The Evolution of Air Doctrine

Developments in Air Doctrine from 1903 to the End of World War II

Air doctrine is essentially an innovation of the 20th Century whose origin can be traced back to 1903 when the Wright brothers flew the first airplane (Bakshi, 1999). However, the first fledging use of air power occurred during World War I between 1914 and 1918 where airplanes were initially employed for scouting, artillery detection, and reconnaissance. This was followed by the use air power for brave air-to-air combat and restricted bombing and strafing missions. Air power doctrine continued to grow through the years as significant developments took place in military and civilian settings. This paper examines the major developments in the history of air doctrine from 1903 to the end of World War II. The analysis of these developments is linked to the works of different theorists like Sun Tzu, Mao, Jomini, Clausewitz, and Douhet.

Brief History on the Developments in Air Doctrine

According to Bakshi (1999), the history of air power doctrine can be traced back to 1903 when the first airplane was flown by the Wright brothers. Since then air power doctrine has undergone significant developments as societies across the globe have continued to evolve. One of the major events that marked the history and application of air power doctrine occurred during World War I (1914-1918). This period marked a significant turning point in the history of air power doctrine by determining its initial application. During this period, air power doctrine was utilized for scouting, artillery detection, and reconnaissance. The use of air power doctrine for this purpose was geared towards giving one an advantage over adversaries. The use of air power for this purpose paved the way for its application to combat. In addition to scouting, reconnaissance, and artillery spotting, air power was later used for brave air-to-air combat and limited bombing and strafing missions.

The period between World War I and World War II marked the greatest developments in the history of air doctrine. During this period, air power was essentially a new technological high-ground. As noted by Green (2010), air power was basically an unprecedented intellectual achievement during this period. Germany and the USSR developed the concept of Land-Air Battle Doctrines as part of their air power strategy. However, maritime nations differed from Continental powers like Germany as they viewed air power as an autonomous outgrowth of a new dimension of power. On the other hand, Japanese air power doctrines heavily emphasized the creation and aggressive exploitation of naval-aviation. Therefore, the application of air doctrine between 1903 and World War II was characterized by the ideals and views of different theorists who also shaped how nations or adversaries viewed war.

Analysis of Developments in Air Doctrine

Air power doctrine has been characterized by a series of developments that influenced its application in the period between 1903 and World War II. Green (2010) asserts that the development of air doctrine is primarily a story of unprecedented intellectual achievement. The intellectual aspect of the development of this concept is attributable to the role theorists played in this process. The intellectual development of air doctrine is also evident in its inclusion of new patterns of thought, stern logic, and aggressive flights of imagination. Perspectives on air power doctrine emerged as new ideas emerged, particularly amidst stern opposition characterized by rigid thinking, vested interest, and inertia in the period between the two wars. Therefore, air doctrine is a dynamic concept as the ideas of 1941 may not serve current and future needs. The dynamism behind this concept is evident in the significant developments that characterized its evolution, application, and growth. The significant developments in the history of air doctrine can be understood through incorporating the works of various theorists. Some of these developments between 1903 and World War II are as follows:

Pre-World War I (1903 – 1914)

The initial period in the history of air doctrine is conceptualization in 1903 when the Wright brothers flew the first airplane (Bakshi, 1999). The successful invention of the first airplane marked a significant turning point in the history of aviation. For the Wright brothers, the invention of the airplane was the culmination of a series of gliders that they had designed, created, and tested from 1899. When designing the first airplane, the Wright brothers noted that the issue was not primarily getting into the air but what to do when the plane was airborne (Paur, 2009). As a result, the Wright brothers observed birds to get an idea on what to include in their design of an airplane. They employed a wing-warping technique in their design, which culminated in the creation of a successful airplane on December 17, 1903.

The history of air power doctrine can be traced back to the development of the first successful airplane and flight. According to Hall (2011), the idea of air power in the military domain emerged nearly at the same time as the field of aviation. The invention of the first successful airplane by the Wright brothers paved way for the conceptualization of air doctrine in the period between 1903 and World War I. The accelerating characteristics of World War I influenced the development of air power since nascent air forces faced extraordinary conditions. As a result of these conditions, air forces started to examine a variety of military applications that were available. By 1918, techniques and equipment were developed and readily available for nearly every form of aerial mission.

