Development and Composition of German Government

¶ … GERMANY & COMPOSITION OF GOVERNMENT. The research focus CURRENT ( year ) developments composition government. Preferred Resources: 1)The Economist 2) BBC News. Development and Composition of German Government Federalism is a key feature of the political system of Germany and its governance. Federalism dates back in the period after World War II when Germany was under the leadership Prussians. At this time, "Germany" consisted of a patchwork of states.

These states formed the "Old Empire" (Altes Reich) with a common institution, the so-called Immerwahrender Reichstag in Regensburg (1663 -- 1806), composed of representatives of the respective territories. Its key features were power-sharing, bargaining and compromise-seeking (Kitschelt and Wolfgang 16). Following the dissolution of that Empire in 1806, 39 territories formed, under Napoleon's protectorate, the Rheinbund (Rhine-Confederation) which was unwieldy and inefficient. The Vienna Congress in 1815 established, the confederal Deutscher Bund, as successor of the Old Empire and with the Bundesrat (in Frankfurt) as the supreme but weak institution (Kitschelt and Wolfgang 18).

After a revolution in 1848, a constituent assembly (Frankfurter Paulskirche) established an alternative structure (a democratic federation similar to the American model, but again with much weight given to the executives from the participating entities). Owing to the resistance of Austria and Prussia, this model could however, not be realized. Political unification was then achieved under Prussia's leadership in two subsequent steps: in 1867 Otto von Bismarck formed the Norddeutscher Bund, which then developed into the German Empire, with the larger states in southern Germany as additional members (Kitschelt and Wolfgang 22).

The Empire was a Confederation of 25 states of where Prussia stood out as the dominant entity. The states proceeded to possess sizeable internal autonomy forming the a sovereign institution Bundesrat to represent governments of the states. Federalism was exemplified executives dominance and public administrations, through the lack of a single national center and preservation of exceptional features in the participating states. The Feudal elements in Germany had been weakened following World War I, under the constitution of the Weimar Republic.

This was by strengthening the Reichstag as Parliament and the President compromising the states lately known as presidents and Lander. They were represented at the Reich level by the Reichsrat, the second chamber, composed of members of Lander governments (formed by political parties), in line with the executive-bias tradition of German federalism. Although the Reichsrat was weak, bargaining between the administrations of the Reich-government and the governments of the Lander continued to be the prevailing feature of decision making.

The Nazi totalitarian regime abolished all remaining federal elements establishing a centralized governance system in the period between (1933 -- 45) (Streeck, Wolfgang and Kathleen 112). The end of World War II ended came as a result of the unconditional surrender of Germany. This is a time when there was no German authority even at the local level. Responsibility in the country and power was taken over by the Soviet Union, UK, USA, and France took over all responsibilities and powers in the country.

An agreement to dissolve Prussia and divide the territory into four zones of occupation was arrived. The decision to dissolve Prussia and divide Germany into supervision territory has an impact on the development of governance of the region (Streeck, Wolfgang and Kathleen 119). Since 1949 the federal system in the Federal Republic of Germany has explicated towards a pattern of interlocking relationships between the federal and Lander governments due to the following factors: There have been a number of attempts to reform German federalism.

From 1973-76, a special commission (Enquete-Kommission Verfassungsreform) discussed a comprehensive reform of the constitution and half of the federation has exploited the provisions for concurrent (and framework) legislative powers; The Lander have been compensated for autonomous legislative power loss with increased right to participate in federal legislation through the Bundesrat.

The comprehensive constitutional responsibility of the Lander for applying and administering most laws; The institution of Joint Tasks (Gemeinschaftsaufgaben) was introduced by a whole set of constitutional amendments in 1969, among them those relating to the financial system; The provisions of the "financial constitution" according to which the most important revenues are shared between the federation and the Lander and which have, in addition, measures of financial equalization amongst the two levels and between the Lander themselves; and Growing cooperation between the federation and Lander and amongst the Lander themselves, accompanied by shared financial responsibilities.

Proposals made referred to federalism. None of these, however, was taken up and introduced in the Basic Law. Attempts in strengthening the Lander by minimizing the fields for Joint Tasks in the 1980s were, by self-restraint on the part of the federation in its legislative action, and by ameliorating the financial foundation of the Lander. These endeavors were unsuccessful, however (Thelen and Kathleen 89). The continued challenges on the reunification and the overall economic situation, have negatively affected federal system entities manoeuvre.

From 1992-94, a joint commission of the Bundestag and Bundesrat discussed reforms of the constitution which might be necessary as a consequence of reunification. With the exception of a few minor modifications, however, the federal system remained unchanged. Decisions on constitutional provisions are difficult as they require a two-thirds-majority in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat, which means an agreement of the two major parties (Thelen and Kathleen 45).

Developing Political Aspects in Germany There are three issues that have substantial implications for German federalism: the consequences of reunification; the challenge of European integration; and initiatives towards a comprehensive reform of the federal system. Reunification has increased the economic and financial disparities amongst the Lander. This has had the result that weaker Lander are more dependent on the federation and thus the federation could win additional weight, which could have consequences for the overall federal balance.

Furthermore, the system of horizontal financial equalization (horizontaler Finanzausgleich) has been affected by the widening gap (The Economist 17). All five new Lander -- Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Sachsen, Sachsen-Anhalt and Thuringen -- belong to the group of netreceivers, with consequences for previous net-receivers (they may become net-payers or, at least, suffer some losses) and the "traditional" net-payers (their burden, transfer payments, may grow) (The Economist 17,18). Finally, the party system in the five new Lander differs from the pattern in the "old" Lander, with the Partei des Demokratischen Sozialismus (PDS).

