History of the Relationship between the US and India Since WW2

U.S./India Security Ties After 11th September 2001

Executive Summary

This paper examines security ties between the US and India in the years after the 9/11 attacks on America. To provide context for those security ties and their development, it first looks at the relationship between India and the US in the years following WW2, when the Cold War caused some tension between the two states. It shows how rifts were caused by various political maneuverings on the part of the US and India, respectively.

Following the establishment of historical context on the matter, the paper turns to an examination of the ways in which US-India security ties have improved since 9/11. It gives several instances that show that these ties have developed and strengthened, particularly during the Bush and Obama Administrations. This section supports the thesis of this paper, which is that since 9/11 security ties between the US and India have improved and grown better.

The next part of the paper provides an antithesis to this argument. Here the suggestion is made that underneath cordial relations, tensions and suspicion remain which undermine any steps towards the true creation of strong security ties between the US and India. The reasons for this suggestion are given and explained. The main reasons for it are geopolitical and cultural.

Finally, the paper concludes with a synthesis of the two arguments—the thesis and the antithesis. The conclusion shows how both are true and how the ultimate perspective on security ties between the US and India must take into account both perspectives. Yet, in the end, with the help of good diplomatic efforts, it is posited that strong security ties can be maintained between the two countries.

Thesis

9/11 changed the working dynamic in security operations and policy in the relationship between the US and India. Prior to 9/11 the security ties between the US and India were relatively weak, largely in part due to the tensions surrounding the Cold War. After 9/11 and the October attack in Kashmir, security ties became stronger between the two nations (Ahmad). However, in recent years tensions have flared once more, as India also has relationships with Iran and Russia that the US has sought to discourage. In spite of recent security disagreements, it is the thesis of this paper that since 9/11, US-India security ties have been strong and beneficial to both states.

The improvement in US-India security ties came after the 9/11 attacks on America in 2001. A concerted effort on the part of nations around the world to counter terrorism got underway, and the improvement in US-India security relations was a prime aspect of the developments that took place. Part of this improvement had to do with the lack of good security ties between the two states in the past; another part had to do with the fact that India had also been attacked in Kashmir a month after 9/11. Considering that India and Pakistan, its neighbor to the northwest also had a long-standing feud, and that Osama Bin Laden, the alleged mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, was said to be somewhere hiding out in Pakistan, it made sense for the US and India to renew their relationship and improve their security ties (Javaid, Rashid).

Background

To provide some context, it is helpful to first examine the nature of the security relationship between the US and India prior to 9/11. Beginning in 1947, as the Cold War was getting under way, the US viewed India’s nuclear program with deep distrust (Council on Foreign Relations). India’s declaration of independence in 1947 established a partition between the Muslim-majority region of Pakistan and the Hindu-majority state of India. Tensions would flare between these two regions. With tensions also flaring between the US and its war-time ally the Soviet Union, India sought to pursue a policy of neutrality, spearheading the non-alignment movement into the 1950s (Council on Foreign Relations).

In spite of India’s policy of non-alignment, ties between the US and India began to develop through education and research programs in which the Indian Institutes of Technology were established and the Kanpur Indo-American Program flourished with American academics collaborating with India to provide higher education in technology (Council on Foreign Relations). This collaboration helped to move India and the US closer on scientific matters, even if diplomatically India remained situated within a non-alignment policy.

Tensions between China and India flared in 1962 over border disputes. The US sided with India. However, that friendship would deteriorate in 1971 with the India-Pakistan conflict. In that war, the US sided with Pakistan because the Nixon Administration was seeking a policy of rapprochement with China via Pakistan (Council on Foreign Relations). India viewed this as a betrayal of friendship and moved towards the Soviet Union in reaction, signing a twenty year treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviets, thus ending its policy of non-alignment in the Cold War (Council on Foreign Relations). The relationship between the US and India would be estranged from that point on, particularly when in 1974 India demonstrated a show of power with the detonation of its first nuclear weapon. However, President Carter did engage India and get the state to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, which allowed for inspections of nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (Council on Foreign Relations).

In 1984, the Bhopal tragedy, in which a gas leak from an American firm in India killed thousands in an Indian village, increased the strain in US-India relations, as the US resisted pressure to have the firm’s executives extradited to India (Morehouse, Subramaniam). In 1998, India would conduct underground nuclear tests, inviting sanctions from the US as a result (Council on Foreign Relations). Thus, it can be seen that prior to 9/11, the US and India were not on a common footing when it came to the establishment of security ties.

Improvement

On September 22, 2001, the G. W. Bush Administration lifted the Clinton-era sanctions on India. It was the first step in a show of renewed solidarity between the two nations and a gesture of friendship on the part of the US towards India. The US knew that it would need India’s assistance if it was going to partner with allies around the globe to combat terrorism and the support of terrorism (through money laundering, financing, and so on) (Pellon).