The exploration of different military applications that contributed to the emergence of the concept of air power can be understood through the views of theorists like Carl von Clausewitz and Baron Antione Jomini. Clausewitz’s theory of war emphasizes the idea of strategic centers of gravity that serve as the focal point in a war (Barlow, 1992). He argues that the center of gravity is not a source of strength/critical capability, but an effects-based approach. Therefore, striking at the center of gravity with adequate force always causes an object to either lose balance and fall. In his theory, Jomini referred to the center of gravity as decisive strategic points because the key to victory is attacking the enemy at the decisive place and time. Clausewitz’s theory emphasizes a specific effect, the collapse or fall of the adversary (Echevarria II, 2002).

The concept of “center of gravity” espoused in Clausewitz’s theory of war seemingly influenced the conceptualization of air power doctrine. He postulated that the center of gravity was vital to compelling an adversary in war or bending him to one’s will (Hall, 2011). Air power essentially emerged as a concept that would give one advantage over an adversary. Air power would be used to strike an adversary’s center of gravity and achieve the desired effect. Even though the center of gravity is traditionally seen as an adversary’s forces, it takes many forms and degrees of accessibility. Therefore, air power is one of the many degrees or forms for accessing an enemy’s force or center of gravity. The inception of air power made it possible to initiate strategic strikes against an enemy (Hall, 2011). Such strikes would be made without making contact in the conventional sea or land war. By using air power, the conflicting parties or nations would circumvent the enemy’s forces and strike his center of gravity.

In light of Clausewitz’s theory of war and the invention of the first airplane, the emergence of air power doctrine was characterized by increased research and technological advancements. Research on this area focused on promoting seamless and effective incorporation of airplanes into military settings for combat. Technological advancements involved the exploration of techniques and equipment that would be used to capitalize on the advantages of air power. As a result, militaries across the globe adapted the Wright Flyer in 1903 and subsequent models (Francis, 2020). These models were used by militaries worldwide for combat operations. In the United States, the adoption of airplanes into military settings involved the establishment of the Aeronautical Division of the U.S. Army Signal Corps in August 1907. This was followed by the creation of the Aviation Section of the Signal Corps through a 1914 federal law. This marked a significant point in the history of air power doctrine in the U.S. as it represented the statutory integration of airpower into the military organization.

Following the conclusion that the airplane had great untapped military potential by the Imperial Russian War Ministry in 1909, the airplane was viewed as a key tool in the reconnaissance role (Kainikara, 2005). As a result, airplanes were part of many military missions and army maneuvers in Russia by 1911. In 1911, an adventurous Italian officer dropped several small bombs in a Turkish camp in North Africa following the emergence of the idea of bombardment (Mark, 1994). Many countries such as the United States, Germany, and Russia made steady progress in organization, technology, and equipment for air power between 1912 and 1914. However, the progress, especially in Russia was not rapid enough for the demands placed on air power at the start of World War I.

World War I (1914 – 1918)

The First World War (1914-1918) marked a significant period in the history of air doctrine. Numerous developments took place during the war and shaped the application of air power as a potent military tool and strategy. Air power gained significant traction during this period as it was used for scouting, artillery spotting, and reconnaissance. As a new technological high-ground, air power doctrine was adopted by many militaries worldwide and used in the war. The first-fledge application of air power in the initial periods of this war paved the way for its later use in air-to-air combat and bombing missions. However, in the initial bombing missions, the use of air power was limited.

The first clearly defined air power doctrine emerged towards the end of World War I even though there was substantial imaginative and informed rumors/assumptions regarding the use of airplane as a weapon of war (Kainikara, 2005). Annexes to the Second Hague Convention of 1907 served as one of the factors in the definition of air power doctrine as the airplane was recognized as a weapon of war. However, these annexes prohibited the use of airplanes to attack villages, towns, hospitals, and houses despite the lack of capabilities to do so at the time.

