Kierkegaard's aesthetic life view

¶ … Aesthetic Life in Either/Or

The crux of the aesthetic life (as well as the ethical life) depends upon the definition of norms and, as Aristotle implied, cultivating "right desire." This sense of "right desire" underlies the norm -- whether constitutive, prescriptive, imperative, etc. -- and establishes a kind of philosophical goal for which mankind may strive. By sifting one's numerous (and/or) contradictory desires for the "right desire," one is compelled to rely upon his intellect (or reason) to discern an object or end (the philosophical goal -- the light from on high that compels the philosopher to climb upward in Plato's "Analogy of the Cave"). In Kierkegaard's Either/Or, this light from on high is examined from a number of perspectives, each making an assertion concerning "right desire" -- yet each, of course, offers differing opinions on what exactly that "desire" should be -- whether aesthetic (as the pseudonymous A argues) or ethical (as the pseudonymous Judge argues), imaginary or practical. Within this framework, Kierkegaard explores life (through lived experience) and the meaning of life (through the use of reason).

This paper will explain the meaning and aim of life from within Kierkegaard's aesthetic life view and show what it is to live the good or happy life according to its prescribed norms; it will also examine whether, on its own terms, such a life view has the resources to realize its existential meaning and aim: I will make the claim that it does not -- that it relies upon the ethical life view to maintain any kind of equilibrium -- or to keep oneself from becoming like Mozart's Don Giovanni; in other words, the aesthetic view needs "right desire" -- as Aristotle stated -- but which, cannot itself fulfill, unless it comes from God Himself (as Kierkegaard implies), hinting at man's ultimate religious nature and purpose.

The Norms and Limitations of the Aesthetic Life

The first part of Either/Or deals with the aesthetic life view, and the authors of this book, A and Johannes Climacus, speak on various subjects, whether music, women, drama, or seduction. The appeal of music, according to A, is that it speaks directly and vividly to the imagination. The language which A uses throughout is sweeping and excessive -- romantic in a sense -- in other words, the type of language one would expect from an aesthete. His discourse is pleasurable and yet measured -- never surfeiting (which is an important point to remember when discussing the aesthetic life: like the Epicurean, the aesthete does not strive for over-indulgence but measure -- lest he should end up eternally damned like the unfortunate Don Giovanni).

Kierkegaard employs Don Giovanni as an example in his discourse on the aesthetic life because he serves to emphasize the two-fold principle, which is that 1) Don Giovanni owes his success with women to the fact that he understands the power of seduction -- or in other words, the aesthetic life view. His very name in fact, is enough to stir and rouse the passions: "Here one sees what I mean when I say that Don Giovanni resonates in Elvira, that it is something more than a phrase" (p. 122) -- or that "he resonates in Leporello" (p. 131) -- or that "there appeared a figure she cannot renounce, and that is Don Giovanni" (p. 191). Don Giovanni is the ultimate seducer -- and he seduces even himself. How? -- and from what? Here is the second part of that principle, which is that 2) Don Giovanni, through lack of restraint and/or aesthetic measure, falls from the role of the comedian and reduces himself to the role of the villain: he seduces himself away from the aesthetic joy and pleasure of woman by inordinately pursuing every woman and giving free reign to his lusts rather than controlling them through his reason. The aesthete must operate according to reason -- for it is reason that gives to us our sense of "right desire." Don Giovanni loses his sense of "right desire" and in the end is punished for it -- by God.

This allusion to God that Don Giovanni necessarily makes compels us to consider that which ultimately leaves the aesthete unfulfilled and unhappy: he cannot possess complete and utter fulfillment on this earth -- which is exactly what Don Giovanni shows, as he strives more and more to fill that hole which his unethical behavior simply makes bigger. Here we must pause and address the nature of the prescriptive norm, which the aesthetic life view promotes: if the "right desire" to which aesthetics applies is based on self-happiness, one may (using Don Giovanni as an example) illustrate exactly how such happiness is attained.

Were Don Giovanni to exercise some modicum of moderation, his story may very well have ended happily: perhaps he may have returned to Elvira, freed his lackey, and begun a respectable life -- without, one might add, losing any of that charm or aesthetic appreciation he possessed. However, because he chose instead to glut himself on lust and abandon any notion of well-being, he destroys all hope of happiness for his well-being. Thus, Kierkegaard states of the pleasures of life, "They are to be enjoyed in moderation" (p. 25).

We also see now that the meaning of life for the aesthete is to enjoy life -- and that to enjoy life, one must play by the rules which life establishes. Whence come these rules? That is another matter -- and the second half of Either/Or deals with life's ethics. But this section on ethics hardly answers the question of whether the good life is attainable in this life. Ethics, for example, provide the parameters in which the aesthete may find enjoyment -- lest his enjoyment begins to deviate into the realm of self-destruction (as is seen in the case of Don Giovanni). But even still, one may argue that the fence which ethics in a sense provides around one's life in order to allow one to better harvest happiness fails to guarantee as a matter of course that one's harvest shall bear fruit.

