Iran-Contra affair: causes, consequences, and political implications

Iran-Contra Affair

Historical Background of the Iran-Contra Affair

Events Surrounding the Decision.

Nicaraguan context. In the 1970s, dissatisfaction with a manipulative and corrupt government was escalating. All socio-economic classes were impacted and by 1978 the situation deteriorated into a short-lived civil war. Through violent opposition, the Marxist Sandinista guerillas achieved power in 1979. By September of 1980, the Sandinistas had suspended elections and taken control of the media. Leftist rebels in El Salvador received aid from Nicaragua and as a result of these ties, during the 1980s, the U.S. sponsored aid to the anti-Sandinista contra guerillas. El Salvador was undergoing a violent civil war at the time, with contention between the leftist rebels who were demanding political and military reform and the government in power.

The United States context referencing Nicaragua. In February of 1979, the U.S. suspended all new military and economic aid to Nicaragua. In 1981, head of the CIA, Casey, established the Central American Task Force, which was authorized to "support and conduct political and paramilitary operations in Nicaragua" (CIA). These efforts were supported by $19 million from Congress, and the Contra combat action began in September of 1982. Part of the Defense Appropriations Act of 1983, the Boland Amendment was enacted in December of 1982, effectively prohibiting funding to support an overthrow of the anti-Sandinista government by the Department of Defense (DoD) and the CIA. By July of 1983, the Boland-Zablocki legislations allowed arms interdiction, but continued to prohibit aid to the Contras effort. Four months into 1983, Congress included $24 million in Contra assistance in the Defense Appropriations Act, but determined the aid program would end on September 30, 1984 with the prohibition to continue until December of 1985.

The Arms Export Control Act (AECA) prohibited retransfer of U.S. arms to a third world country unless certain conditions could be met: 1) The U.S. could not make the transfer directly; 2) The U.S. required certificates of receipt confirming transfer; 3) Reports were required to be filed with the Speaker of the House and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee about the retransfer agreements; 4) Notice was to be given to Congress within 30 days following a retransfer of major defense equipment in excess of $1 million. No criminal sanctions for violations were provided by the AECA. A violation of AECA would not viewed as criminal unless a there was a concomitant conspiracy to defraud the U.S. Further, Section 501(a) of the National Security Act of 1947 required intelligence activities to be disclosed to the House and Senate intelligence committees, except for those activities deemed too sensitive by the President. Especially sensitive information could be disclosed only to the intelligence committee chair and ranking member and to the leadership of the House and Senate. Covert action is intended to be a tool of policy makers -- not intelligence agencies -- if it is determined that the best way to achieve a specific policy goal is through secret means. According to the National Security Act Section 503(e), covert action is "An activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly" ("Ethical Problems, 2011).

From late 1984 to may 1986, the National Security Council continued fund-raising in order to channel goods and cash to the Contras. An economic embargo was declared on Nicaragua by President Reagan in April 1985. Through the Intelligence Authorization Act, Congress authorized the provision of communications equipment and intelligence to the Contras by the CIA. Lethal assistance was formally discontinued to the Contras with the Presidential Finding in January of 1986. The Kerry Committee of the Senate Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations began an investigation into alleged narcotics trafficking and gun running during the Contra War (Ebel, 1992; Hamilton & Inouye, 1995). A violation of the Boland restrictions by the National Security Council was reported by the Miami Herald in June of 1986. In December of 1986, the Iran-Contra affair, as it had become known, was to be investigated by Independent Counsel Walsh. In fiscal year 1987, Congress provided $100 million to renew the nonmilitary and military assistance to the Contras. A provision of that legislation barred aid to any group engaging in drug trafficking. This provision effectively cleared the way for the CIA to get involved in the Contra War once again.

