Cabell and Richard Bissell go to Secretary Rusk's office. Rusk tells them he has just been talking to the president on the phone and recommended that the Monday morning air strikes (D-Day) should be canceled and the president agreed. Cabell and Bissell protest strongly, arguing that the ships as well as the landings will be seriously endangered without the dawn strikes. Rusk indicates there are policy considerations against air strikes before the beachhead airfield is in the hands of the landing force and completely operational and capable of supporting the raids. Rusk calls the president and tells him of the CIA's objections but restates his own recommendation to cancel the strikes. He offers to let the CIA representatives talk to the president directly but they decline. The order canceling the air strikes is dispatched to the departure field in Nicaragua, arriving when the pilots are in their cockpits ready for takeoff (Blight and Kornbluh 167)."
As we can see, from Blight and Kornbluh's research using declassified documents, there was less presidential indecision, and the President's decision to call back the air support was based on information provided to him.
As regards weapons promised to the expatriates,...
Blight and Kornblouh's research also yielded information that proved that President Kennedy never committed U.S. military personnel to the invasion (Blight and Kornbluh 3). This is a demonstration that Hawkins, who was personally involved, and who probably at least to the extent that his rank climbed the ladder of reporting echelon would allow, was told that the blame rested with the White House. It did, the President made the decision, based on information provided to him, to call off the air strike, which Hawkins, Bight, and Kornbluh agree was the reason the invasion failed.
Later, President Kennedy would express anger over his decision to rely on the "experts." Blight and Kornbluh quote the President as saying:
All my life I've known better than to depend on the experts. How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?"
The Bay of Pigs incident would not have happened had President Kennedy taken the information provided him, and then made his own decision. Instead, he allowed himself to be guided by the "experts," and later admitted to the disastrous mistakes he made in the operation. Later, he would be less inclined to repeat his mistakes when confronted with the dynamics of the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Works Cited
http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=105514152
Blight, James G., and Peter Kornbluh, eds. Politics of Illusion: The Bay of Pigs Invasion Reexamined. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999. Questia. 8 June 2008 http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=105514154.
A www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002277509
Hawkins, Jack. "Classified Disaster: The Bay of Pigs Operation Was Doomed by Presidential Indecisiveness and Lack of Commitment." National Review 31 Dec. 1996: 36+. Questia. 8 June 2008 http://www.questia.com/PM.qst?a=o&d=5002277509.
