Descartes: Why God Is Not

Descartes: Why God is Not a Deceiver After going to such great lengths in Meditation III to prove that God actually exists, which was the first 'fact' that Descartes needed to demonstrate in order to undermine the Product of Chance Argument from Meditation I, Descartes next demonstrates that God is not (cannot be) a deceiver. Decartes does this, however, in a much pithier manner: single paragraph at the end of Meditation III. God.. A being having all those perfections that I cannot comprehend..

And a being subject to no defects whatever.. cannot be a deceiver, for it is manifest by the light of nature that all fraud and deception depend on some defect." (p. 40) The basis of his argument is that (1) Deception is an imperfection; and (2) God has all perfections and no imperfections; so therefore, God is not a deceiver. In reality, Descartes does not completely expound upon what is meant when he writes that deception is an imperfection.

One manner of making sense of this is to argue that evil is nothing real, but is merely the absence of something real -- the absence of goodness. In other words, the progression would be, (1) Deception is evil; (2) Evil is not a quality; (3) Goodness is a quality; (4) Evil is the lack of the quality of goodness; (5) God has all qualities and lacks no quality; (6) God is good; and (7) God is not evil; so therefore God is not a deceiver.

For Descartes, evil, therefore, is not a true quality, but actually the lack or privation of an actual quality - basically, the quality of being good. The truism in Descartes is that since God has all qualities, and lacks no qualities, it by obvious extraction, God is good, and not evil, and God does not do anything evil, so therefore He is not a deceiver.

In Meditation IV, Descartes adds a bit to his argument that God is not a deceiver by writing, "It is impossible for God ever to deceive me, for trickery or deception is always indicative of some imperfection. And although the ability to deceive seems to be an indication of cleverness or power, the will to deceive undoubtedly attest to maliciousness or weakness. Accordingly, deception is incompatible with God." (p.

41) Here, Descartes writes that the will to deceive "attests to maliciousness or weakness." As a result, a human or divine entity only deceives if he is either weak or malicious. As Descartes has proven, God can be neither weak nor malicious, so therefore he cannot be a deceiver. This raises several questions, however.

For instance, is it acceptable that a person only deceives another if he is weak or malicious? or, can a person not deceive another person even if he is more powerful, and/or even if she is not being malicious? Cannot it not be that there exists a more powerful, and non-malicious, deceiver? So basically, for Descartes, God is an entity that cannot lack in anything; and as deceiving means to lack certain positive qualities, he cannot possibly be a deceiver as he does not lack.

This viewpoint dovetails nicely with Plato's republic and the Cave allegory in that it presents a very black-and-white depiction of God and God's abilities, virtues and perfection. That is why Descartes is unique: He paints for us a simple view of God in some ways. The Counter-Point One may argue against Descartes on the idea that evil may well be a quality in itself, as opposed to simply the lack of the quality of goodness.

Basically, the argument here is that negative space - in its lack of foundation and being - actually constitutes space. Perhaps evil is actually a quality, and since God has every quality - not just those we ignorantly assume are positive - he is evil as well; and since those who are evil deceive, God deceives. By making this argument, the person puts a hole in Descartes' logic: Who are we to assume which qualities are.