The United States context referencing Iran. The Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, was restored to power in 1953 by a coup organized by the Eisenhower administration and supported by the CIA and the British Foreign Intelligence Service (M16) at the U.S. Embassy. The complexities of alignments and power-brokering over oil supplies and refinement, coupled with fears of The Cold War, led the U.S. To align with British oil interests with the hope of shutting out the Soviets. The coup was directed against the nationalist Iranian government that was attempting to unconstitutionally unseat the Shah. A campaign of religious and secular unrest directed against the Shah began to escalate in October of 1977. Buy January of 1978, the resistance to the royal monarch had intensified until, in the last quarter of 1978, Iran was overcome with chronic demonstrations and strikes. When the Shah of Iran entered the U.S. For medical treatment in 1979, Iranians feared another U.S. backed coup with plans to support the Shah. A radical student group seized U.S. citizens as hostages from several diplomatic compounds in Tehran. The 1979 Iranian Revolution successfully replaced the unpopular pro-Western Shah with a fundamentally anti-Western Islamic Republic of Iran. As Time reporter John Snow put it, the crisis in Iran -- U.S. relations, which was -- from an American perspective -- exacerbated by the taking of hostages, an entanglement of "vengeance and mutual incomprehension" (Snow, 1981). The taking of hostages violated established principles of international law that grants immunity from arrest to diplomats and recognizes sovereignty to diplomats in their embassies. The U.S. experienced the taking of the hostages in Iran as a blow to its influence in Iran and as an end to the long-standing support of the Shah. A pivotal point in Iran-U.S. relations, the hostage situation served to enhance the power and prestige of the Ayatollah Khomeini. Further, it strengthened the political will of Iranian supporters of theocracy and eroded the ground of previous efforts to normalize Iranian relations with the West. Shortly afterward, the U.S. took economic sanctions against Iran, further widening the growing gap between the two countries.

In response to the hostage situation, and after unsuccessful attempts to negotiate the release of the hostages, the U.S. froze approximately $12 billion in Iranian assets. Following the invasion of Iran by Iraq, the sanctions against Iran were increased in 1984 to prohibit weapons sales and all U.S. assistance to Iran.

The Iran context. Iran became an Islamic republic in 1979 when the monarchy in power was overthrown and Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi went into exile. A theocratic system of government replaced the monarchy. Governing power was vested in the Supreme Leader, a conservative religious scholar who was accountable only an elected body of 86 clerics known as the Assembly of Experts. In 1979, Islamic students and militants took over the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, signaling their support of the Iranian Revolution. On November 4, 1979, three U.S. citizens were taken hostage at the Iranian Foreign Ministry and 66 more U.S. citizens were taken from the Embassy of the United States. Six Americans, aided by the Canadian Parliament that provided Canadian passports for the hidden hostages, escaped and 13 were released on November 19 and 20, 1979. One more U.S. citizen was released on July 11, 1980. The remaining 52 American hostages were held for 444 days until their release on January 20, 1981. The U.S. had not been able to negotiate a release of the hostages so a military rescue operation, Operation Eagle Claw, was attempted on April 24,1980. The mission failed badly, destroying two aircraft and resulting in the death of one Iranian civilian and eight American soldiers. On January 19, 1981, the Algiers Accords was signed, thereby obtaining the release of the hostages. Their release coincided with President Reagan's inaugural address immediately following being sworn in as President of the United States, replacing Jimmy Carter. From 1980 through 1988, Iran and Iraq fought a violent, indecisive war which led, between 1987 and 1988, to clashes between the Iranian military and the U.S. Navy in the Persian Gulf.

The Lebanon context. Between 1982 and 1992, Lebanese terrorists took 96 foreigners hostage, apparently as insurance against retaliation by the U.S., Syria, and other nations who believed they were responsible for bombing incidents against a Marine barracks and the embassy in Beirut. At least eight hostages were killed outright and many others perished from maltreatment. The kidnappers were associated with different clans within the Hezbollah organization. There was speculation that the Islamic Republic of Iran and perhaps Syria were actively involved in or instigated the kidnappings. Security about the location of the hostages and the kidnappers was tight and prevented rescue. Public pressure and pressure from families was keen, eventually leading to a deterioration of the practice of not negotiating and not giving concessions to terrorists to which the Americans and the French held themselves. The Reagan administration violated official Congressional policy to negotiate secret arms-for-hostage exchange with the Iranians, who were believed to have sufficient influence over Hezbollah to achieve release of the hostages.

Literature Review

When is a Story a Lie is a Story? Boynton (1991) describes a theory of politics as conversation. He might not have had the testimonies given at the Walsh trial of the Iran-Contra affair in mind, but it seems to be a good fit for a practical application of the theory. Bogen and Lynch (1989, in their examination of Oliver North's testimony to a Joint Congressional committee investigating the Iran-Contra affair, describe how a narrative can be constructed by one party and simultaneously deconstructed by another. The interrogator strives to assimilate the various stories provided by North and, in doing so, to bring the North's narrative from one of chronology and biography to one of history. North skillfully sidesteps this process by embedding his story in local entitlements. North was a public official carrying out his public duties under supervisors of whom he assumed consulted with the President about his mission.

