It is clear that the Human Rights Act is a Bill of Rights were composed of several decades of debate that went across all political parties, on the need to include the European Convention on Human Rights. It provides British person access to justice at home and it make available a resourceful model tailored to British constitutional traditions. Some experts believe that is necessary to replace the HRA with a new Bill of Rights. With that said, this paper will critically evaluate the approach of the domestic courts to the duty to read and give effect to domestic legislation in manner compatible with the Convention rights.
Research shows that under the Human right act 1998 (HRA) Section 3 "So far as it is likely to do so', key lawmaking and secondary legislation, must be read and given effect in a way which is well-matched with the convention rights' (Anon., 2014). Furthermore this is saying that if the court is not able to understand the decree in the way that is attuned with the European convention on human rights (ECHR) it can be precede a formal to the inconsistency.
Human rights Act of 1998 jumped on to the scene Wales and England on October 2, 2000. The sole objective of the human rights act is to "provide some additional outcome" in United Kingdom law similar rights which European Convention on Human Rights gotten. It makes public powers that be more accountable for their choices and makes justice's works to change in the United Kingdom system (Puddephatt, 2010). Before Human rights act 1998 came on the scene, the human rights were openly joined to Strasbourg Court. For a lot of years any person who obtained their rights in United Kingdom were not given any kind of choice but to bring the case to the Strasbourg court of law (Anon., 2014). Most of the time, they were powerless to reach their rights and make quarrels in the United Kingdom court of law. Research shows that the Human rights act 1998 was put together in such a way that insignificant influence on the traditional interpretation of parliamentary rule. The act is supposed to show the basic rights and freedom for all human being who are eligible (Scott, 2010).
However, it can be argued that the main point which stimulated in S.3 is the word "imaginable'. On the other hand the understanding of "possible' word is not easy and necessitates experts to try and understand its significance. With the passage of time judges have established conventions (or customs) that lead them to discovering the meaning of law which congress and other rule- making bodies' harvest. Guidelines which are set out in decrees should be able to cope with different classes of people in dissimilar circumstances. It is for the judges who are able to decide and find solution to the complications and keeping in view the claim of the Human Rights Act 1998.
Study makes the point that Lord Nicholls likewise considered that the legislation is understood to express the determination of section 3 which possibly will be well-suited to push the force of the important. He also talked about the fact that section 3 is recognized as the main segment in human rights act 1998 (Reddy, 2003). The implication of the section 3 is that all the previous and upcoming acts of parliament have to be made consistent with the convention privileges. The section 3 is not hard section to which they are not able to decide uncertainties in the word of the statute for the reason that people are to read from decree (Anon., 2014).
Research also shows that the main judgment in the case of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza  was provided by Lord Nicholls the point he made there that the agreement of the judicial which in detail positions that section 3 (1) may not to necessitate in order to make choice from the court which need by lawmaking deliberation (Puddephatt, 2010).
The defendant Mr. Juan Godin-Mendoza, in the case of Ghaidan v Godin-Mendoza , had living arrangements with his lover Mr. Hugh Wallwyn- James. This man was on oral residential occupancy of the underground room of apartment at 17 Creswell garden, London. Right before the death of Mr. Hugh, he was living with defendant at the same address. This was the same place where Mr. Mendoza still lives today. When Mr. James died, the landlord of the flat named Mr. Ahmed Ghaidan had the case brought to the West London County Court with the entitlement of ownership of apartment (Scott, 2010). Later on, Judge Cowell was the one that held that when Mr. James died that Mr. Mendoza would not be the person that is entitle to have the tenancy of apartment for the reason that he was not wife of Mr. James a member of initial occupant's "family' Under the paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 1977 (Reddy, 2003).
Later on, Mr. Mendoza was the one that appealed in court of Appeal and this is where it all took place. At this point he was permitted to have occupancy of the apartment as a constitutional tenant which was recognized to be up under paragraph 2. It was clear that the House of Lord made the point in the previous case that living with a partner of the same sex partner could be looked at as being the same as family and spouse (Puddephatt, 2010). When the choice was done on behalf of Mr. Mendoza the property-owner Mr. Ghaidan made a sudden appeal to the House of lordships. Also talked about in Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Schedule 1 to the Rent Act 1977 makes the point that if initial tenant who is living in dwelling-house right after the passing away of initial occupant they are allowed to have the apartment and if an individual living with original occupant as being his wife or her husband will be handled as significant other of initial tenant. The division 2 does not communicate here that a person who is looked at as being an companion of a family of primary tenant living with him 2 years in advance of his death then after his passing away one of them have to be resolved by agreement which one will be permitted to have dwelling-household. When it comes to the case of Fitzpatrick's it was determined that the homosexual pairs may have the right as initial occupant by succession up under the Para 3 if the person wages rent or a marketplace rent which is valued worth under the constitutional tenancy.
The research makes the point that Mr. Godin-Mendoza unquestionably qualified for a certain tenancy under paragraph 3 for being a member of Mr. Wallwyn-James' "family" (Anon., 2009). However, the conditions of an assured tenancy were, nevertheless, significantly less promising than those of a constitutional tenancy and therefore, Mr. Godin-Mendoza sought to bring himself inside the description of "significant other" in paragraph 2.8. So that he could have his way, Mr. Godin-Mendoza had tome up with a way to persuade the court that he was "an individual who was living with the tenant as husband or wife" (Anon., 2014)for the commitments of paragraph 2.
Experts make the argument that this sub-paragraph was placed right into the lawmaking in 1988 to extend the protection for married pairs. Mr. Godin-Mendoza faced two, noteworthy obstacles. The first had something to do with the gendered language of paragraph 2: "husband or wife (Reddy, 2003). The next was a choice of the House of Lords on the precise point which has been handed down just three years before it all took place. Some think that it was not fair that in Fitzpatrick that the House of Lords was able to just unanimously do away with an argument that a same-sex partner were able to just bring themselves inside the scope of paragraph 2 (Puddephatt, 2010). Many argued that their Lordships held that the phrase "their wife or husband" brought an association among a man and a woman and that the drive of paragraph 2(2) was to prolong the guard specified to married people under paragraph 2(1) to all intents and purposes but yet heterosexual couples. (Reddy, 2003)
Lord Nicholls came up with the argument in the Ghaidan that even though the language is the same when it comes down to gender-specific, the "social policy triggering the act.7 is related to homosexual couples on account of the "an exuviated association' (Reddy, 2003). He mostly put the emphasis on the relationship which may be eligible to have eligible of statutory occupancy. Lord Nicholls made the point that section 3 of Human Right Act 1998 is a much more powerful section where court has to "re-write' the law which was found unsuited with European Convention Human Rights (Anon., 2009). It was later noted that the House of Lord were the ones that made it known to the court of appeals that…