Humanism and Enlightenment Theory on Crime

Scholarly Review of An Essay on Crimes and Punishments by Cesare Beccaria (1764)

Cesare Beccaria’s An Essay on Crimes and Punishments (1764) is one of the most influential works in the history of criminology and legal reform. This seminal text was written during the Enlightenment, and is lauded for paving the way for contemporary criminal justice systems, and in particular for its opposition to the death penalty and the use of torture. The work calls for a justice system grounded in the humane treatment of offenders. Beccaria’s seemingly revolutionary ideas (at the time) still resonate among scholars and theorists in the field and fill modern discussions surrounding crime and punishment.

Historical Context and Significance

The 18th century still held to traditions in criminal justice which relied heavily on punitive measures such as torture and the death penalty. Beccaria promoted Enlightenment principles that emphasized humanism and reason not based on religious principles but rather on humanistic ideals. Thus, he challenged the norms of the old-world culture of Europe. An Essay on Crimes and Punishments quickly gained recognition and has been viewed as a seminal text for legal theorists and reformers throughout Europe. This was especially true for figures like Voltaire, who provided commentary on the text. The work was just as important for later criminological theories and reformers who have called for overhaul of legal systems so that they are more equitable, transparent, and humane.

The preface of the book emphasizes the need for reducing penal laws to a standard of Enlightenment-based reason. This introduces the reader to Beccaria's core argument: that penal systems should be crafted not to satisfy the so-called vengeful instincts of old-world society but to maximize social welfare through Enlightenment thought and more humanistic punishment.

Arguments and Themes

Opposition to Torture and the Death Penalty

Beccaria (1764) is clearly opposed to the methods of punishment practiced prior to the Enlightenment era. For example, he describes how under Louis IX, profaners would have their tongues pierced with a hot rod. He decries this as excessive arguing that the offender “deserved chastisement, but did he deserve such excruciating torture, and the most horrible death?” (p. 90). In fact, Beccaria often excuses such offenses as being the unruly excesses of youth—meaningless, really, and hardly justifying torture such as the removal of one’s upper lip. What Beccaria is doing, however, is judging a different era and time and culture according to the standards of Enlightenment philosophy. What he views as a minor offense, would have been viewed much differently during the time of St. Louis.

Yet there is an underlying purpose to Beccaria’s method: essentially, his argument is this: if the Enlightened citizens of the 18th century are going to abandon the religious beliefs and practices of the prior Age, they should also abandon the punishments and practices of that Age. It would be argued, then, from the perspective of one such as St. Louis that Beccaria’s staunch opposition to the use of torture and the death penalty is one of the most radical elements of his essay. For St. Louis, profanity and blasphemy were not only sins against God but also crimes against the order and stability of a Christian society. However, that Christianity society had weakened to such a point that by the 18th century its entire reason for being seemed in peril (and in fact would be violently attacked during the French Revolution at the end of that century) (Delia, 2021). To men like Voltaire and Beccaria, the old-world hierarchies were no longer relevant (Quastana, 2023). Beccaria himself with his treatise on crimes and punishment is paving the way for this overthrow of the old-world order by, first, excusing the sin/crime as negligible (the result of frivolous youthful passion), and second, by likening torture to a practice that is both barbaric and counterproductive. He asserts plainly that it undermines the very objective of justice and even of the Christian concept of mercy: thus, Beccaria subtly critiques Christian society by suggesting it is hypocritical for punishing sin/crime so severely; he remarks, rather, that one should “imitate God in your proceedings against [the offender]. If he be penitent, God forgives him. Impose a penance, and let him be pardoned” (p. 90).

Regarding the death penalty, Beccaria’s arguments are philosophical and pragmatic, couched in the cause for humanity and Enlightenment thought. He asserts that the state does not possess the moral authority to take a life, given that life is an inalienable right. Moreover, he argues that capital punishment is ineffective as a deterrent, suggesting that it only serves to brutalize society by endorsing violence at the highest level of government: “the punishment of death has never prevented determined men from injuring society” (p. 51). Beccaria states elsewhere that “the punishment of death is not authorised by any right; for I have demonstrated that no such right exists. It is therefore a war of a whole nation against a citizen, whose destruction they consider as necessary or useful to the general good” (Beccaria, p. 51). His opposition to both torture and the death penalty basically laid the groundwork for modern movements against inhumane treatment in the penal system.

Proportionality and Justness of Punishment

I find that one of Beccaria’s most important contributions to legal theory is his insistence on proportionality between crimes and punishments. He argues that for punishment to be effective and just, it must be proportional to the crime committed. Excessive punishments violate the principle of justice and fail to serve their intended purpose of deterrence. Beccaria suggests that overly harsh punishments are arbitrary and can cause more social harm by way of resentment and fear rather than compliance with the law. He constantly describes the death penalty, for example, as hypocritical: “Is it not absurd, that the laws, which detect and punish homicide, should, in order to prevent murder, publicly commit murder themselves?” (Beccaria, p. 53). He likens capital punishment to human sacrifice (p. 54) and argues that “the punishment of a crime cannot be just, (that is, necessary), if the laws have not endeavoured to prevent that crime by the best means which times and circumstances would allow” (p. 61). In other words, to prevent crime, the state must actually strive to address the social determinants of crime—the factors that lead people to commit offenses in the first place. If it does not do this, it itself has no right to punish. This is why Freilich (2015) views Beccaria as an important thinker in understanding situational crime and the factors that lead to the breeding of criminal behavior.