Bok (1999), in her seminal book Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, says unequivocally that a good man does not lie. But, she then asks, why we are categorically harsh on a liar when not all lies are bad, in that, not all lies result in bad things happening. In fact, some lies bring about good. Many lies are associated with only trivial consequences and some are associated with substantive good.

When the means is just a lie, we might ask, doesn't it easily justify the end? Clearly, this was a gauge against which some members of Reagan's Cabinet measured their engagement in deceitful practices. It took the White House and Congress four years of discussion and debate to formulate the 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act. A Kennedy School case study in ethical problems in public careers highlights an innate tension that has always been part of the undercurrents of the Central Intelligence Agency since its creation just after World War II: "How should clandestine operations, whose effectiveness is based in secrecy, be treated in a democracy?" (Kennedy School Case Study No. 548.0). In their article written for the Belfer Center for International Affairs, Rosenbach and Peritz (2009) discuss covert action and how the Iran-Contra affair led to substantive changes in the laws dealing with covert actions of the United States government.

Congress Has More Important Things to Talk About. Beer and Boynton (1999) present a framework for examining Senatorial conversation. They contrast realist rhetoric and Senatorial rhetoric. Realist rhetoric, they suggest, has to do with the "immutable laws of international politics" while Senatorial rhetoric is much more plastic and accommodates agent-actions. Senatorial rhetoric is pragmatic. Senators "want to know what will is likely to work in the specific context and what is not" (Beer & Boynton, 1999). The nation state is showcased in realist rhetoric while, according to Beer and Boynton, Senatorial rhetoric focuses on individual agents and political groups and factions at home. These domestic or local actors are weighted differently by Senatorial rhetoric also, as the "power of actors depends heavily on local, rather than global calculations" (Beer & Boynton, 1999). In the purest application of their theoretical construct to the topic of the Iran-Contra affair, the authors describe the projection of rhetoric constructs into the "world in the instrumental terms of ends and means" while Senatorial rhetoric choose other dimensions of the political action of individuals. The interest of individual agents may be defined by Senatorial rhetoric "in terms of power is a motivation that drives the actors, national and sub-national. But other dimensions -- memory, emotions such as hatred and fear, guilt, responsibility, morality -- are important as well' (Beers & Boynton, 1999).

Rhetorical conversations are intrinsically related to the culture within which the individual agent or groups exist. A look at culture, particularly strategic culture, can facilitate an analysis of the how the Iran-Contra decisions were made to carry out an arms-to-hostage transaction with Iran. Cruz suggested that elites people in a culture have more latitude than might be surmised, and others have argued that strategic culture can be characterized as a reality that is negotiated among the elites of the foreign policy arena (2005). Cruz suggests that while leaders honor the deepest convictions embedded in their strategic culture, they are still apt to seek a degree of legitimization "for preferred policy courses that may, or may not, conform to traditional cultural boundaries" (Cruz, 2005). In these efforts to legitimize their preferences, a talent robustly demonstrated by the Reagan administration during the Iran-Contra affair, these elite agents "recast a particular agenda as most appropriate to a given collective reality or…recast reality itself by establishing a (new) credible balance between the known and the unknown" (Cruz, 2005). Cruz's words aptly describe the policy practices of the Reagan administration and the Congressional testimony as witness after witness sought to "redefine the limits of the possible, both descriptively and prescriptively" (Cruz, 2005).

Contemporary theory in international relations would have it that the decision making unit of analysis is the state or nation. From this perspective, the state or nation is susceptible to "black boxing" and is considered to be equivalent to or approximate to a "unitary rational actor" (Hudson, 2005). Or the interactions between nations may be perceived as moving pieces in a "billiard ball model" which is more commonly known as actor-general theory (Hudson, 2005). Further, Hudson suggests that, as a subfield of international relations, foreign policy analysis (FBA) takes the next rational step to actor-specific theory due to the recognition that human decision makers are the hub (the theoretical grounding) of international relations. As that pivotal hub, human decision makers are not best thought of as "unitary rational actors" that stand in for, or approximate, the state.

