Criminal justice law fundamentals and practice

¶ … Fourth Amendment of the Constitution is designed to protect the right of the people to live in privacy. As such, it concerns itself with security against illegal or unjustified searches and seizures, as well as the inappropriate levying of warrants. However, the potential conflict that this amendment commonly incites against law enforcement practices causes much debate over specific application of its provision.

In the case of Dopey v. The People of the State of California, the defendant has invoked the amendment, contesting that his conviction on charges of drug trafficking was invalid to the fashion in which officers obtained the evidence. Upon careful examination of the case, and based on the nature of precedent, Dopey's assertion is correct. Both the cash found in his house and the cocaine found in his car were collected by law enforcement in violation of the Constitution.

According to the "exclusionary rule," first invoked by Mapp v. Ohio (1961), any evidence gained by measures not accorded by the fourth amendment will be considered inadmissible to the court and can therefore not be used in building a case against the defendant. This condition applies directly to the Dopey's situation.

Of particular note is that Dopey was arrested inside his home by officers who used neither an arrest warrant or a search warrant in doing so. Entering his home by force, they made the arrest and proceeded to search the home, thus finding the case considered in evidence.

According to Payton v. New York (1980), reasons that could be considered valid for making an arrest in a public place can not be employed likewise in a home. In the home, probable cause is not enough for forcible entry and arrest. An officer may arrest the suspect only under exigent circumstances.

Because Dopey's alleged drug exchange, in public, presented no visible or concrete evidence that would extend beyond probably cause, his retreat to his house should have necessitated a search warrant. Because the police failed to acquire said warrant, all evidence found inside the house must be considered inadmissible. Also, this fact calls into question the very legitimacy of the arrest.

If the arrest is to be considered valid, than the evidence still would be considered inadmissible under Chimel v California (1969). The $11,000 was found in a room in which the arrest did not occur, which, according to the above cited case, makes it inadmissible. Because it was not in the direct vicinity of the arrest, the evidence could not be considered yielded from a search incidental to a valid arrest.

Because the legitimacy of the arrest itself is severely questionable, it hearkens New York v Belton (1981) in which it was established that a car may be searched only if the arrest of the suspect is a valid and legal apprehension. This, of course, could be negated by a circumstance of 'in plain view' which would than demand a search of the vehicle.

In the case of Dopey, the arrest is not entirely valid, and no circumstances of the incident or evidence acquired within the house were sufficient enough to imply exigency. And though there was a substance that was believed to be heroin on the defendant's car seat and floor, in plain view, the substance was found to be a legal substance. As such, there was no imperative to impound the vehicle or conduct a more intensive search therein. That being the case, the cocaine found in the spare tire compartment of the truck is also inadmissible. Dopey's appeal should be admonished and honored as there is no legitimately acquired evidence to uphold his conviction.

Part II

When a judicial system allows evidence acquired by unconstitutional means, it creates an enormous void of control of the enforcement branch of governance, entirely invalidating a structure of checks and balances. The existence of the fourth amendment, though nominally designed to protect, is also a method of restraint to be brandished against law officers acting inappropriately or outside the bounds of the Constitution. So to compromise the conditions under which evidence is to obtained would be a significant threat to the sanctity of both of these constitutional purposes.

So to draw a distinction between evidence that is substantive to the case or not seems irrelevant. In fact, to violate the intentions of the Fourth Amendment only upon the condition that the ill-gotten evidence seems to validate a case is particularly egregious. The conditionality therein would reveal the amendment to be hollow in terms of its application and execution, so it's very important that the proclivities of the amendment be consistently acknowledged with regards to evidence acquisition.

In Mapp v Ohio, Justice Tom C. Clark opined that "we hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in court."

Thusly, the court supported the notion that, even if the evidence's reliability as a source for conviction is not negatively impacted by the illegal nature of its search and/or acquisition, to present the evidence as part of the case against the defendant would be unconstitutional.

Of course, it could be contended that the evidence's obviation of the suspect's guilt should be sufficient enough to strip the defendant of his rights. To employ this process of reasoning in the prosecution of a defendant would be cardinally opposed to the cardinal notion the underlies the judicial body, of a defendant's inherent innocence prior to a legal establishment of his guilt.

Therefore, the evidence's being probative should never have to enter into the debate. Pennsylvania v Scott provides that any illegal procedure that leads to the acquisition of evidence is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. And the evidence in the case was certainly a sufficient vehicle to the defendant's conviction. It seemed to be substantial enough to imply the likelihood of guilt and subsequent conviction.