The first serious and protracted aerial conflict in the history of mankind took place during the First World War and shaped the definition of air power doctrine. This conflict was fought over the Western Front and served as the precedence for all future aerial battles. The aerial conflict at the Western Front during World War I reached its peak activity between 1917 and 1918. As a result, the air forces of different nations developed themselves into well-organized and recognizable units with clear mission capabilities like bomber squadrons, observation units, and fighter squadrons.

Bomber squadrons played a major role in the aerial conflict at the Western Front and influenced the development of air doctrine. Towards the end of the First World War i.e. from May 1917 to May 1918, bombings had become a critical part of aerial conflicts as airplanes were used as dangerous weapons of war. By this time, nearly 27 day and night attacks were made by German Gotha bombers against English targets. These bombers dropped nearly 11,935kgs of bombs that killed 835 people and injured 1,972 (Kainikara, 2005). The bombings damaged properties worth £1,418,272. While the actual numbers of these attacks are trivial compared to casualties from Europe’s trench warfare, the attacks showed the devastating impacts of using airplane as a weapon of war. These attacks shaped the development of air power doctrine by demonstrating the capability of the airplane to transcend beyond fighting armies. Following these attacks, a dedicated Bomber wing was created within the Royal Flying Corps and mandated with the responsibility of strategic bombing missions. Moreover, the Royal Air Force was established as an autonomous separate service based on the recommendations of General Jan Smuts.

Strategic bombing that characterized air power towards the end of World War I can be attributed to theorists like Guilio Douhet, Viscount Hugh Trenchard, and William Mitchell. According to Biddle (2019), Guilio Douhet, commander of the Italian Army aviation section before the beginning of World War I, was the most assertive and vocal initial advocate of air power. Douhet’s vision and ideas regarding air power doctrine were influenced by the connection of airplanes and chemical warfare. Douhet postulated that wars could be rapidly won by implementing a strategic air power campaign against the enemy’s homeland. The theorist believed that the enemy’s civilian population was a key strategic target at a time when air forces were becoming the primary means of conducting war. Douhet’s theory postulates that an enemy’s civilian population was his Achilles heel and is an excellent target that could be attacked by military forces (Hall, 2011). For Douhet, the application of air power could singlehandedly be used as a tool of bringing a nation to its knees as part of strategic bombing.

Viscount Hugh Trenchard’s theory of war established four principles of air power include to achieve mastery of the air and to destroy an enemy’s production and collaboration through strategic bombing. In addition, the theory suggests that air power is crucial to maintain the battle without an enemy’s interference and to prevent the enemy from maintaining the battle. Through his theory, Trenchard introduced the concepts of “air control” or “air method” and argued that air power could be substituted for ground and naval forces as a cost-effective strategy with little to no friendly casualties (Kainikara, 2005). However, Trenchard differed from Douhet by arguing that strategic bombing campaigns should be carried out within the confines of international law to limit collateral damage.

For General William Mitchell, aerial advantage and superiority would be realized by uninterrupted attacks on an enemy’s air power on the ground and in aerial battle. Mitchell advocated for the independence of air forces as part of efforts to enhance the efficacy of air power. Mitchell’s call for the independence of air forces was one of the key tenets of his theory on air power (O’Neill, 2011). The other key tenets or concepts of his air power doctrine include strategic bombardment of vital population areas and industrial centers as well as defense against aircraft in order to enable strategic bombing.

The ideas presented by Douhet, Trenchard, and Mitchell dominate air power doctrine during World War I. These ideas were particularly evident towards the end of this war as strategic bombings and the establishment of independent air forces became common. Warring nations at the time adopted these strategies based on the ideas of these theorists and used them as the premise of gaining advantages over their enemy. As evident in the theorists’ major concepts, the development of air power doctrine towards the end of World War I involved the idea that air power could be used to bring an enemy to his knees. Therefore, the ultimate purpose of using air power during World War I was to attack the enemy until he is weakened as postulated in the progressive expansion principle of guerilla warfare developed by Mao (Ogan, 1994).