Foreign policy analysis is characterized (Hudson, 2005) as having a wholly integrative theoretical basis. It is multidisciplinary, in that, it borrows as needed and appropriate from the fields of psychology, anthropology, sociology, economics, organizational behavior, and military behavior, and so on. Hudson further suggests that foreign policy analysis is multifactorial and multilevel in orientation as it considers many variables from many different levels of analysis. With all the lenses and combinations of an optometrist's refractometer, the most relevant attribute for the purposes of this paper is that foreign policy analysis is agent-oriented and actor-specific (Hudson, 2005). In a 1993 seminal work analyzing the Cuban Missile Crisis, Alexander George (George, 1964) was unwilling to represent the humans in the crisis as "rational utility maximizers" who were equivalent to their nations. George coined the term actor-specific as a way of underscoring that analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis could not proceed without concrete, specific information about the individual decision makers from the U.S., Cuba, and the Soviet Union (George, 1964).

Actor-specific theory permits the policy analyst to gather the determinants of state behavior, which Hudson (2005) has described as intangible "material and ideational factors" (p. 3) at their tangible intersection: A decision maker. In their seminal work, Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin (1962) explained that, "Decision makers are viewed as operating in dual-aspect setting so that apparently unrelated internal and external factors become related in the actions of the decision-makers" (1962: 74, p.85).

Within the actor-specific theory of foreign policy analysis, an important consideration, particularly when analyzing a specific policy decision rather than a policy outcome, is the construction of meaning by the actor-agents, and the framing of situations that act as scaffolding to the generated meaning. In a backward looking analysis of either policy process or policy outcomes, an "extended narrative reconstruction" may be a useful reasoning device. Boynton (1991) provides a strong example of how this meaning-making facilitates or hinders decision-making. Using the official records of Congressional committee hearings, Boynton examined how members make sense of policies and current events. Boynton charted the crystallization at meaning points when interpretation took shape, and charted how committee members attempted to convey to other committee members the meaning they generated for themselves (Boynton, 1991). Using the term "interpretive triple" as a construct, Boynton sets out a framework that shows how connections are made between facts and how the plausibility is ascribed to those facts. An interpretive triple can turn a list of facts or a chronology into a narrative by establishing between two events a plausible connection (Paletz, 1996). Interpretive triples can be used for predicting what might happen if certain actions are taken, or not taken, and for counterfactual arguments (Paletz, 1996).

Although the committee members weigh the plausibility of their interpretations within the context of the hearings in Boynton's study, the relation of context to plausibility does extend to other decision making environments and arenas. In fact, Paletz suggests that three important points need to be considered when exploring this model of reasoning. First, in framing decision-making with an interpretive triple, a narrative is reconstructed and projected ahead to the action that should take place, and from this a judgment is formed. Second, this reconstruction of a narrative in a pair-wise fashion does not require that the explanation -- the practical reasoning -- be integrated. In Paletz's words, "Interpretive triples do not require synoptic reasoning: it is practical reasoning taking advantage of whatever knowledge one has that can help interpret events. Third, instances of interpretive triples are not limited just to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and, in fact, can be found in many other types of committee hearings" (1996, p. 106).

Actor-Specific Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis

The field of international relations (IR) is akin to the social sciences in which inquiry is focused on "understanding how humans perceive and react to the world around them, and how humans shape and are shaped by the world around them" (Hudson, 2005, p. 1). For international relations, the unit of analysis is not nations, per se, but the "human decision makers acting singly or in groups" who impact those nations and the relations between those nations. If one were to overlay an empirical framework, the human decision makers would be the independent variables and the nations would be considered the dependent variables (Lane, 1992). The actions of decision makers are dynamic, bringing about changes in the relations between nations and, as such, the actors or decision makers are central to the theoretical framework.

An agent-specific theoretical framework (George, 1964) and employing extended narrative reconstruction (Boynton, 1991; Paletz, 1996) will be used to analyze the policy decision to sell arms to Iran and the motivation behind that foreign policy decision.

