Berghuis v. Thompkins: Supreme Court case analysis

Berghuis v. Thompkins

Throughout the course of American history, the overall power to arrest and question criminal suspects has been continually brought to the forefront. This is designed to prevent law enforcement from engaging in activities that would stifle the basic constitutional projections which everyone enjoys. However, as time goes by new questions arise about the way the police should be applying these principles when interacting with suspects. The results are that the courts have provided guidelines that must be followed. (Dempsey, 2010)

A good example of this can be seen with. Miranda v. Arizona. In this ruling, the Supreme Court determined that law enforcement must read suspects a warning. It states: they have the right to remain silent, can have their attorneys present during all questioning and anything they say can and will be used against them. Over the years, these provisions have become the foundation for deciding if the police violated a defendant's rights. ("Miranda v. Arizona," 1966)

However, there are new challenges surrounding when these protections can be applied in criminal investigations. In Berghuis v. Thompkins, there were questions about how to interpret non-verbal signals from a suspect and if this is an indication of them responding to the warning. To fully understand how this can be utilized requires examining: the background of the case, the significance of the decision and the way it is applied in real world settings. Together, these elements will offer specific insights from the decision. ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2010)

The background for Berghuis v. Thompkins

The case started when police arrested Van Chester Thompkins for murder. He was a part of a group of three criminal suspects who were involved a drive by shooting from a van they were using. After he was arrested, the police began to question him and read Thompkins his Miranda rights. He did not say anything about if he accepted these protections or if he wanted to continue talking with law enforcement. ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2010) ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2012)

The police questioned him with no answers for three hours. Then, at the very end of the interview is when they asked if wanted to pray to God to forgive him for being a part of the shooting. Thompkins response was, "Yes." Law enforcement used this as a confession about how he committed the murder. This subsequently helped to convict Thompkins of the shooting with him receiving life in prison. ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2010) ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2012)

During the appeal, Thompkins stated that he did not want to talk with the police. According to him, this was obvious from the moment he did not answer their questions and continued to remain silent. The Supreme Court determined that these practices are constitutional. This is because Thompkins did not specifically stated that he is invoking his Miranda rights. The inability to respond; meant that the police could continue questioning him without his attorneys present. The only way that these protections can be applied is when the defendant states that they are invoking these rights and no longer want to continue with the questioning. ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2010) ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2012)

Evidence of this can be seen with comments from Justice Kennedy (who wrote the majority opinion) with him saying, "Thompkin's silence during the interrogation did not invoke his right to remain silent. A suspect's Miranda right to counsel must be invoked "unambiguously." Davis v. United States. If the accused makes an ambiguous or equivocal statement or no statement, the police are not required to end the interrogation, or ask questions to clarify the accused's intent. There is no principled reason to adopt different standards for determining when an accused has invoked the Miranda right to remain silent and the Miranda right to counsel at issue in Davis. Thompkins waived his right to remain silent when he knowingly and voluntarily made a statement to police. A waiver must be the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception and made with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the decision to abandon it. If the State establishes that a Miranda warning was given and that it was understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver. The record here shows that Thompkins waived his right to remain silent. First, the lack of any contention that he did not understand his rights indicates that he knew what he gave up when he spoke. Second, his answer to the question about God is a course of conduct indicating waiver of that right. Had he wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing in response or unambiguously invoked his Miranda rights, ending the interrogation. That he made a statement nearly three hours after receiving a Miranda warning does not overcome the fact that he engaged in a course of conduct indicating waiver. Third, there is no evidence that his statement was coerced." ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2010)

This is showing how the inability to invoke the Miranda rights is indicating that an implied warranty is present. If the suspect begins talking to the police, these protections are no longer in place. This is because they understood the warning and chose to answer some questions. The fact that they made this decision is a sign that they are aware of their statements and the consequences of them. ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2010) ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2012)

The Significance of the Decision

This decision is significant, in that it changed the interpretations as to when someone is invoking their rights. The police can use these techniques and they can continue questioning the suspect in these situations. This is because they did not clearly state that they want to evoke their Miranda rights. Instead, the individual will not say anything. ("Berghuis v. Thompkins" 2009) ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2012) ("Miranda v. Arizona," 1966) (Dempsey, 2010)

Under Berghuis v. Thompkins this is considered to be the suspect embracing implied constitutional protections. This is when they did not tell the police that they were invoking these rights. Instead, their silence is an implied signal which is indicating that they understand what has been read to them and wish to continue. If at any point the defendant answers a question, there is the possibility that these safeguards are longer valid. ("Berghuis v. Thompkins" 2009) ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2012) ("Miranda v. Arizona," 1966) (Dempsey, 2010)

When this happens, the Supreme Court determined that the suspect knows what is occurring and has decided to begin answering questions. This is because the use of these protections can change during the course of the interview. Once this takes place, it means that the defendant can begin talking with law enforcement. As they have waived their Miranda rights based upon the way they are acting towards the questions directed at them. ("Berghuis v. Thompkins" 2009) ("Miranda v. Arizona," 1966) (Dempsey, 2010)

Evidence of this can be seen with Justice Kennedy saying, "Thompkins argues that, even if his answer to Helgert could constitute a waiver of his right to remain silent, the police were not allowed to question him until they first obtained a waiver. However, a rule requiring a waiver at the outset would be inconsistent with U.S. v. Butler, which says that courts can infer a waiver from the actions and words of the person interrogated. Any waiver, express or implied, may be contradicted by an invocation at any time, terminating further interrogation. When the suspect knows that Miranda rights can be invoked at any time, he or she can reassess his or her immediate and long-term interests as the interrogation progresses. After giving a Miranda warning, police may interrogate a suspect who has neither invoked nor waived Miranda rights. Thus, the police were not required to obtain a waiver of Thompkin's Miranda rights before interrogating him." ("Berghuis v. Thompkins" 2009)

This is illustrating how a suspect will lose the Miranda protections when they begin answering questions. As these changes are a sign that the individual knows what is happening (based upon how they are interacting with the police). The fact that they are now answering their questions is a sign that they have revoked the implied warranty. ("Berghuis v. Thompkins" 2009) ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2012) ("Miranda v. Arizona," 1966) (Dempsey, 2010)

Therefore, the use and application of constitutional protections is continually evolving. This means that if a suspect uses body language and other signs to communicate. They have chosen to evoke their basic constitutional rights. However, when they begin talking is the point that they have waived them. This decision is significant in determining what practices and standards are considered to be legal when questioning a suspect by the police. ("Berghuis v. Thompkins" 2009) ("Berghuis v. Thompkins," 2012) ("Miranda v. Arizona," 1966) (Dempsey, 2010)