The Economic Inequality of Today

Locke’s Private Property Theory Cannot Justify the Economic Inequality We Observe Today
Introduction
In 2015, more than 1 percent of families living in the United States generated over 25 times what other families of the remaining 99 percent generated (Kluegel & Smith, 2017). This discovery is being realized as the rich keep getting richer while the poor become even poorer, as observed in the US.
Locke starts by explaining his theory of private property by determining how people start to possess property apart from the ordinary resources offered to humankind. The key feature that defines a given part of private property is called labor, as the person who operates the “labor that eliminates [the good] from the common natural condition that it was left in” gives him ownership of the property (Locke, 2002; 30). Locke asserts that the common natural resources are available to every individual, but one takes ownership of a specific good when a person provides a certain amount of labor on the good. In consideration to this argument, Locke refers to the concept that, opportunities are made available to everyone, and it is therefore upon the individual to take advantage of the opportunity provided and perform labor, with earnings available for the person to relish. Well, this seems utopian, right? This might be because in the real world, opportunities are restricted to the majority and therefore, the particular source of inequality, whether economically or politically, and therefore the main source of existing social classes (Kluegel & Smith, 2017). Consequently, this paper provides an argument that supports the statement which states that Locke’s private property theory is not able to justify the current economic inequality observed today.
Background Information
Locke states that, in the “natural state”—the original condition where each individual had an equal right to the available natural resources made available by the “voluntary hand of Nature”—nobody had “a private authority, exclusive to the rest of humankind,” over such resources. But these resources would have been unproductive for the survival of mankind and their benefit unless they could be operated by mankind for their personal benefit. So how is it possible to justify the change from the unowned property to private ownership? How can an individual legitimately assert an exclusive right to the use of a given resource that, in its original state, could be utilized by anyone? Locke’s argument of this problem continues to be highly contentious among critics. Locke’s theory has been applied to justify most concepts from the laissez-faire to the welfare state and even full-blown socialism. Which of these contradictory interpretations should be covered in my study of Locke’s political ideas is a judgment call, and I honestly remain unsure of my final decision. I dread that most of my followers will limited interest in the distinct points of the Lockean scholarship. Most of those details may however be of interest to specialists.
Argument
Locke's critiques reveal that private property according to the two different types of utilities requires diverse justifications. According to Locke, when one picks some apples from a tree or cultivate a virgin land, then he not only take ownership of the apples or the agricultural produce, but he also owns the tree which produced the apple or the land that he cultivated. Therefore, the labor theory of value is used to justify the ownership of an individual only on the specific product of his labor, and not on the method of production applied (apart from his own labor), for instance the apple tree or the cultivated land mentioned. Mill, for example, supports Locke’s theory that the grounds for the former property right is "the claim of producers to what they produce themselves", but states that this principle cannot be used to justify private property in regards to land since "no individual created land" (Day, 1966: 207).
Locke’s argument of justice is almost completely related with the economic inequalities which appear in the pre-political societies after the introduction of money. A point to note from the start, however, is that according to Locke, money is not the only initial driver of income circulation. Pre-monetary exchange is, first of all, a major cause of material inequality, and thus it is not hard to see why this might not be justified. Picture a pre-political community of producers cum traders all provided with varied level of productivity. It is fair to assume that the more fruitful or able-bodied will penetrate the marketplace with a higher tradable stock and therefore have greater bargaining ability, than the less fruitful or disabled (Behnegar, 2012). It is clear to see that, initial inequalities of the tradable endowments, as increased by the bargaining benefits, show that the better endowed can benefit in the marketplace, contribute to income inequalities as the marketplace clears.
Putting aside textual considerations, there is a second standardizing factor why Locke’s consent argument ought not to be viewed as a justification of the inequalities found in initial appropriation, regardless of what Locke’s positive pronouncements on the matter might have been (Locke, 2002; 49, 50). Even though the state-of-nature landowners might have, in a theoretical history, tried to rely on the contribution of marginal land to support the start of capitalist accumulation, the regulating clout of Locke’s Law of Nature will have simply prevented this course of action. Revisionists and abrogationists alike provide strategies that resolve the (real or likely) clash between the sufficiency proviso and the outcome of monetization failure to take off from the ground. Allow me to explain using two famous formulae of Locke. First, Locke defines labor as “the measure of Property” (Locke, 2002; 36). Undeniably, this formula states, positively, that labor can give rise to relations regarding property (i.e., the labor-mixing argument). However it also describes, negatively, that an individual may not be able to appropriate more land other than which one could either labor on by themselves, or (more contentiously) hire laborers to work on the land (Locke, 2002; 28). Therefore, the property is (at the least primarily) to be cultivated for productive investment, rather than for rental income. Considering the second formula: Locke states that every instance of appropriation should leave “plenty, and as good [...] in prevalent for others” (Locke, 2002; 27). This stated proviso (i.e., the “sufficiency proviso”) simply means, negatively, that, even if an individual was considered a “production monster” that could make him labor (or invest) on the vast tracts of land, then the resulting appropriation would be hindered (Uberti, 2013). The proviso also asserts, in a positive manner, that everybody is entitled to a chance to expend their labor, and therefore access property relations.