Analysis of Decision-Making Process Leading to Sale of Arms to Iran

Sale of arms to Iranian groups. Transactions to trade arms-for-hostages occurred over many months (Brown University, 2010). When Colonel Oliver North first began making arrangements, in what was later referred to as the "first channel," the expectation was that an infusion of arms to the moderate Iranian groups would be sufficiently persuasive to afford the release of all the remaining American hostages. Released hostages were meted out over repeated transactions in order to extract as many arms as possible from the U.S., and further, it is believed, as a demonstration of Hezbollah's power and a source of continued embarrassment to American. The primary agents in the deal to sell arms to Iran through the "first channel" were as follows:

Ronald Reagan, President of the United States

CIA station chief William Francis Buckley was one of the first people taken hostage in Beirut. Buckley was held hostage for 15 months, during which time he was tortured, taken to Iran, and died in captivity. Reagan was acutely distressed and frustrated by Buckley's ordeal (Crouch, 2009; Hersh, 2007), the fate of the other hostages, and hi inability to successfully negotiate their release. After the Boland Amendment was passed, Reagan approached McFarlane and asked him to help keep the Contras rebels alive "body and soul." McFarlane passed that responsibility on to Colonel North (Walsh, 1998).

King Fahd, Saudi Arabia

In meetings with President Reagan in 1984, King Fahd received special and deferential treatment, and the topic of whether Saudi Arabia would continue to provide funding to support the Contras was on the hidden agenda (Walsh, 1998). In 1984, Saudi Arabia was sending $1 million dollars a month to Colonel North in order to support the Contras. Some time shortly after the meeting, King Fahd let McFarlane know that the funding would continue into 1985, but at a rate of $2 million per month (Walsh, 1998).

John Poindexter, National Security Advisor

Poindexter confessed at his trial to destroying Presidential Findings that would have tied Reagan to knowledge of the arms-for-hostage swaps. Reagan followed the advice of William Casey head of the CIA and succumbed to pressure from John McMahon Deputy Director of the CIA and issued a Presidential Finding that was torn up as a political embarrassment to the President. In his testimony to Congress, Poindexter testified, "I made a deliberate decision not to ask the President, so that I could insulate him from the decision and provide some future deniability for the President if it ever leaked out."

William Casey, Director of the CIA

Casey was accustomed to having the entire CIA at his beck and call. McFarlane testified that Colonel North was acting under the aegis of Casey during the arms sales, citing phone calls made to a chief of station in a Central American Country and to an ambassador in Lebanon.

Oliver North, Head of National Security Council

North was a career U.S. Marine Corps officer when he joined the National Security Council. North's perceptions appear to have substantively influenced by his military training and experience (U.S. v. William Calley Jr., 1993). He stated "I was given a mission and I tried to carry it out." North had a mission to fulfill and worked to that end, at a very deep level unwilling to be diverted or denied opportunity to accomplish that mission. North is said to have worked with Ghorbanifar's suggestion about raising the price of arms sold to Iran and diverting the profits to the Contras.

Prior to the passage of the Boland Amendment, North asked for permission to raise funds to replace the helicopter that the Contras had recently lost. McFarlane wrote back to him saying "I don't think this is legal." McFarlane was clear that he could encourage the rebels to show more military prowess but that he was not permitted to solicit funds. But North and McFarlane continued with their plan. At his trial, North testified, "I was that deniable link and I was supposed to be dropped like a hot rock when it call came down."

Robert McFarlane, National Security Advisor

Reagan replaced McFarlane with Admiral John Poindexter in December of 1985. But McFarlane volunteered to work as Reagan's emissary on a mission to Tehran in May 1986, to establishing a "second channel" to the Iranians that would bypass Ghorbanifar. McFarlane's loyalty to North and Poindexter didn't falter, and he later helped to cover up Poindexter's work to continue arms-for-hostages swaps. On a deeply personal level, McFarlane believed that the U.S. government should have the "gumption enough to be able to differentiate between those terrorist events which are susceptible to violence and those which are not" (Cohen, 2009).

Michael Ledeen, Consultant to the National Security Council

Ledeen vouched for Iranian intermediary Manucher Ghorbanifar and worked with Prime Minister Shimon Peres, other Israeli Foreign Ministry officials, and the CIA to facilitate the arms sales by Israelis to Iran. Ledeen appears to have motivated by the financial gain from his consultations predominantly for the U.S. And Italy. A disappointed academic, he writes cynical, inflammatory neoconservative critiques for the Wall Street Journal and National Review (Hersh, 2007).

