Existentialism the Foundations of Existentialism,

Existentialism The foundations of existentialism, though the philosophy is often seen as a modern and new philosophy, according to Flynn is truly connected to the ideas of much older philosophies, but mainly the "ethic of care" associated with Socrates. This ethic of care demonstrates that just believing or understanding a philosophy, even as the core of being is rather useless unless the philosophy elicits action in tune with it.

In accordance with Socrates, as he most profoundly expressed his beliefs during the period of his sentencing and execution, through Plato, the need to live what you believe is essential to self development. Such self development was unlikely to be achieved if one did not live by the premise of his or her philosophy.

Socrates made extensive attempts to stress to people that one must be true to one's self over all other but must also live within the confines of those institutions he or she believes in, in his case the Athenian state. In the end Socrates chose to allow his life to be taken by the state because he could not resolve the idea that he loved Athens and had historically believed in all of its laws and guidance.

To him, skirting the death penalty by acting outside of his personal ethics and the state's ruling would degrade Athens unnecessarily, despite the fact that he and most others believed that the condemnation and sentencing of Socrates was precipitated by unethical men at its head. To Socrates, the existence of these unethical men did not negate the ethic of the Athenian state or the idea that the state should eliminate anyone who it had deemed through legal means to be a threat to it.

Though Socrates and his allies did not truly believe he was a threat to Athens, the fact that the legal system had found against him demonstrated that an ethic would be broken if he did not follow through with the sentence. The thematic aspect of existentialism pointed out by Flynn, i.e. number 5, Ethical considerations are paramount.

Expresses the idea quite well as it is the responsibility of the existentialist "to examine the authenticity of our personal lives and of our society" (Flynn 8) We as individuals must understand our role in the ethics of our society and our own personal ethics even above our freedom and responsibility. The idea of the examined life is essential to not only understanding but living within the confines of our world.

As Socrates did, seeking to understand if the ethic that had tried him and convicted him of treason within his beloved Athens was valid and therefore the sentence and its result was valid. His own ethic of historical belief challenged his ability to challenge and deny his own death. Existentialism, then mirrors the Socratic ideal as it is asking those who believe in it to examine, just as Socrates did, the authenticity of their ethic and that of the society in which they live.

(Flynn 7-12) Question The first tenet of Husserl's phenomenological approach is historical and universal to phenomenology, and applies the idea of identity and being to thought. If an individual is thinking about or philosophizing about a phenomena that individual is thinking of an "other" even if his or her thoughts are of the self, he or she is seeing the self as if it were an outsider looking upon the phenomena of self or his or her actions.

Husserl's conception of phenomenology is associated with this concept, the concept of intentionality or a way of thinking that separates the self from phenomena so the phenomena can be viewed philosophically. His main goal was to demonstrate an ideology of being, again a historical quest which had given many philosophers pause for as long as philosophy has existed. Husserl contends that being is inherent, as if a phenomena is observable it is therefore in existence and can be viewed fundamentally as a phenomena worth thinking about.

He attempted to bridge the mind with external world, picking up in some ways where Descartes left off. Descartes believed that because he was capable of doubt and doubt is thought his existence in the real was ensured. Yet, this according to some left him trapped in his mind. Husserl, and many other existentialists believed that this bridge must be grounded, and that the real world must be paramount to thought.

According to Husserl, being conscious and capable of thought was a way of being in the world, and yet as is true with all existential philosophers actions and conceptions of the individual's place in the real world are essential to being. The conception of an image, or its description in our mind is different from a conception of an image that we are actually observing.

The essence of an object, or its remembered or conceived characteristics are different from the actual object, as it exists in the world and if one were to describe this object from memory he or she would give the object only the remembered or conceived characteristics of it.

While if he or she were to observe that same object and then describe it the object would be described in a way that reflected the real character of it, limited only by the ability of the observer to use language to describe it.

Husserl contended that the task of the existentialist in the phenomenological approach was to allow his or her description of the object to be as complete as possible through what he called 'eidetic reduction' and that this rigorous description could stand alone as a full conceivable essence of the object, that another could look at and understand and therefore the viewer will simply see for himself the essence of the object.

(Flynn 19-21) Detractors from this idea give the phenomenologist a weak score as he or she has no recourse when he is sharing a deductive description with another than to tell the other to simply look harder, as presumably the description is as clear as it can be. Flynn, points out that the deduction of Husserl is likely to be as an assertion of his mathematics background. While some existentialists argue that the human mind often does "get it" and even from variations in descriptions.

The argument waged against the use of phenomenological reduction is that it leaves the individual lacking practical application, as it is based in the theoretical. Merleau-Ponty was in fact one of the greatest rejecters of the Husserl reduction method as he said that being is not "essence" and therefore the object cannot fully be understood or reduced as such. To Merleau-Ponty the essence was in and of itself a secondary object and that the being is clearly more than his or her external observable essence.

In other more trite words, an object or item is more than the sum of its parts or in this case the description of the sum of its parts.

