Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) This case was first brought in district court against Ernest Miranda after a rape investigation led authorities to question him. Under questioning, Miranda admitted to raping a young girl and signed a written confession. The case was heard in Phoenix district court and Miranda was adjudicated as guilty. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected Miranda's appeal, finding him guilty once again. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed.

Ernesto Miranda was accused of raping a young woman. The woman described her assailant and his vehicle, and using this information, the police traced the vehicle description to Miranda. Miranda also fit the physical description of the attacker, and was arrested and questioned. Under questioning, Miranda signed a written confession. His district trial summarily convicted him and he was sentenced to thirty to forty years in prison.

Miranda's lawyer appealed to the state supreme court on the grounds that his client was not aware that he was entitled to an attorney when he made his confession; the investigating officer had, in fact, testified that it was not standard to inform individuals under arrest of their rights before they made a statement. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and upheld Miranda's conviction. Miranda then appealed on the same basis -- that he was unaware of his right to counsel or against self-incrimination -- to the Supreme Court, which accepted the case.

The Supreme Court had ruled in a prior case about the right of arrested persons to counsel in Gideon v. Wainwright. 372 U.S. 335, (1963) This case established that an accused individual had the right to an attorney being present at their trial, but did not establish a right to an attorney at any other point. Miranda's counsel argued in both the district court and state Supreme Court that this opinion should be interpreted...

Both courts rejected this interpretation.
During the time period between Miranda's district court conviction and his trial at the Arizona Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a rule that made it mandatory for suspects in custody to have access to counsel. Even pre-indictment, the Court ruled, suspects had the right to consult with their attorney. (Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478) Still, the Arizona Supreme Court did not believe that the lack of counsel present invalidated Miranda's confession.

The questions determined by the Supreme Court, which chose to hear Miranda's case in conjunction with three other, similar Fifth/Sixth Amendment cases, were concerned with what constituted a violation of these civil rights when questioning a suspect. More specifically, the Court was concerned with how law enforcement officials were ensuring that suspects were aware of their Fifth Amendment right to self-incrimination and their Sixth Amendment right to counsel.

The Court established that not only were the basic protections against self-incrimination and to counsel in all phases of interrogation valid, but that police could not assume that suspects automatically knew of these rights. The Court determined that in order to ensure all suspects were aware of these rights, police had to explain them aloud. Specifically, a suspect "must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent (384 U.S. 436, 468). This explanation also must include "that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court." (384 U.S. 484, 470) With regards to counsel, suspects "must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation." (384 U.S. 436, 472) Suspects must also have…