Economic Impacts of SARS

SARS Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) broke out in China in 2002, in Guangdong Province. This area is an industrialized region that lies at the heart of China's economic strategy. Cities like Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Dongguan are all major manufacturing hubs, the former two also shipping hubs. SARS was a form of pneumonia, and spreading from Guangdong it infected 1622 people in 13 countries, causing 58 deaths (Cyranoski, 2003). A doctor visiting nearby Hong Kong is believed to be responsible for the spared of SARS outside of China, though most commonly among medical professionals.

Social Factors SARS was an issue because it was an unknown disease, and because of the nature by which it spread. People who came into contact with victims could catch the disease, and it is by this means that it traveled to multiple locations around the world. Most of these locations were in Asia, but there was also a cluster in Toronto, again concentrated among health care workers. SARS was damaging to China, however.

The World Health Organization posted travel advisories, not just to Guangdong but to other regions of China as well, plus Hong Kong. (WHO, 2003). This travel advisory caused a degree of panic among people, and had impacts on business in the country. In total, over 8000 globally were infected, and of those 900 died. The economic impact was significant. Mainland China saw its GDP decline by 1.05% in 2003, and in Hong Kong the decline was 2.63%.

It is also worth considering that these areas face a lingering country risk premium, meaning that businesses and travelers were for years less likely to go to these areas out of concerns for future outbreaks (Lee & McKibbin, 2004). Important to remember is that SARS was more or less contained. While it affected thirteen countries, there were only a few thousand people affected. The swine flu a few years later affected many more people. But SARS had pandemic risk.

Experts warn that had SARS not been contained, it could have cost the global economy $3 trillion, or 5% of GDP, and likely it would still be a lingering issue (Frangoul, 2014). Economic Factors China was the epicenter for the SARS epidemic. It hit in one of the country's most productive economic regions, which complicated matters with respect to the economic cost of SARS.

In addition to the decline in GDP of 1.03% for 2003, the SARS epidemic has a lasting, ripple effect It served to curtail future investment in China for a few years, especially to the affected region. This decline in confidence for foreign investors may, however, have simply resulted in a shift in doing business to other parts of China, in particular the Yangtze region around Shanghai, Suzhou, Ningbo and Hangzhou.

Industries that were most exposed where those in the service sector, which could not move as easily, and some of those industries suffered declines of 15% or more. Costs in this industries increased 5%, partially to mitigate risks. However, the negative effects of SARS were short-term, and once it was contained it only took a year or two to get back onto normal growth patterns in the affected areas.

Further, China's economy as a whole did not suffer -- it was more localized and many businesses simply set up in other regions of China that were not as affected by the outbreak (Lee & McKibbin, 2004). US Global Health Policies and Initiatives The United States did not experience SARS, just eight cases of people bringing it back from affected areas (CDC, 2012). Even though their direct air links to affected areas such as Guangzhou and Hong Kong, the U.S. never reported any cases.

The cases in Toronto were contained to health care professionals, so there was no outbreak there to pose risk to the U.S. The American authorities institute travel warnings with respect to the affected regions, largely aligned with WHO travel warnings. Testing and vaccination were developed in Canada, and applied by the United States. The U.S. response was instead focused on ensuring that any cases of SARS that were confirmed in the country were effectively contained so that an outbreak did not occur.

There was significant concern among U.S. health authorities about the possibility of an outbreak. In particular, the CDC recommends isolation/quarantine for people suspected of having SARS, due to its high rate of transmission and the high risk of death for people who contract it. The CDC now has produced a checklist of SARS preparedness to assist with community health officials, in the event that it returns, and a lot of this advice if valuable in the case of other pneumonia or influenza strains.

The United States also banned the importation of civets, an animal that was determined to be a carrier of the virus, again as a prophylactic measure. Resource Allocation When SARS broke, it was essentially all hands on deck. There was an immediate and pressing need to identify the disease, where it came from, to contain it and then to understand how to deal with it. All of these consumed significant resources in the effected countries.

The response was governmental in China, where most major things are run by the government and definitely its health care system. The Canadians who contributed the best work on detecting and treating SARS were also working for government-run health systems. There was not much contribution from big pharma, private foundations or other such things.

The World Health Organization was involved, in particular on the human resources and financial side, providing some assistance to ensure that progress on the fight against SARS was quick, as there was strong incentive to avoid a dangerous pandemic, which was a real possibility at the time. The WHO in particular served a coordinating role. It faced challenges working with the Chinese government, which was reluctant to provide accurate and current data about the crisis. This was unfortunate, because the WHO was working hard especially on containment.

A lot of research needed to done quickly to determine what the vectors were, for example, and the WHO was able to commit its laboratories and funding to that end (Aguirre, 2003). On the Canadian side, the Michael Smith Genome Sciences Centre was charged with isolating the genome for.