(Flynn 23) Heidegger discusses the definition of "being" and in fact detracts again, as Merleau-Ponty does from Husserl's reduction method in that he describes the idea of "being" as both universally understood, as we all understand what it means to "be happy" and indefinable, as the situation of "being" is mysterious and denotes the need for the essence of life, but most importantly as separate from a being.

The object itself or "genus" is not universal and does not define "being." In a sense one can see that the Heidegger discussion leads one toward the concept of the soul being separate from the body. If life is struck from an individual the body lies in a heap at the feet of his or her murderer and he body is said to be there but the individual is no longer in a stat of "being" unless he or she is doing so outside this visible realm.

(Krell 43-46) So again it would seem unlikely that Heidegger would agree with Husserl in his conception of reducibility. Yet, this is confused by the fact that Heidegger opens his work Being and Time with a historical interpretation of 'being" as it has changed over the course of philosophy.

Heidegger in fact agrees with Husserl to some degree by demonstrating a belief in the use of language as a tool of representation that becomes the expression or key to the definition of "being." (Flynn 107) Heidegger's argument then being that we are primarily "in the world" because we have practical concerns and that this is the area we should focus on to define, "being." (Flynn 23) Heidegger also stresses that what he calls "descriptive phenomenology" a term which seems similar to the "phenomenological reduction" method of Husserl, is the demonstration of the real, through language and exploration and that the use of the style of reasoning "concept of method" as he puts it that will in essence help answer the question of the difference and separation of "being" from beings.

(Krell 71-87) Question 3: Heidegger qualifies as an existentialist in that his goal though lofty, to define "being" characterizes the foundation of existentialism in all but one major point.

Realistically Heidegger was at least vaguely a theist, which is rather contrary to the existentialist mind set of humanism, but his point was still existential and in his early work, at least he attempted to clearly deduce a way of stressing the need for the individual to seek answers through thought and identity, it was only in his later work that he stressed the transcendence of practical thought.

To some degree as Flynn puts it Heidegger challenged the existentialists to stop losing the forest for the trees, by over emphasizing the concrete and practical examination over the whole of the greater "being." Yet, he also stresses that we are simply because we exist in the world with practical concerns of the every day and that to some degree this makes us universal to one another and therefore responsible for understanding self and society.

(Flynn 51-54) According to Heidegger the ontological pursuit is what separates Dasein (man) from other beings, as he is according to Heidegger the only known being who is and should be "concerned about its very Being." (Krell 53) This ontological pursuet of understanding the self and society is the core of his difference from other beings as well as the core of his universality with his fellow Dasein. (Krell 53-54) if the Dasein rejects this ontological pursuit he has rejected his society and has lost the ability to understand himself.

The lived experience of Dasein is therefore the translation of the ability of this Being to understand and experience his life through existential thought, with the inclusion of Heidegger's defined constitution of existential thought. (Flynn 54-55) For Heidegger the experience of ontological pursuit, as it applies to the lived experience of Dasein determines a culmination of an understanding of Being. Dasein is in fact according to Heidegger the primary object of interrogation and the source from which all access to understanding will be derived.

(Krell 57) "Dasein tends to understand its own Being in terms of that being which it is essentially, continually, and most closely related -- the "world." In Dasein itself and therewith in its own understanding of Being,...the way the world is understood is ontologically reflected back upon the interpretation of Dasein." In other words, Dasein can understand self only in terms of the immediate environment (or the perception of it) including but not limited to society and self, as this is the only alternative known to him.

There is no alternative universe for the being to discover and place himself within, in any real way of understanding that can define his Being. This statement in and of itself defines Heidegger as an existentialist, regardless of his theist leanings, as this would seem to negate the idea of "heaven" or paradise, unless such was to be found in this world. Though it could also be said that it is not contrary to theism because the ideal could be carried to an alternative environment i.e.

heaven when such is needed. The quest of the ontological discovery of self through interpretation of the immediate world is a demonstrative example of exactly what existentialism is, at its core. The quest to understand a concept like "Being" is therefore the quest with which universality is achieved. All individuals seek the answers of Being and therefore exhibit the need to do so to survive in the environment.

Heidegger stresses that human responsibility is such that these two questions that or self and Being will never be divorced from one another as this is what in a sense makes us human and existent. (Flynn 54-55) This would also seem to challenge the individuality of existentialism, and yet it is also clear that Heidegger does not attempt to place all individuals in the same "world" only in the same process of understanding and therefore the quest is not going to have the same outcome for everyone.

Within Heidegger and many of the other existential seekers of the definition of Being there is a sense that the quest of the definition of Being is as important, if not more important than the being or the Being. As definitions of terms show us, abstract concepts that have universal acceptance but lack universal application or understanding are likely to continue to guide the world, especially within the order of higher thought.

Concepts like, love, truth, honor, justice and of course Heidegger's Being to some degree defy clear definitions as they are both universal and yet in a practical sense completely transient to culture, place and time. It would seem that the goal of defining Being or the quest of it is both universal and individual and that a full understanding of self and society, no matter the environment is only partial at any given time.