Still, the US and India had to find a way to work together and pursuit a common aim in security while simultaneously being able to pursue their own nationalist self-interests. For example, in 2005, the US wanted to sell fighter jets to Pakistan and India wanted cooperate with Iran in the field of energy. Because the US has a special relationship with Israel, and Israel views Iran as an enemy, the US routinely sanctions Iran and states who engage in business relationships with Iran. Because Pakistan and India continue to be at odds with one another, the sale of military hardware to Pakistan by the US is viewed unfavorably by India. Thus, both states have reason to be hesitant about working together in the field of security (Vijayalakshmi).

However, it is still seen as being in both states’ best interest to work together on security matters because of the fact that the world has become increasingly globalized, and without strong security ties the threat of terrorism cannot be addressed adequately. India has suffered from terror attacks as has the US since 9/11. The terror attack on the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel in Mumbai in 2008 was a tragedy in which three hundred Indians died and six Americans. This incident further heightened the need for enhanced security ties between the US and India. Indeed, Nobhojit Roy questioned whether the attacks on the Palace Hotel weren’t the start of a proxy war against the US.

The fact is that steps had been taken between 2005 and 2008 to strengthen security ties already between the US and India, and that irritated some of these two states’ enemies (Roy). In June of 2005, for instance, India and the US signed a new defense framework, the US-India Defense Relationship agreement, which established the parameters of maritime security cooperation and coordination. Months after that agreement, the two states conducted the largest joint naval exercise in the two states’ history (Council on Foreign Relations).

This demonstration of security amity was followed by Civil Nuclear Cooperation Initiative, also signed in 2005. This Initiative put an end to the moratorium on the nuclear energy trade with India. India agreed to divide its civil nuclear energy facilities from its military nuclear energy facilities and to submit as well to all International Atomic Energy Agency safety protocols (Council on Foreign Relations). By 2008, India was permitted to engage in the nuclear energy trade, with permission from the Nuclear Suppliers Group, thanks in no small part to the Bush Administration’s lobby of the Group for a waiver on India’s behalf. In 2008, the US-India Space Cooperation agreement was renewed as India conducted a moon landing using NASA-designed instruments (Council on Foreign Relations).

Under the Obama Administration, friendly overtures continued. In 2010, the first US-India Strategic Dialogue was held in Washington. Months later, President Obama supported India’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (Council on Foreign Relations). The following year, the US and India signed a memorandum of understanding regarding cooperation on cyber-security matters, fulfilling one of the promises made during the US-India Strategic Dialogue conducted the year prior (Council on Foreign Relations). As part of a “pivot to Asia” strategy, President Obama sent Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta to India further develop military and security ties between the two states (Pitlo III). Finally, in 2020, the US and India signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement Act, which allows for the sharing of intelligence between the two states, particularly with respect to geospatial data so as to help India obtain better accuracy in cruise missile firings and drone warfare (Council on Foreign Relations).

The character of these developments since 9/11 indicates that the US and India have strengthened their security ties and improved their relationship overall. Prior to 9/11 a Cold War mentality largely existed and frustrated security understandings between the two states. Post-9/11, when both states suffered terror attacks, a sense of renewed commitment to strengthening security around the globe developed and the two nations have since fostered a relationship that promotes heightened security efforts.

Antithesis

Under the Trump Administration, the US sought to adopt a stronger stance towards Russia, China and Iran. The US has viewed China’s Belt and Road Initiative as a threat to its own unipolar worldview. With India cooperating with China, Russia and India in different respects, the US took a defensive position: The Trump Administration threatened both India’s benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences and the H-1B Visa Program through which many Indians come to America for employment opportunities (Thakker). Furthermore, the Trump Administration demanded that India stop importing oil from Iran. Far from the friendliness shown during the Obama Administration, this was not a gesture of solidarity but rather a warning to India that it should not assist Iran by providing it an outlet for exports.

India also sought to purchase the S-400 surface-to-air missile defense system produced by Russia (Thakker). Given the Trump Administration’s use of sanctions against Russia and its position of antagonism towards Russia, it viewed this pledged purchase as contrary to the type of security aims that the US and India had been pursuing since 9/11. Essentially, the US has viewed any relationship with Russia or Iran as negative and has sought to curtail these.

