Case Brief of Giles v Commonwealth

Giles v. Commonwealth

Cite as 672 S.E. 2d 879 (Va. 2009)

Facts of Case

Defendant, Christopher Lee Giles, took part in breaking and entering a house on September 28, 2005, in the City of Martinsville. The house belonged to Oscar Thornton, which was an inheritance from his deceased mother three months before. While Mr. Thornton has his primary home in Maryland, he treated the house he inherited from his mother as a vacation home. Since inheriting it, Mr. Thornton has visited the home twice a month. Prior to the break-in, Mr. Thornton had stayed a whole weekend in the house ten days before. Mr. Thornton’s vacation home was a fully-furnished residence with fully-stocked food and sleeping quarters. During the break-in, Giles took food, sheets, towels, a videocassette recorder, two TV screens, and bathroom supplies.

While Giles’ involvement in the break-in is not in dispute, he moved to strike arguing that the Commonwealth failed to ascertain a prima facie case. In his defense, he further contended that the Commonwealth did not establish that the house was a dwelling house as required in Code § 18.2–89. Giles stated that the house was not a dwelling house since no one was living there during the break-in and it was not used for sleeping on a regular basis. Giles’ motion to strike was denied by the Circuit Court, which found adequate evidence that it was a dwelling place. In this regard, the Circuit Court argued that Mr. Thornton purposed to return to the house though he did not spend every night there. Mr. Thornton’s intended return was adequate to determine that the house was a dwelling place. Even though Giles renewed his motion to strike, it was denied again by the Circuit Court, which found him guilty of burglary and sentenced him to 20 years for violation of Code § 18.2–89. Upon appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the circuit court’s ruling.

Procedural History

Defendant Christopher Lee Giles was convicted in the Circuit Court of breaking and entering Mr. Thornton’s house with the intention to steal. He was convicted of violating Code § 18.2–89 since the house was still a dwelling place despite being used as a vacation home by Mr. Thornton. His appeal at the Court of Appeals was denied on grounds that an individual can have several houses as long as an individual sleeps in them and participates in other functions that are generally linked to habitation. Defendant appealed.

Legal Issue(s)

Did Mr. Thornton’s vacation home meet the required elements to constitute what would be deemed a “dwelling house” under Code § 18.2–89, the burglary statute? The Court examined the degree to which an individual must inhabit a house for it to be deemed a ‘dwelling house” under this statute.

Statement of Rule

The burglary statute (Code § 18.2–89) partly states “a structure does not have to be physically inhabited every day or week or month in order to be a dwelling house within the meaning of burglary statute…”[footnoteRef:1] The statute also states “[i]f any person break and enter the dwelling house of another in the nighttime with intent to commit a felony or any larceny therein, he shall be guilty of burglary.”[footnoteRef:2] When examining the issue based on this statute, the court sought to determine the statutory interpretation of what constitutes a “dwelling house.” [1: Giles v. Commonwealth, 672 S.E.2d 879 (Va. 2009)] [2: Ibid., 1.]