The successor of the Communist Party in the former GDR -- becoming a third force beside the Christian Democratic Union (Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU)) and Social Democratic Party (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD)). Also, the fact that the Liberals (Free Democratic Party/Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP)) and the Greens are not represented in the respective Land Parliaments (Scarrow 622).

This has had consequences for coalition patterns (SPD with PDS, or grand coalitions, if one party cannot form a majority on its own) which may have an impact on political developments in German politics as a whole. The deepening process of European consolidation has confounded a challenge to the legal status of the Lander and therefore, to the federal structure of the FRG.

The first challenge arises from the fact that the European Union (EU) has extended its functional scope considerably which means that EU activities fall into areas which have been reserved to the Lander in the internal allocation of competencies. The second challenge has arisen from the modalities of EU decision making. In the EU, the Council of Ministers is the most important decision making and legislative body, and Germany is represented in the Council by the federal government.

This means participation of the federal government in decisions in fields belonging to the exclusive competence of the Lander. The third challenge lies in the field of implementation of European legislation in Germany; this is primarily the responsibility of the Lander which until recently had no opportunity to influence the legislation and thus saw themselves under a strong degree of control by the federal government (Scarrow 625). The Lander have reacted to this challenge successfully.

First, they established in 1992 -- 93 (in the new Article 23, supplemented by the "Law on the Cooperation of Federation and Lander in Affairs of the EU") rights of participation in dealing with EU matters at the domestic level. The federal government now has to consider Lander concerns, formulated by the Bundesrat, and in matters falling under the exclusive competence of the Lander. A further transfer of sovereign powers when this would alter the content of the Basic Law requires a two-thirds majority in support of the measure in the Bundesrat.

Second, the Lander have established and developed autonomous EU activities (example setting up representatives in Brussels and lobbying directly). Finally, they have acquired the right to participate formally and directly in the decision making process at the eu level. They are represented in the Committee of the Regions established in 1993 (in an advisory capacity only), and they can represent Germany in the Council when matters falling under their jurisdiction are on the agenda.

In addition, the new Article 24.1(a) allows the Lander to transfer (subject to federal government consent) sovereign powers to cross-border institutions insofar as the Lander have the competence in the policy fields concerned. On the whole, the position of the Lander has been strengthened (Kitschelt and Wolfgang 21). This is illustrated by the fact that two Lander representatives have participated in governmental conferences (Amsterdam 1996 and Nice 2000) on reforms of the eu-treaties; and that the Bundesrat and Bundestag were represented by one member each in the convention on the eu constitution in 2002/2003.

The thorough and substantial reform of federalism has been on the political agenda since the 1980s with the Lander -- amongst them primarily the stronger ones -- pushing towards "competitive federalism" (Wettbewerbsfoderalismus) instead of "participatory federalism" (Beteiligungsfoderalismus). They demand an increase in their autonomous competencies, combined with the reduction of federal level activities (example, in the areas of concurrent and framework legislative powers). Second, they are interested in further extending their freedom of manoeuvre in cross-border activities and "external" relations.

Here, they refer to functional needs in connection with the EU "Internal Market" policy (i.e., abolish internal economic borders and create a unified market for all EU member countries) and the new geographical centrality of Germany with a larger number of neighbouring countries in an enlarging EU (Scarrow 628). The third topic, which is very controversial amongst the Lander themselves but vis-a-vis the federation as well, has to do with the financial system.

The stronger Lander (as net-payers) are trying hard (by appealing to the Federal Constitutional Court and through political negotiations aiming towards a consensual new equalization system) to reduce their burden. The weaker Lander (as net-receivers) insist on solidarity both from the federation (which they expect to allocate additional resources to them in connection with extending their legislative autonomy) and from the stronger Lander, and believe that financial equalization, even if reduced, should continue. Since all changes would affect vested interests, one can only expect modest reform (Thelen and Kathleen 128).

In spring 2003 the federal government and the Prime Ministers of the Lander submitted their reform proposals as the basis for political negotiations. They agree on demanding an end to the interlocking relationship, but they differ on what measures should be taken and which deserve priority. In summer 2003 both sides agreed to set up a bicameral committee to consider the modernization of German federalism and elaborate proposals for constitutional reform. The committee is expected to report at the end of 2004.

The following issues are at the centre of the reform agenda which has been discussed widely since 2000/01: To extend the freedom of the Lander for more autonomous legislation by reducing the list of concurrent powers and, perhaps, eliminating framework legislation of the federation. This is in exchange for a reduction of the participation of the Bundesrat in federal legislation. If the party majorities in the two Houses are different, the composition of the Bundesrat has resulted frequently in either a blockade or a non-transparent bargain on compromise agreements.

Thus the federal government would win more freedom in realizing and implementing its program if the role of the Bundesrat is reduced. To revise the financial system as a consequence of and in line with a new allocation of powers and responsibilities. In November 2003 a bicameral committee (Kommission Bundesstaatsreform) was established formally and started its work.

More radical reform proposals have been submitted from outside the committee (e.g., to replace the Bundesrat by a U.S.-type Senate; to abolish the block-vote of each Land in the Bundesrat; to give the Lander the right to impose their own taxes or to differ from the average rates for particular categories of taxes). With the establishment of this committee both sides have generated great expectations in the public that substantial reform of German federalism will be realized.

However, since changes affect existent interests, it is likely that success will only result from a deal with a package that is balanced. Developments in the Constitution It is a feature of German federalism that the Lander are responsible for implementing federal legislation in their own right (Article 83). There are very few examples of direct federal administration (matters such as a foreign service, the army, border control, air traffic, waterways, inland navigation and federal finances.