The quest is bound to fail, as the term Being and the state of Being are as transient as any other abstract concepts, yet it is also clear that the quest is the goal, not an end and that seeking "your truth" is to some degree a success, no matter if it is determined to be "right," or "wrong" for another.

The determination of Being is therefore abstract enough that there will likely never be a common ground, other than the quest itself and that this is the core of the success of the quest. In a sense as long as the quest is waged, the success is inevitable.

Question 4.1 Heidegger's angst is twofold according to Flynn is that Dasein exhibits the tendency to forgo discovery of self at the expense of the mundane and as I will expound on later delving to deeply into thought (metaphysics, meaning, the existence of being...) negates the authentic by eliminating the humanity of living within the life we find ourselves in.

That we as individuals get completely caught up in the running of our daily lives and simply ape the actions of others, rather than exploring our own path toward understanding of self, society and our place in it. (Flynn 70) This angst is universal as many believe that those who are allotted the time, away from everyday concerns also lack the everyday experiences that cause question and challenges.

Heidegger makes clear that an individual must have both the experiences of the trials and tribulations of the lived experience of Dasein and the desire to apply these experiences to the quest of ontological discovery in order to fulfill their ultimate role in society and more importantly to develop the self.

So, the fact that Heidegger stresses the fact that we are first and foremost "in the world" also becomes the greatest downfall of the individual as being in the world can be assumed and universal it also has the tendency to reduce the time one has to discover the quest for Being and the answers to self-awareness that we need to discover.

(Flynn 23) Additionally, for Heidegger the idea was to find a balance as he also criticized many philosophers for concentrating to heavily on "metaphysical questions of essence and existence, cause and effect, subject and object, and theories of human nature." (Flynn 51) the Heidegger concept was then to take personal responsibility for finding the definitions of Being through the experiences of life, as it is lived, while assuming certain issues to be irrelevant or given and therefore not worth to much thought, existence itself is a good example.

Heidegger also laments the fact that the humanistic definition of man is one of an animal with the gift of speech; this to him is an affront to man, and an underestimation of his worth. He laments that humanism allows a mechanistic society where man is defined only by his utility. (Flynn 51) There are others who agree with Heidegger on this note and develop ideals about man that give him a higher order goal and plan.

The angst of belittling man to that of an animal who walks, talks and thinks is a simple mathematical assault on his position as the primary source and reason for the ontological quest. (Krell 57) if man is simply an animal then how is he or she different from and capable of reason and discovery and why then is he or she able to make decisions associated with self and society that are moral, good and true, or even immoral, bad and untruthful.

The finite lives of individuals designate that man must not be culled down to his or her lowest common denominator, the fact that he eats, breaths and lives within this world, as an animal but must also be given his due credit as a thinking living being that in and of him or herself constitutes, Being at it core and is capable of understanding such.

(Krell 62) Heidegger believes this human tendency to ignore the broader questions at the expense of the mundane and focus on fundamental questions that are answered simply by existence, disturbs the cycle of growth and creates a mass of incomplete men who before death seek no answers but when death is imminent seek more answers than they could ever find in the time they have left to themselves.

The idea of finality is clear, as Heidegger stresses that we as individuals have only a limited amount of time on this earth and if we squander this time it may not be retrievable to any degree and therefore we will live through eternity (he presumes we go on after death even though we live in time here) as infants forever seeking answers we should have gotten while we were living.

The idea of Being as existing in only in time to Heidegger is irrational as he expresses that the Being is capable of "atemporal" thought and "supratemporal" thought. The Being can conceive that there was a time before him or her that was different from his time only in that he or she was not in it and can conceive of the same with regard to the end of his or her time.

There will be a time after the Being exists that will again differ only in that he or she is not in it.

(Krell 62-65) Heidegger was not alone in his conception of the temporal as an essential aspect of binding for the individual as many after him defined time-based living similarly: Temporality, exstatic: Developed by Heidegger, adapted by Sarte and others, but anticipated by Kierkegaard, this refers to the threefold dimensions of lived time as distinct from quantitative clock time, namely the past as 'thrownness' or facticity, the future as 'projection' or ekstasis, and the present as 'fallenness' or immersion in the average everyday.

It elaborates the existentialist view that we are fundamentally time-bound but emphasizes the dimension of the future as possibility and, above all our most proper possibility, our being-unto-death.

(Flynn 135) It would be interesting also to note that these conceptions are theoretical and develop more with experience, as in children the time before is fascinating but relatively inconceivable and it is only after one has been on the quest to understand Being for a while that he or she can conceive that their ancestors had similar experiences to their own before them.

Additionally, children cannot conceive of a time after their existence as such is inconceivable, while adults who rightly begin to question their legacy can imagine what will come of their lives after they have been snuffed out. This is of course if they have the ability to overcome human tendency and seek the quest for Being when they are young, yet experienced enough to come to some conclusions about it.

In short temporal finitude is not entirely possible, according to Heidegger as he attests that the end of possibilities is likely the only end to which the Being actually becomes end, and yet he while living we assume comes to death as a.