Euthyphro and Piety an Analysis of Euthyphro

Euthyphro and Piety An Analysis of Euthyphro with an Alternative Definition of Piety Euthyphro gives three definitions of piety which fail to satisfy Socrates. Socrates' goal in this dialogue is to reveal the shallowness of Euythyphro's argument and obtain a better understanding of truth. In other words, Socrates' objective is the same as always: To point out, as Rudebusch (1999) states, "that one who is aware of one's ignorance is in a better position to learn the truth than one taking oneself to know" (p. 13).

This paper will provide Euthyphro's three definitions of piety, Socrates' refutations, my own definition of piety and what I think Socrates' response would be to it. 1st Definition Piety, Euthyphro explains in his first definition to Socrates, is "doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of similar crime -- whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be -- that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety" (5e).

Euthyphro's definition of piety is stark, simple, and clear -- and so is the fact that he considers himself to be a very pious person. This fact is immediately analyzed by Socrates. Socrates cross-examines Euthyphro, attempting to extract from him a more precise definition of piety: "When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder" (6d).

The irony here is that Socrates is already aware that Euthyphro is not interested in absolute truth but rather only in justifying himself, for which reason Socrates now gently mocks him, implying that it must be pious to charge one's father with murder. Euthyphro is concerned with the letter not with the spirit.

2nd Definition Indeed, it is Socrates who is searching for an objective standard -- an absolute outside himself by which he may judge: "Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions" (6e).

So, Euthyphro happily obliges Socrates by giving his second definition: "piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them" (7a) -- thus opening the way for Socrates to expose Euthyphro's own supposed "piety" as relativistic. Socrates points out how even the gods are often in dispute -- showing that they fail to agree amongst themselves about what is just and unjust, pious and impious.

If piety is that which is pleasing to the gods, it stands to reason that piety is relativistic, since some of the gods may see some actions as holy and others as unholy. Euthyphro agrees with this assumption. Again, Socrates demonstrates that he himself is searching for truth, while Euthyphro has thus far shown himself to be shallow and relativistic. 3rd Definition Euthyphro's final definition of piety is "that part of justice which attends to the gods" (12e).

But this again is a superficial response and Socrates exposes it as such when he asks in what manner the gods require attendance? Are they like horses that need care and attention? Euthyphro is willing to consent to Socrates' objections, but he is unwilling ultimately to look at himself as objectively as Socrates would like. Before Socrates can conclude the conversation with a proper definition, Euthyphro excuses himself and runs off.

As Plato shows in this dialogue, Socrates is concerned primarily with admitting one's ignorance, moving away from error and toward truth. Euthyphro is more sophistically-oriented: He wants nothing but to be "right." As George Rudebusch states, "The singly ignorant person is he who is ignorant but at least recognizes his ignorance; the doubly ignorant person is he who, besides his ignorance, takes himself to know, so he is ignorant of his ignorance, too" (p. 13). It is Socrates' goal to draw his audience out of its doubly ignorant state.

An Alternative Definition along with a Socratic Critique If I had to supply a proper definition of piety, it would be "union with Truth." Socrates might ask me to define my terms: "What do you mean by 'union' and 'Truth'?" I would reply that Truth is, as Andrew Napolitano (2010) has stated, "identity between intellect and reality" (p. xiii). Union is the state of being one with something else -- namely, Truth. Piety, therefore, is unity with this identity.

Socrates could question me as to how one unites oneself to Truth -- how this feat is accomplished; whether a man must give up his own identity and put on the identity of Truth or retain his own identity and simply proclaim that he is "in the truth." Obviously, Socrates would say, one's mind must adapt and correspond to the reality of life -- and this, of course, is the overall goal of the philosopher: to know and understand reality -- a task, which if undertaken properly and with.