The Alternative

While ethics serves the aesthete with boundaries, they do not solve the problem of pain. Pain finds a way to seep in through the cracks as though one's life -- no matter how aesthetically pleasing -- could not simply exist without it. Neither suffering nor pain is escapable and for this reason, Kierkagaard states that "absolute suffering is beyond the powers of the aesthetic and belongs to the metaphysical" (p. 150). This statement immediately draws the philosopher into a discussion of the life of Christ, who by His very history unites the physical with the metaphysical and thus gives all mankind after Him a way of navigating through life: it is the religious answer -- the "or" portion of the either/or: either one may attempt to make a heaven of this world or he may attempt to live so as to be accepted into heaven in the next. In fact, the two are not so distinct from one another -- for in living as though for heaven, one finds that he must behave as though he were in heaven (and thus we are back to the realm of the imaginary -- although here we see a fusion of the imaginary and the practical: attainment of heaven must come through practical application of virtue, and practical application of virtue requires that one keep in mind at all times -- or as much as is humanly and spiritually possible -- the vision of heaven, or to put it in Pauline terms, one must "see Christ" wherever he looks).

And yet, Kierkagaard states that "nil admirari [marvel at nothing] is the proper wisdom of life. No part of life ought to have so much meaning for a person that he cannot forget it any moment he wants to" (p. 293). Again, he states that "he who cannot forget will never amount to much," and, "A person's resiliency can actually be measured by his power to forget" (p. 294). Here we may see, as we place these statements in their proper context, that Kierkagaard sees that pain exists so long as it exists in the mind (the memory) -- and that to be able to displace painful memories is a condition of happiness. Kierkagaard argues that it can be accomplished -- and that striving to do so is indeed an art. But he also alludes to Lethe -- the mythological river that Dante must bathe in before he cannot enjoy eternal bliss forever in Heaven: it is the river of forgetfulness and it is a prelude to bliss.

However, Lethe is itself a part of the other world -- and in this one, no matter how hard we try, the art of forgetting -- or to be more exact, the aesthetic life -- is concerned with this seeking to effect a superficial Lethe (in a sense), which is its norm. Cultivation of the "good life" is the key to the aesthete -- and an aesthetical appreciation of life is his goal. It only remains to see how this goal may be reached -- and Kierkagaard's book on aesthetics ends with the love letter from Climacus to Cordelia, in which we learn the true approximation of life and the simple path to the aesthetic goal (a path which Don Giovanni misses): "love is everything" (p. 407).

Kierkagaard states, "For one who loves everything ceases to have intrinsic meaning and has meaning only through the interpretation love gives to it" (p. 407). Cordelia is the object of Climacus' romantic love -- but this constitutive norm may also be applied to spiritual or religious love. At any rate, it is the latter that is only briefly touched upon in Either/Or -- and yet it is this that makes either the aesthetic life or the ethical life insufficient in and of themselves. In fact, even though the two ways must necessarily be coupled together, it is the religious love, which Kiergagaard intimates, that truly contains the object-goal to happiness. Religious love is immortal and lasts into eternity; earthly and aesthetic and/or ethical love is mortal and dies with the last breath. If Solon said, "call no man happy till he is dead," his reason was because then he would know whether he had lived sufficiently well to merit Heaven or insufficiently and merited Hell (like Don Giovanni).

This line of thinking can also help explain the rather unhappy sentiment embodied by the following statement: "Marry, and you will regret it. Do not marry, and you will also regret it. Marry or do not marry, you will regret it either way" (p. 38). How can one's aesthetics or one's ethics possibly lead one to happiness when the summation, here, is that either/or will leave you unfulfilled and full of regret? What then may one conclude about the aesthetic life? It is insufficient because it cannot answer for the entire mystery of man. If man were merely a consumer, or an animal, or a biological machine; i.e. devoid of spirit, it may hold true that the aesthetical life view held the key to happiness (as long as it was exercised with restraint). However, if we take into consideration this spiritual element, we are left with a number of questions and concerns, which Kierkagaard attempts to take up in his later works. But as he implies at the end of Either/Or, when one views ones actions in the light of God, they cannot help but appear as vanity.

Finding the "Right Desire"

"Only when there is desire is there an object," says Kierkagaard. "The desire and the object are twins" (p. 80). Finding the correct object to desire is the essence of Aristotle's "right desire," and education, prayer, and reflection offer the best avenues to establishing "right desire." Indeed, the institutionalization of religion appears to be the crux at the heart of the matter -- for if God did indeed become Incarnate and establish for men an object (union with Him in Heaven) for which to strive, then it must follow that He left on earth some means for them to attain this goal -- and thus Kierkagaard turns to the Church, which comes with any number of ready-made prayers just waiting to be learned and recited: "Since each prayer is not especially long, does not demand any time, I am able to run through my rosary much faster, yet not in the sense of my not reflecting on my prayer; on the contrary I do a lot of reflecting" (p. 578). Here we see in this subtle admission the fullness of the aesthetic life view coupled with the fullness of the ethical life view -- together incorporated into the religious life view (and the promises of happiness which it contains): we see opportunity for reflection and intellectual activity, conversation (which is what prayer is), and rigor (of the ethical variety -- found in the recitation of the rosary).