Manucher Ghorbanifar, expatriate Iranian arms dealer

According to Oliver North, Ghorbanifar gave him the idea of exorbitantly raising the prices of the TOW and HAWK missiles being sold to Iran, and diverting the profits to the Contras. Ghorbanifar was known to be duplicitous and opportunistic. CIA Director William Casey required three lie-detector tests of Ghorbanifer, which he failed. Iranian officials didn't trust him either as Ghorbanifer apparently tried to pass forged American documents to Iran. By 1984, the CIA had issued a Fabricator Notice or burn notice on Ghorbanifer, and in a 1987 Congressional report, the CIA warned that he "should be regarded as an intelligence fabricator and a nuisance." (Brown University, 2010). Oliver North said, "I knew him to be a liar." And Robert McFarlane described Ghorbanifar as "one of the most despicable characters I have ever met."

Casper Weinberger, Secretary of Defense

Weinberger believed that reaching out to Iran for the arms-hostage swap "was just contrary to everything" he knew. When told that arms would be sold to moderate Iranians, Weinberger countered that he did not know of a single Iranian official who could be called moderate and who was "not virulently anti-America." Weinberger's advice could not withstand the pressure to move ahead with the deal by CIA head William Casey and Admiral John Poindexter of the National Security Council.

Application of Interpretive Triple to Testimonial Transcripts. The excerpt of testimony from Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger, is provided here to illustrate how the technique known as interpretive triple may be applied to a reconstructed narrative such as the testimonial transcripts from Walsh's trial (Walsh, 1993).

Mr. SARBANES: Are you familiar with the PROF notes between North and Poindexter that appear in the Tower Report? When North suggested to Poindexter before departing for Tehran with McFarlane that he and Poindexter have a quiet meeting with the President and McFarlane without papers and that Poindexter might want to include the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, Poindexter responded negatively, "I don't want a meeting with Ronald Reagan, Shultz, and Weinberger."

Secretary WEINBERGER: I became aware of it when I read it in that report.

Mr. SARBANES: Well, Mr. Secretary, what was going on? What is your perception of what was occurring? You are the Secretary of Defense, you're a statutory member of the National Security Council. You are charged with major responsibility and, in fact, in the command and control function in the case of conflict, have a very unique and special responsibility that has been entrusted to you and yet here we are with your obtaining information about what your own government is doing from foreign sources. The National Security Adviser in effect is saying, no, we don't want the Secretaries of State and Defense to consult with the President. What is your perception of what was taking place in our government?

Secretary WEINBERGER: Senator, what was taking place, I believe, is what I described earlier and which I strongly disapprove of, that people with their own agenda who thought that this opening was a good thing, who knew that I opposed it and that George Shultz opposed it, did not want the President to hear these arguments after the decision had been made or perhaps indeed even to the extent that they were made before, I don't know. But I think that that was basically the problem, and I think that people with their own agenda as I have said in the Security Council were doing everything they can and maybe their motives were good, I don't know, but were doing everything they could to put this agenda into effect and one of the ways they tried to do that was to keep away from the President views that they suspected, quite correctly most of the time, differ with theirs. I think it was a very bad procedure. I think it has been completely corrected now because we have totally different kinds of people who have a totally different approach. I am not trying to lay blame, or anything, I am trying candidly to express to you how I think this situation came about.

1. FACT ONE: Poindexter responded negatively, "I don't want a meeting with Ronald Reagan, Shultz, and Weinberger."

2. FACT TWO: You are charged with major responsibility and, in fact, in the command and control function in the case of conflict, have a very unique and special responsibility that has been entrusted to you and

3. JUDGMENT yet here we are with your obtaining information about what your own government is doing from foreign sources.

4. (DEFENSE & ) PLAUSIBILITY: people with their own agenda who thought that this opening was a good thing, who knew that I opposed it and that George Shultz opposed it, did not want the President to hear these arguments after the decision had been made.

5. people with their own agenda as I have said in the Security Council were doing everything they can and maybe their motives were good, I don't know, but were doing everything they could to put this agenda into effect and one of the ways they tried to do that was to keep away from the President views that they suspected, quite correctly most of the time, differ with theirs.

