It is commonly believed that wars break out as the result of an imbalance of power among nations. Blainey shows that this is not always the case. There have been numerous cases in history when war has broken out as the result of a perceived balance of power.

Another popular notion regarding the cause of wars is the idea that economic slumps are major factors that often lead to war. But there have been numerous examples of wars that have begun during an era when a nation's economy has begun to flourish, Blainey notes.

Then there is the idea that moderate treaties help to maintain peace and thus discourage nations from going to war. The problem with this theory is that a number of moderate treaties have also led to an increase in conflict between nations. Harsh treaties, it is commonly believed, often lead to an increase in war; but there have also been examples throughout history where harsh treaties have been quite effective in maintaining the peace.

Many people believed, at the time of Blainey's writing (1988), that the Cold War and the threat of nuclear war that it entailed effectively shattered all previous theories of war. Blainey was at least right in regards to his doubting that war would result thanks to the nuclear arms race. Rather, the long era of peace that has come about is thanks to the threat of nuclear weapons, which has prevented each side from making the first move. Blainey reaches the conclusion that, as in other eras, "peace will prevail if nations believe they lose more than they gain by resolving their disagreements through fighting" (295). This is one of Blainey's typically common sense conclusions reached at the end of a long list of numerous examples.

One of the main problems with Blainey's book is that it lacks a systematic, objective approach - much like the theories that he attacks throughout the Causes of War. He basically just wants to show how all previous theories of war are off the mark, and that the truth is a lot more blurry....

By choosing examples of wars throughout history that are meant to disprove certain theories, Blainey makes no effort to demonstrate how each example might apply to other cases. The lesson we learn in the end is that each war is so particular that only vague comparisons with other (and potentially future) wars can be posited.
While it is certainly an illuminating read in many respects, overall I was disappointed with Geoffrey Blainey's book. My problem had more to do with the style of writing than anything else. While I believe Blainey is correct in explaining that war cannot be traced back to any one particular theory, and that we must consider the myriad of factors that lead to war in each historical instance, Blainey's method is essentially a negative one. He refutes each and every one of the theories with a host of examples that begin to read like a list midway through each chapter. Rather than trying to tell an engaging story via narrative, Blainey gets caught up in reciting endless examples to support his refutations.

While I would probably recommend this book to people who are interested in studying the causes of war over the centuries, I would probably not advise people to read all the way through it. Instead, I would recommend that they skim through the contents of the book, while paying close attention to the conclusions that Blainey draws.

The feeling that Geoffrey Blainey's the Causes of War leaves the reader with at the end of the book is that there is no sure fire method for predicting when a war will break out. This may disappoint some readers, who come to this book looking for a clear answer. But reality is a lot more complicated than that - as Blainey's myriad examples prove. In this respect, we are given to understand why so many easy theories on the origins of war come about. Blainey's study is useful in that it shows how facile such theories tend to be.

Works Cited

Blainey, Geoffrey. The Causes of War. London: Macmillan Press, 1988.