The relevance of Beccaria’s ideas is also seen in the way modern criminal justice systems place importance on rehabilitation over retribution. Restorative justice, for instance, falls in line with Beccaria’s call for “penance” rather than severe punishment (p. 90). Beccaria believed that the goal of criminal justice should be to prevent further crimes by reforming the offender, rather than simply a means of punitive treatment. His call for a justice system based on reason and respect for human dignity is one that echoes the call for restorative justice today (Fosse, 2020). Many contemporary systems focus on rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders and argue that punitive measures alone are not enough to address the root causes of crime. Programs aimed at offender rehabilitation, restorative justice practices, and efforts to reduce recidivism are all reflective of Beccaria’s views (Bez, 2018).

Beccaria’s influence also feeds into modern human rights law, for example, in the development of legal protections for people within the justice system. His work has been important in shaping the modern concept of legal rights, such as the rights of accused, the right to a fair trial, protection from cruel punishments, and the assurance of due process (Bez, 2018). These principles are enshrined in numerous national constitutions and international legal frameworks, such as the European Convention on Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Crime Prevention over Retribution

Another important theme in An Essay on Crimes and Punishments is Beccaria’s belief that the primary goal of a criminal justice system should be the prevention of crime rather than retribution: “The first laws, and the first magistrates, owed their existence to the necessity of preventing the disorders, which the natural despotism of individuals would unavoidably produce. This was the object of the establishment of society” (Beccharia, p. 22). He argues that a well-organized society should focus its efforts on preventing crimes from occurring in the first place. The idea that “it is better to prevent crimes than to punish them” reflects Beccaria’s overall perspective on criminal justice (p. 74). A punitive system is counter-intuitive; a fair society should seek to prevent criminal behavior in the first place. Thus, Beccharia emphasizes the importance of education: “the most certain method of preventing crimes, is to perfect the system of education” (p. 79). He also advocates the creation of laws that are clear and known to all citizens, and the necessity of addressing the root causes of criminal behavior, such as poverty and lack of education—as well as the idea of clemency, or pardoning offenders outright (p. 80).

The idea that prevention is superior to punishment is revisited again and again throughout his work. Beccaria clearly advocates for reforms that would reduce the incidence of crime by addressing the factors that lead individuals to commit offenses. This preventative approach is widely accepted in contemporary criminal justice systems, where rehabilitation and restorative justice are prioritized alongside deterrence.

Criticisms and Limitations

While Beccaria’s work was revolutionary, it is not without its limitations. One criticism of Beccaria's work is his opposition to the death penalty due to the fact that Beccaria offers little in the way of alternative punishment for the most heinous crimes (Delia, 2021). He categorically opposes capital punishment, writing that it is neither an effective deterrent nor a just punishment, but he leaves unanswered the question of how to adequately respond to crimes that are considered exceptionally egregious. Beccaria’s failure to propose serious alternatives for such extreme cases leaves a gap in his framework. Without addressing what should replace the death penalty in such cases, Beccaria’s arguments can seem incomplete.

Additionally, Beccaria’s emphasis on proportionality and prevention could also be viewed as simplistic. His call for punishments to be proportional to the crime was revolutionary in a sense, but there is little in the way of complexity. For example, proportionality may work well in cases of theft or property crimes, but it becomes less clear how it would work when dealing with serious crimes of passion or mental illness.

Modern criminology advances from Beccaria’s focus on deterrence and proportional punishment and applies insights from psychology and sociology to better understand the underlying causes of crime. Beccaria’s work can be seen as foundational in the sense that it opens the door to future inquiries, but it itself did not go too deeply into the structural factors that influence crime (Bez, 2018).

Perhaps one of the most important critiques of Beccaria’s work is that it reflects the limitations of Enlightenment thought, particularly its emphasis on rationality and universality. Beccaria, like many Enlightenment thinkers, believed that reason and logic could serve as the foundation for a just society, and he approached the criminal justice system with this same faith in human rationality. However, the Enlightenment reliance on reason did not end up too well for people, for instance, in Paris during the Reign of Terror.

Beccaria hints at a need to consider individual factors, but what he is mainly interested in is overthrowing the old-world penal system. Today, legal scholars tend to affirm the importance of considering individual circumstances—such as socio-economic status and mental health—when determining appropriate punishments. In contrast, Beccaria tends to see all people as rational actors (even if they get a little out of hand). It is not entirely in line with the reality of crime, and the limitations of rational choice theory show as much. Beccaria lauds the Roman system of public criminal prosecutions and condemns his society’s private hearings. But how practical is the Roman system in the modern era?

There is some idealism in Beccaria’s approach, but there is also a desire to return to a kind of pre-Christian courtroom, one that he finds magnanimously represented in ancient Rome (p. 116). But is such a return really possible? There is little attempt on the part of Beccaria to understand the reason for the punitive measures, for instance, of Louis IX. His arguments are couched in an obvious disregard for the beliefs and values of that day and age.

Influence on Modern Legal Systems