The reason that Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger gave in his testimony before Congress for taking action on behalf of the hostages was that the act of prolonged holding of hostages was thought to be "primarily based on Iranian foreign policy calculations and interests" that were intended to extract "political, military and financial concessions from the Western world" since the Islamic Republic of Iran was aligned with the hostage takers. A report in a Lebanese newspaper revealed that the U.S. had sold arms to Iran. The U.S. And Israel had agreed to have Israel supply the arms and the U.S. would subsequently replenish their supply of arms commensurate with what was sold to Iran. Oliver North, head of National Security Council, was instrumental in these arrangements, as confirmed by letters he sent to John Poindexter, who was Deputy National Security Advisor and National Security Advisor for the Reagan administration (Brown University, 2010).

Iran was, at the time of these transactions, engaged in war with Iraq. Other nations were not stepping forward to supply Iran with weapons. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane and his consultant Michael Ledeen contacted Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres for assistance in the sale of arms to Iran. Reportedly, the plan for the exchange was carried out in a secret meeting in Paris. An intermediary, Manucher Ghorbanifar, was considered to be a member of a moderate Iranian group with the capacity to weld political influence on the Iranians who opposed Ayatollah Khomeni. The arrangement would entail Israel supplying the arms to the moderate Iranian group and then the U.S. would reimburse them the Israelis but would also receive a monetary benefit from the Israelis. Before the Israelis agreed to the deal they wanted assurance that the transaction had approval at the Cabinet level of the U.S. government. Robert McFarlane convinced the Israelis that the U.S. government did approve and the arms were sold to an Iranian group. Robert McFarlane had been a career Marine and later, as a member of the Reagan administration, was a primary architect of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) for defending the U.S. against missile attack. On principle, McFarlane rejected Congressional attitudes about dealing with terrorists. He argued that Israel's policies for dealing with terrorists were more effective than those of the U.S., saying "whenever they [terrorists] commit terrorism against Israel, something, somehow, somewhere is going to happen." He acknowledged that America "must have a policy at all times compatible with American values," but he apparently believed that more could and should be done.

Oliver North was determined that money from arms sales would go to the Contras. He repeated claimed, both in testimony and later in his book, which Reagan knew about. Casper Weinberger also said Reagan did know and authorize the arms-for-hostage swap, and further understood that the money would be diverted to the Contras (Walsh, 1993).

Motivation behind foreign policy decision. Cuba and the United States vied for the allegiance of the Nicaraguan government during the Carter administration, and the goal was maintenance of that relationship state. Carter had authorized aid to the Gobierno de Reconstruccion Nacional (GRN). But after the fall in 1979, given the direction of the Sandinista policies, he also authorized support to the Nicaraguan elements that showed democratic leanings. However, aid to the Gobierno de Reconstruccion Nacional was suspended by Carter in January of 1981, and this policy continued after Reagan took office. Several factors contributed to a growing concern about the Sandinista position in Nicaragua. A dominant issue, given the residual fear related to the Soviet Union, was the apparent connection between the Nicaraguan government and the Soviet Bloc (Paletz & Gutherie, 1987). CIA reports about domestic repression of the Nicaraguan citizens by the Sandinistas and their increasing military force threatened to increase Nicaraguan vulnerability to Soviet influence. Also, linkages between the Salvadorian insurgency and the Sandinistas were strengthening. Drawing from historical patterns to strengthen the position of opponents to dictatorships or leftist-leaning regimes, Washington determined to set a course to assist the Contras, opponents of the Sandinistas.

Early supporters of the GRN fled Nicaragua and were exiled in the Honduras, Costa Rica, and the United States. Many groups and coalitions formed and dissolved and recombined in this time of chaos and continually realigning allegiance. By 1981, resistance fighters in Honduras were looking for sources of aid to fight the Sandinistas, and DCI William Casey created the Central America Task Force (CATF) within the CIA. The agency was authorized to carry out covet and paramilitary operations against Cuba and Sandinista targets that were believed to be engaged in arms trafficking to Central American insurgents. Equipment, CIA agents, and arms flowed into Honduras beginning in January of 1982 for the purpose of creating and sustaining the Contra forces. From 1982 to 1984, CIA support was given to the Enrique Bermudez and Adolfo Calero of the FDN, and to Pastora and the united Sandino Revolutionary Front/Democratic Revolutionary Alliance groups (FRS/ARDE). Congress moved to ensure that arms interdiction was the mission of the CIA program by enacting the Intelligence Authorization Act in December of 1982. The Act prohibited the CIA from supporting attempts to overthrow the GRN or from provoking military confrontations between Honduras and Nicaragua. The Contra forces were not deterred and the CIA could barely keep pace with Contra needs for "material." Congressional attitude changed by September 1983 and the CIA was permitted more latitude through Presidential Finding to work toward peaceful negotiations with the Sandinistas (Moore, 1997). However, when Congress learned that the CIA had placed mines in Nicaraguan seaports, they denied further supplemental funds. Funding to support the Contras dried up and Congress again restricted the CIA efforts to give paramilitary assistance to the Contra for two full years.