Yet even before the Trump Administration came to power, there were problems along security relationship lines—and these related to the same age-old issues of trust and alliances. As Stephen Cohen and Dhruva Jaishankar point out, the US sought to institutionalize its security forces with India, by offering India the opportunity to become part of Combined Task Force 150 out of Djibouti—but India declined. India also decline the invitation to take part in peace-keeping operations in Iraq. At the same time, India offered to take on a greater role in the management of Afghanistan in the wake of the US-Taliban conflict—but the US did not accept this offer because it did not want to upset Afghanistan’s neighbor Pakistan (Cohen, Jaishankar). Thus, it can be seen that in spite of what passes for surface-level coordination and collaboration on security matters, tensions still exist and these tensions will always undermine security ties between the US and India, two nations that have disparate geopolitical aims and ambitions and therefore visions of what is in the best interests of their own states.

Furthermore, as Teresita Schaffer notes, India is still reluctant to be seen as aligned with US policy on the global stage. Since the end of WW2, India has sought to maintain neutrality (except for its move towards the Soviet Union in the 1970s in response to alienating US policy). Even as the US and India currently look to augment and bolster their security ties, the problem as India sees it is that it does not want to submit to the idea of America as the leader of the free world. India wants to be able to make its own decisions that are beneficial to domestic policy, and it cannot do that if the US asserts too many principles and doctrines linked to security policies (Schaffer). This discrepancy in terms of roles is what prevents the US and India from having strong security ties. Regardless of what passes as a good relationship on the surface, below the cordiality of photo-ops is deep suspicion caused by cultural differences, geopolitics, and differences in alliances.

Until the two nations can come to some understanding on the matter of Pakistan, Russia and Iran, it is unlikely that there will be any real improvement in their security ties. Pakistan is a long-standing thorn in India’s side and the US’s support of Pakistan does not make India sympathetic to US overtures in many ways. The US does not seem to appreciate India’s view of Pakistan or try to understand the cultural issues that make US support of Pakistan a problem for the Indian government. Likewise, the US does not like to see India engaging in relations with Russia or Iran, as both countries have been targets of American sanctions for years and have been seen at times as hostile to America’s special friend in the Middle East, Israel. Russia prevented the fall of Syria, which has long been a target of Israel. Iran continues to push for nuclear development, which Israel perceives as a threat. Thus, the US continues to hammer on both Russia and Iran, warning other nations not to do business with them—whether it is the construction of a gas pipeline through Europe or the purchasing of arms or fuel.

Synthesis

Certainly some steps have been made since 9/11 towards greater integration of security concerns between the US and India. Both have suffered tragic terror attacks on their own soil and both have interests in curbing terrorism in the Middle East. The US has had a strong presence in Iraq and Afghanistan since 2003; India is always watching the India-Pakistan border. There is a great deal of overlap between the two nations’ security concerns when it comes to maintaining peace in the Middle East. Thus, there is room for the two states to work together and find common cause to develop their security ties still further.

The defense framework signed under Bush and the bid to help India obtain a seat on the UN Security Council have both been seen as manifestations of a willingness on the side of both states to work together to achieve common security goals. The dialogue between the two states during the years of the Obama Administration further indicated a spirit of alliance on security matters. Even in 2020 there are signs that the security ties of the US and India continue to develop and strengthen, what with the agreement to share intelligence in the matter of security.

Nonetheless, it is true that relations under the surface are complex and contentious, the fact is that this characterizes virtually all diplomatic relations among nations around the world. Every state has its own ambitions and national self-interest. No two states align perfectly on every topic or viewpoint. This does not mean, however, that they cannot still work together to develop strong security ties, which can be seen as mutually beneficial because such ties can be a way to reduce the risk of money laundering (which is a way to support terrorism) or to reduce the risk of attack by enemy states.

Every relationship in diplomacy is complicated and it can seem at times impossible to achieve positive development because of nationalistic and cultural differences. For the US-India security relationship, Pakistan is a major sticking point for India, and Russia and Iran are major sticking points for the US. Yet, the two nations can still pursue and do still pursue security ties—because it is understood among mature national leaders that there is unlikely to be agreement on everything and a lack of total agreement does not mean that there cannot still be a good relationship and a strong tie on areas of common interest.

And the fact remains that the US and India do have a common interest in maintaining strong security ties. The US was attacked by terrorists from the Middle East in 2001. India was attacked by terrorists in Mumbai in 2008. Both countries have experienced loss and tragedy, and both understand the importance of beefing up security operations and forces so as to prevent the spread of terror cells and terroristic operations around the globe. It is not just a matter of domestic security; it is a matter of global security. Every nation around the world is interdependent upon the globalized order. One need only see how the recent blocking of the Suez Canal by the Evergreen ship caused back-ups and delays in shipping, frustrated supply lines, and cost hundreds of millions of dollars in lost time. Security has to be a top concern for states because without it, there can be no confidence in its own ability to stand for long.