According to Marxian analysis, capitalist development is seen as a means resulting in the accumulation of the means of production placed in a few hands (otherwise known as monopolization of capital). Such a process consequently increases the dominance of one social class over the other, and so we observe growing inequalities around the socioeconomic setting. Also, for a long time before Marx, many critiques, including Aristotle and Jefferson, made arguments that showed democracy required substantial equality when it comes to the appropriation of wealth and income. (Uberti, 2013). The major reason in this argument was that belief that shows that great inequalities in the economic setting would ultimately change into political inequality.
Objection
Locke’s theory reveals that the state of nature is a condition of perfect freedom, where individuals "plan their actions, and eliminate their belongings and persons, as they see fit, within the provisions of the stipulated law of nature, without seeking for a leave or relying upon the will of another individual" (Locke, 2002, 269). The law of nature or that of reason states that everybody is equal and independent. Thus, "nobody should harm another person’s life, liberty, health, or belongings" (Locke, 2002, 271). Because everybody is equal, "all the authority and jurisdiction is correlating, nobody therefore having more than the other" (Locke, 2002, 269). It not only occurs to Locke that individuals are equal and thus excluded from subordination (besides the special case of slaves), but he also argues that since all men are created by God, none reserves the absolute property rights even over oneself, leave alone over other individuals (Haddad, 2003).
Counter to Objection
The reference that Locke makes to "natural rights" in the early sections of his treatise expressed his principal thrust. In order to comprehend the Lockean natural rights, it is important to first evaluate the arguments made by his main critiques, the proponents of total monarchy, who were positioned in Robert Filmer's Patriarcha, that was published in 1680 (Filmer, 1991). Robert Filmer understood that the relationship between King and his subject was similar to that of father and child, and thus it followed reasonably that private property could be only be given by the crown. This is the statement that Locke firmly reputed. God, he argued, had not granted exclusive property rights to the monarchy. The doctrine of natural rights and natural law uphold the existence of private property prior to the government.
Conclusion
According to the argument stated above, it is obvious that Locke’s private property theory cannot be used to justify the economic inequality that we witness today. Indeed, Locke’s theory does not fully justify why the Oil-rich country of Nigeria is not wealthy, although it has wealthy individuals there, who are largely linked to the state. Also, it doesn’t put into consideration Switzerland’s per capita income (per capita GDP [PPP] of $51,262) and of Luxembourg (per capita GDP [PPP] $89,012) and the Country of Hong Kong (per capita GDP [PPP] $50,551), which are very high and still, they don’t relate to the wealthy natural resource of Nigeria. It is necessary to note that there are numerous vital perspectives that weigh down a philosophical argument. In the case of Locke’s private property theory, the said aspects have greatly changed. For instance, the concept of land inheritance and that of limited resources. One of the common factors between the countries that have quite small differences in economic inequality and those that have huge differences between the rich individuals and the poor is how they exercise their rights. It is therefore fascinating to research on how the exercise of rights affects the distribution of wealth within a given place, and to what extent.










References
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Day, J.P. (1966). Locke on Property. Philosophical Quarterly. Volume 16, 207-220.
Fimer. R. (1991). Patriarcha and Other Writings. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
Haddad, B. M. (2003). Property rights, ecosystem management, and John Locke's labor theory of ownership. Ecological economics, 46(1), 19-31.
Kluegel, J. R., & Smith, E. R. (2017). Beliefs about inequality: Americans' views of what is and what ought to be. Routledge.
Locke, J. (2002). Two Trealises of Government. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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Uberti, L. J. (2013). By" fancy or agreement": Locke's theory of money and the justice of the global monetary system. Erasmus Journal for Philosophy and Economics, 6(1), 49-81.