Without U.S. support, the Contra appealed to private sources of funds and other governments. The National Security Council (NSC) under Oliver North, in an effort to continue to supply the Contras, established a network of companies and facilities to fill the gap. During his trial Oliver North said, "I was given a mission and I tried to carry it out."

However, the overall needs of the Contras could not be met by that network and the Reagan administration worked to persuade Congress to again provide direct aid through the CIA. The CIA prevailed and Congress authorized both paramilitary support and $100 million for fiscal year 1987. The legislation barred aid to any group engaged in "gross violations of internationally recognized human rights . . . Or drug smuggling, or significant misuse of public or private funds" (Brown University, 2010).

U.S. Attorney General Edwin Meese released information in November 1986 that proceeds from the sale of arms to Iran had been diverted to the Contras during a period when Congress had prohibited U.S. military aid to the Contras. As the Iran-Contra affair investigations progressed, Congressional support for the Contras dropped precipitously. The lack of resources and the infusions of cash concomitant with exhaustion from years of fighting contributed to a waning war effort by both the Contras and the Sandinistas.

The Morning After -- An Analysis of What Went Wrong and What Was Right

In Consideration of Ethics. The lens of foreign policy is not a single lens that can be held up to every foreign policy circumstance, every decision, and every stakeholder or agent in an event or situation (Wildavsky, 1987). The Iran-Contra affair caused the nation to examine how it felt about the actions of government and the military, and to explore beliefs about ethical decision making, obeying orders, deception, professional loyalty, and the significance of the constitutional separation of governmental powers. Perhaps most salient, it allowed Americans to revisit the construct about the ends justifying the means.

Covert Action. Following the Iran-Contra scandal, some fundamental changes were made to covert action policy (The Belfer Center). It had already been established that covert meant that U.S. officials could, under a clause known as "plausible deniability," retain secrecy about an event even to the point of denying any involvement in the activity (Rosenbach & Peritz 2011). Congress described a more formal, substantial, and active role in the authorization and oversight of covert action. The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1991 established several important procedures related to covert action. The President must issue a document called a Presidential Finding that declares a covert action is necessary in order to support U.S. "identifiable foreign policy objectives." A written Presidential Finding approving the covert action must be issued within 48 hours after the policy decision has been made official. This process is meant as a means of ensuring that communication between the President and Congress takes place, and it greatly extends the need-to-know practices of the National Security Act of 1947. However, this does not preclude members of the President's Cabinet from destroying the written copy of a Presidential Finding, as Casper Weinberger did to Reagan in the Iran-Contra years and, apparently from his testimony, a number of other times over the years. Further, the Congressional intelligence committees are to be kept fully informed of the covert action by the Director of the CIA and the heads of all agencies, departments, and entities of the Government that are in some way involved in the covert action. A final safeguard permits the President to disclose information that is of an extraordinary nature and for which it is essential to limit access only to the Gang of Eight. This group consists of the ranking minority members and chairman of the intelligence committees, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the minority leader of the House of Representatives, Senate majority and minority leaders, and other Congressional leaders the President determines to inform.

Annotated Bibliography

Beer, F.A. And Boynton, G.R. Realistic rhetoric but not realism: A senatorial conversation on Cambodia. In Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman, Eds., Post-Realism: The Rhetorical Turn in International Relations. East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 1999, accessed http://sobek.colorado.edu/~beer/PAPERS/rhetoric.pdf

The authors present a theoretical framework for analyzing the conversations and written records of Senatorial conversation, contrasting the classic rhetoric of foreign relations policy with the more realistic orientation of Senators.