How to Apply the IOPs to Counterterrorism

Somali terrorist group al-Shabaab has been wreaking havoc in the region since 2015. Al-Shabaab seriously undermines stability and security in the region, necessitating an intelligent and coordinated application of the instruments of power (IOPs). Recently, there has been some dissention among al-Shabaab leaders over their strategic alliances with al-Qaeda on the one hand, and their interest in helping Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), on the other (U.S. Department of State, 2015). In spite of factions within al-Shabaab, the group remains relatively strong and has been able to successfully establish safe havens throughout Somalia. Their safe havens have allowed the group to wage successful attacks both within Somalia and further abroad, raising red flags and encouraging intervention. For example, al-Shabaab is responsible for attacks on major public infrastructure targets like the Mogadishu International Airport, government agencies, and key hotels as well as the 2015 attack on a university in Kenya (U.S. Department of State, 2015). In response to the al-Shabaab attack on Garissa University College, the governments of Kenya and neighboring nations have stepped up their counterterrorism efforts through the increased use of multiple IOPs including diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments.
The United States government has historically pursued counterterrorism within an international relations framework of liberalism. Liberalism implies that the focus remains on forming strategic alliances to create an interdependent network to achieve common goals. Indeed, the liberal approach should continue to inform some elements of counterterrorism strategy in East Africa. However, changing the counterterrorism approach to constructivism could prove more effective in the long run. The most immediate goal with regards to al-Shabaab and other terrorist groups in East Africa would be to infiltrate and eliminate safe havens, a goal that has been pursued by the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the intelligence community (Williams-Bridgers, 2011). However, as Smith (2007) points out, about fifty times as much money is spent on the military IOP versus on diplomacy. The past several decades have seen a shift in American foreign policy and counterterrorism strategy away from diplomacy as an IOP. Neglecting the importance of diplomacy as an instrument of power may be hampering efforts to wipe out terrorist groups in East Africa swiftly and decisively. Diplomacy, the instrument of power used by the Department of State, needs to be wielded more strategically in the region to enable the construction of new alliances, not just with governments but with local leaders.
Diplomacy alone is not enough, though, especially as the Department of State pursues a potentially problematic and aggressive policy of “transformational diplomacy,” (Smith, 2007, p. 8). Transformational diplomacy is based on the assumption that the nation-state is the primary political domain, but in East Africa, the domains of community leadership and religious and/or educational institutions may be more important for diplomatic relations. State-building, in the neo-liberal worldview, needs to be set aside in favor of a constructivist policy that understands the value of another crucial instrument of power: information. When information and diplomacy are fused, the potential for counterterrorism success grows. Diplomacy and information share in common an interest in creating and maintaining structures and institutions, including the transformation of core value systems, ethics, and worldviews. Both diplomacy and information are IOPs focusing on long-range goals and not immediate action as with the military IOP. The means by which to fuse the goals of information and diplomacy in East Africa include forming alliances between and among educational institutions, religious institutions, the private sector, and the public sector. New media and social media also play a critical role, especially in the use of information as an IOP.
The line between informational diplomacy and propaganda is blurry, though, if propaganda is defined as “any form of communication in support of national objectives designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly,” (Murphy, 2008). The implication with propaganda is that it is manipulative or false, and with counterterrorism efforts it is crucial to use diplomatic strategies to prevent propaganda from taking over the information IOP. Methods by which the diplomatic corps can implement information or communications strategies include partnering with local organizations, the private sector, and non-profit or non-governmental organizations, and enabling the organic emergence of information from within the targeted areas. Instead of imposing a set of worldviews, beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions on the people in Somali or Kenyan villages, the goal would be to survey and work directly with the people directly. Empowering individuals in this way shifts American counterterrorism policy from its neo-liberal stance towards a more constructivist approach. Strategic communications need to move beyond its current and limited role as “to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advance national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information,” towards a more nuanced approach that is akin to public diplomacy (Murphy, 2008, p. 5). Public diplomacy fuses informational and diplomatic IOPs by applying a diversity perspective. A diversity perspective seeks understanding, collaboration, and discursive methods of solving problems through the use of information, communication, and education.
Just as diplomatic and informational IOPs can fuse their resources and pursue strategic objectives in similar ways, the economic and military IOPs can also wield power in East Africa for the purposes of counterterrorism. The military IOP is often mistakenly believed to be “the most important instrument of power available to a nation-state,” (Troxell, 2004, p. 187). As important as the military IOP is, it needs to be kept in check by the other IOPs if it is to be effective or intelligent. Use of brute force can easily achieve a temporary objective while losing sight of the long term battles being waged against groups like al-Shabaab. Because of the trans-national and para-military nature of terrorism itself, the United States and its allies need to move away from the liberal lauding of military might, and start making the military almost subservient to, or at least on part with, the other IOPs. For example, military power can be used to enforce paradigms, policies, and programs that have been devised through the informational, diplomatic, and economic IOPs.
As indispensible and inevitable military IOPs are, countering al-Shabaab, al Qaeda, and similar terrorist groups in East Africa cannot be done with use of force alone. The economic IOP provides a strategic means to empower individuals, communities, and organizations that can help fight terrorist organizations through nonviolent means. The liberal approach uses the economic IOP coercively, such as through sanctions or restricting access to strategic oil reserves (Chun, 2009). A constructivist approach would instead entail working in tandem with the private sector and NGOs to minimize the possibility that terrorist groups take root or spread. It is critical to eliminate the terrorist groups’ access to funding, and it is also important to create the economic conditions whereby counterterrorist goals can be reached more readily.
Interagency alliances need to become part of the counterterrorist strategy in East Africa. A constructivist approach enables the wielding of all IOPs in tandem, pursuing mutually beneficial goals intelligently and also sensitive to cultural diversity. Forming alliances with strategic partners on the ground, from community leaders to religious institutions, from the private sector to NGOs, will remain a core component of counterterrorist strategy in East Africa.



References

Chun, C.K.S. (2009). Economics: A key element of national power. Retrieved online: http://marshallcenterciss.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16378coll5/id/486
Marcella, G. (n.d.). National security and the interagency process. Retrieved online: http://www.bard.edu/civicengagement/usfp/docs/marcella.pdf
Murphy, D.M. (2008). Strategic communication: Wielding the information instrument of power. Retrieved online: http://marshallcenterciss.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p16378coll5/id/337
Smith, A.K. (2007). Turning on the dime: Diplomacy’s role in national security. Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). Retrieved online: https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/PUB801.pdf
Troxell, J.F. (2004). Military power and the use of force. Retrieved online: http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/army-usawc/strategy2004/14troxell.pdf
U.S. Department of State (2015). Country Reports: Africa overview. Retrieved online: https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2015/257514.htm
Williams-Bridgers, J.L. (2011). Combatting terrorism. United States Government Accountability Office. Retrieved online: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11713t.pdf