Interwar Period (1919 – 1939)

According to Kainikara (2005), the period between World War I and World War II played a critical role in the development of air power doctrine. During this period, air power was vital in all future wars despite the limited capabilities of the aircraft at the time. Strategic bombing using aircraft was largely adopted as a probable option for air forces despite the lack of comprehensive analysis/surveys regarding its ability to effectively neutralize adversaries. However, the Washington Conference in 1921-22 suggested that military goals should be the lawful targets of aerial bombardment since such attacks were considered to have terror effects on civilian populations when used outside military objectives or in violation of international law. Green (2010) notes that the interwar period was characterized by evolving doctrines of air power and its application. Air leaders during this period engaged in a struggle regarding the organization and control of airpower but made significant progress in developing others aspects of air doctrine.

The interwar era witnessed a growing interest in different forms of air defense and almost every industrialized nation became interested in air power and long-range bombardment (Biddle, 2019). While not all nations developed long-range bombardment, air power was integrated into military organizations of many states based on geopolitics and geography. Air theorist, William C. Sherman, influenced some organizations and ideas of air power in 1926. He introduced the idea of systematic bombardment on grounds that destroying some elements of the industry would cripple the whole since industry comprises different interconnected systems (Biddle, 2019). The theory postulates that an enemy could be weakened and unable to fight an industrial war when some of his key nodes in the war economy are identified and destroyed. Sherman’s theory influenced the development of an initial version of the United States industrial fabric theory of bombing in the 1930s.

Monama (2019) contends that protecting civilians in the event of war became a major concern during the interwar era following the development of air power and military aviation. In relation to Sherman’s theory, industrial areas and population centers became a primary target for aerial attacks in the event of a war. In Southern Africa, civil defense emerged after World War I showed that the civilian population was vulnerable to aerial bombardment by an enemy. As evident in air attacks against Britain and France by the German Gotha bombers and Zeppelin airships during World War I, civilian populations were vulnerable to air raids. Similar to the United States and Europe, African nations like South Africa developed civil defense programs or measures to protect civilian populations in the event of a war. In South Africa, 80,000 civilians volunteered for service between 1940 and 1945 as part of this strategy. Civilian protection programs and services ultimately shaped air power doctrine as the protection of civilian populations during air bombardment became critical.

World War II (1939 – 1945)

The Second World War was essentially the proving ground for air power doctrine and theories that emerged before, during, and after World War I (Francis, 2020). During World War II, the U.S. Army Air Forces battled a comparable enemy for air supremacy for the first time. Similar to the First World War, airpower played an important role in World War II as aerial conflict and strategic bombardment dominated the war. Francis (2020) notes that the initial implementation of air power theory or doctrine during World War II failed. Some assumptions underlying air power doctrine such as the quality of bombing accuracy, the insignificance of fighter-escort, and the ability to precisely select and identify targeted failed. As a result, the Allies lost air supremacy to Germany and were losing the war by early 1944.

World War II was characterized by strategic bombings and the destruction of key industrial areas based on the ideas of theorists like Douhet, Trenchard, Mitchell, and Sherman. Sherman’s theory was applied by the US Army Air Forces in the early stages of World War II. As Allies were losing aerial superiority to Germany, the U.S. adapted escort tactics and engaged Germany’s Luftwaffe offensively rather than defensively escorting bombers. Additionally, U.S. Army Air Forces realized that attacking some aspects of Germany’s industrial production would help cripple Luftwaffe force. This realization was based on Sherman’s theory of war that suggests that attacking some aspects of industry would help weaken an enemy (Biddle, 2019). The Americans achieved tremendous victory over Germans as Luftwaffe forces lost experienced aircrew and the German oil industry was decimated by the U.S. By 1945, the Germans lost men and material and could not keep up while the Americans continued with the buildup. This proved critical in the development of air power doctrine as a combination of strategic bombings and decimating some aspects of industrial production proved effective in gaining air superiority.